University of Alberta

The Changing Chinese Dragon: Implications for (Cross-) Cultural Psychology in a Globalized World

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of therequirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Psychology

Fall 2013
Edmonton, Alberta

Library and Archives Canada

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395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
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Direction du Patrimoine de l'édition

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence
ISBN: 978-0-499-27792-3

Our file Notre référence
ISBN: 978-0-499-27792-3

DEDICATION

To my grandma, who did not live to see the closing of this chapter in my life.

ABSTRACT

Applying a hybridization framework that conceptualizes culture as a dynamic and open system, the overall objective of this dissertation is to illuminate some psychological consequences of sociocultural change in contemporary China. Although (cross-) cultural psychology tends to portray China as an archetype of collectivistic cultures, there is some evidence for a cultural shift in contemporary China in a more individualistic direction propelled by socioeconomic transition and intercultural contact, changes commonly associated with globalization processes in academic discourse. Seven studies were conducted to test this general premise. Study 1a, Study1b, and Study 2 were informed by the intersubjective approach to culture (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010) and measured intersubjective culture in terms of basic values (Schwartz, 1992). Chinese students' perception of contemporary Chinese values corresponded with the direction of sociocultural change in China. Contemporary Chinese values were perceived to shift away from traditional Chinese values, yet remain distinct from Western values. Study 3a and 3b examined change in personal values. Chinese students' personal values were consistently more congruent with perceived Western and contemporary Chinese values than perceived traditional Chinese values (Study 3a). Study 3b cast a wider net in the three-wave (1994-2007) Chinese datasets from the World Values Survey and found both cultural stability and cultural change in personal values and other empirically validated indicators of individualism-collectivism. Moreover, Study 4a and 4b investigated the effect of sociocultural change on the tendency to make self-enhancing social

comparisons (Alicke & Govorun, 2005), which is typically seen in individualistic cultures. Employing experimental priming and survey methods and two different operationalizations, the last two studies provided evidence for the rising self-enhancement tendency in contemporary China. Finally, comparisons with Chinese Canadians (Study 2 and Study 4b) provided additional support that the demonstrated psychological consequenceswere unique to China. Implications of these findings for existing approaches to culture and cultural change were discussed.

Keywords: sociocultural change, globalization, Chinese culture, values, self-enhancement, cultural differences, intersubjective culture

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge my advisor, Kim Noels, for the decision to take on someone who was a disciplinary outsider and the autonomy-supportive mentorship from then on. I am indebted to her invaluable help and guidance for sharpening the research into the end product presented here. Thank you for setting an example of how to do interdisciplinary work.Thanks are also due to my committee members, Jeff Schimel and Taka Masuda, and my external examiners, Reza Hasmath and Chi-yue Chiu.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Steve Kulich for launching me on the academic path, for his continued encouragement, and for his passion as a people developer. Many thanks also go to Yanjun Guan and Wenhua Yan, without whom some of the data collection would not have been possible.

Other unsung heroes include past and present members of the Intercultural Communication lab, the Culture and Cognition lab, and the Terror Management lab, many of whom contributed to the completion of this project at its various stages. I enjoyed your company, collegial or otherwise!

I also acknowledge the help from the China Institute at the University of Alberta which graciously funded some of the studies reported here.

Finally, to Linda, for being a superwoman in my life anda shining example of academic excellence!

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CHAPTER 1:

General Introduction

Globalization is a major prism in which the human condition is refracted nowadays. According to one account (Guillén, 2001), the importance of globalization in academic discourse can be seen in the exponential increase in the scholarly work on globalization since the 1980s, especially in economics, sociology, and political science. Psychologists, by and large, have been slow to react. It is only recently that they were urged to advance a psychological understanding of globalization (Arnett, 2002; Chiu & Cheng, 2007). On the one hand, a psychological examination of globalization requires exploring previously unchartered territory (Marsella, 2012). On the other hand, existing psychological research can be expanded through a global lens. One particular endeavour in this connection is the interest in sociocultural influences on psychology and social behaviour rekindled by(cross-) cultural psychologists(Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Kitayama & Cohen, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). One of the field's most significant contributions lies inconsolidating the classic distinction between individualism and collectivism by virtue ofdemonstrating how culture, psychology, and behaviour are intimately intertwined. However, (cross-) cultural psychologists have generally skirtedthe topic of globalization in their treatment of cultureand cultural variations.In this dissertation, I aim to extend (cross-) cultural psychology to understanding cultural change in contemporary China as the country grapples withglobalization.

What is Globalization?

As attested to by the proliferation of globalization literatures, globalization is one of the most contested topics in the social sciences. Globalization often

refers to the integration of nation-states into an emerging global system throughthe continuous flow of goods, capital, technology, ideas, and people. However, questions such as which aspects of globalization to focus onand how to study these aspects are more often than not a matter of disciplinary tradition or preference and thus conclusions drawn in one discipline invite resistance in another. The lingering controversies surrounding globalization can be understood, quiteironically, by one emerging consensus --- globalization is multi-dimensional and multi-layered, and its impacts on individuals, institutions, and societiesare complex, uneven, divergent, and contradictory (Giddens, 1991; Guillén, 2001; Kellner, 2002;Nederveen Pieterse, 2009). In light of the confusion over globalization, a few points need to be clarified to contextualize globalization in China for the purpose of this dissertation.

First, although different disciplines have their own timetable of when globalization arose, there is some agreement that, if understood as a historical process of worldwide interconnectedness, globalization dates back to the dawning of human civilizations (Nederveen Pieterse, 2009). In other words, even if the word is new, the process is not(Marsella, 2012). Thus, the zeitgeist of today's world can be more appropriatelydescribed as "accelerated globalization" (Nederveen Pieterse, 2009, p. 16; also see, Hermans & Kempen, 1998).

Second,globalization has a cultural dimension and, as will be described in detail below, the relations between local cultures and globalization are complicated and dialectical. There is no simple formula for understanding cultural change in the globalized world.

Third, there is no consensus over whether or how globalization is different from another widely discussed process of modernization (Guillén, 2001). To be sure, modernization and globalization are not perceived to be identical by lay people (D. Yang et al., 2011). Modernization conventionally refers to societal change in modes of production, transitioning from a rural and agrarian condition to an urban and industrial condition. In contrast, globalization highlights global connectivity enabled by the dismantling of national obstacles to the flow of commodities, technologies, cultural forms, and etc. One intuitive way to distinguish globalization from modernization may be that the latter refers to internal change such as urbanization and industrialization, while the former indicates external change due to foreign or transnational influence.

This dissertation does not adopt such simplistic demarcation. Although the first wave of modernization, which originated in 17th-century Western Europe, can be described as change from within, modernization movement that has swept across the rest of the world since the first wave should be more meaningfully understood to be exogenous modernization (K. S. Yang, 1998). In fact, one way in which globalization is intertwined with modernization is to see the former as the expanding or globalizing of modernization, especially the market-based economy that originated in Western Europe (Kashima et al., 2011), across the world. Thus, to the non-Western world, modernization is experienced as a collective reaction to the early modernized countries that globalized themodernization movementthrough trade, war, and colonization. Particularly in the Chinese context, both globalization and modernization are perceived to be

exogenous change as globalization is thought of as a continuation of the modernization project (Yan, 2002). Because mainland Chinese people experienced globalization around the same time as the nation embarked on its modernization path with the implementation of the "open-door" policy, modernization and globalization are closely associated with each other in the Chinese mind (D. Yang et al., 2011). For this reason, it is not my intention to privilege the influence of globalization in the narrow sense of direct external pressures over the influence of modernization in the commonsense of nation building and economic development. Given my focus on the cultural psychological consequences of change in China rather than the complex historical antecedents of such change, I use globalization as shorthand to refer to the broad context in which both endogenous and exogenous changes have taken place in China.

Although no single definition is likely to capture the multi-faceted nature of globalization, to provide a conceptual guidepost for my research, I use sociologist Roland Robertson's (1992, p. 8) definition of globalization as "[both] the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole". It is a useful definition for two main reasons. First, it emphasizes the awareness of global interconnectedness, which lends itself to a psychological understanding of globalization. Second, it highlights the opening up of local cultures into a more multicultural space over its course of evolution, which is the focal theme of my dissertation.

The Cultural Dimensions of Globalization

Once the study of globalization broadened beyond the economic dimension and was linked with the diversity of cultural life around the world, its cultural dynamics received increasing scholarly attention. Sociology and anthropology are at the forefront of theorizing about culture and globalization. The big question has been globalization's cultural consequences. Globalization is foregrounded in many contemporary writings about cultural forms. Anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1996) distinguished between a variety of global cultural landscapes (i.e., ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes). These fluid landscapes interact unevenly with local cultures and move across national boundaries, which in turn create transnational contact zones. As another example, sociologist Peter L. Berger (1997) identified four facets of cultural globalization (business elite, faculty club, popular culture, and social movements) that are diffused globally in variegated forms.

One fundamental question concerning the cultural dimensions of globalization isthe fate of cultural difference. Although difference is often the point of departure in (cross-) cultural psychology and there is a growing body of work on the origin of cultural differences (Chiao& Blizinsky, 2010; Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008; Kitayama, Conway, Pietromonaco, Park,& Plaut, 2010),what becomes of cultural diversity under the influence of globalization is not typically investigated. To fill in this conceptual gap in the study of sociocultural change in China,I follow the work of anthropologist Nederveen Pieterse (2009) and outline three main perspectives onglobalization and cultural diversity (also see, Holton, 2000). As I will show below, wheneverthe

question of change is considered in (cross-) cultural research, the arguments tend to be constructed from one perspective only.

The first two theses have been around for a fairly long time and make opposing predictions regarding the outcome of cultural diversity. The cultural homogenization thesis emphasizes the hegemony of globalization and predicts eventual uniformity of cultures. In sharp contrast to this thesis is the cultural distinctiveness thesis, which portrays cultural differences as deep-seated and long-lasting to the point of being immutable.

The homogenization perspective in the social sciences can be traced back at least to the writings of Max Weber (1904/1992), who lamented that the basics of social life since the dawn of Western European capitalism would be dominated by instrumental rationality and no culture would escape from such "iron cage". Ritzer (1993) expanded on the Weberian rationalization and coined the term "McDonaldization" to emphasize the role of Western corporations in spreading modes of capitalist relations such as calculability, predictability, and cost-benefit thinking to the rest of the world. Nederveen Pieterse (2009) adopted McDonaldization to refer to the cultural perspective that equates globalization with Westernizationand cultural convergence of lifestyles, social relations, and values. This version of economic determinism led to the rise of modernization theory in the 1960s (see Tipps, 1973) that culminated in measuring "the modernization of man [sic]" with psychological instruments (Inkeles, 1975; Inkeles & Smith, 1974).In many ways, modernized societies were understood to ultimately converge towards a stage resembling individualism (Yang,

1988).Although the contribution of societal modernization to individualism has been demonstrated consistently both across and within societies (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Kohn, 2010),(near) uniformityproves to be an overstatement (e.g., Mills et al., 2008). A well-known case against it is the phenomenon of *glocalization* (Robertson, 1995), where multinational corporations adapt their products to suit the specific needs of local markets. Ironically, research on McDonald's in non-Western countries revealed quite the opposite of the McDonaldization prophecy: Instead of uniformity, differences were documented, ranging frommenu items to the social aspects of dining experience (Watson, 1997).Anotherserious challenge to the homogenization thesis comes from no other than (cross-) cultural psychology itself.Much of its research has focused on contrasting North America witheconomically developed countries with distinctively non-Western cultural heritage such as Japan and has discovered important cultural differences.

The counterpoint to homogenization is cultural resilience. Central to this thesis is the notion that globalization is not so much a transformative force as what is eventually to be absorbed by local cultures. Exemplified by Samuel Huntington's (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, this perspective essentially reverses the logic of cultural homogenization. Instead of world cultures being homogenized by modernization, it is modernization that is being indigenized. To this end, Huntington famously argued that modernization in the rest of the world is possible without Westernization -- it is Western cultural heritage that set the West on its path of modernization, not the other way around. His version of cultural triumphalism can be best summarized in

the claim that "the West was the West long before it was modern" (p. 69). Unlike the homogenization thesis, Huntington'sview of globalization reinforcing distinctive cultural clusters whose crystallization long predated global forces resonates well with (cross-) cultural psychology that accords cultural variation a central role.Even a cursory review of the cross-cultural literature leaves one with the impression that the cultural distinctiveness perspectiveis the primary source of arguments for the continued existence of stable cultural differences in today's world. However, according to Nederveen Pieterse (2009), this perspective is not without its problems either. He pointed out that with an over-zealous emphasis on difference come the questionable notions of spatial boundedness and temporal stability of cultures and mutual incommensurability between cultural zones. Pushed to the extreme, this perspective conjures up the future world imagery of "a mosaic of immutably different cultures"(Nederveen Pieterse, 2009, p. 57)such that cultural zones such as the East and the West become reifications that should not be mixed, with boundaries that should not be crossed. In this "never the twain shall meet" framework, cultural change is either impossible or nothing more than surface structures overlaid on top of deep cultural design.

Nederveen Pieterse (2009) advocateda third perspective on globalization and cultural diversity. Without assigning complete dominance to either cultural homogenization or cultural polarization, he views globalization as a historical process of cultural mixing or hybridization.According to him, hybridity theory originated in cultural and postcolonial studies of hybrid cultural forms such as creolizationas the mixture of African and European cultures, syncretism as the

fusion of religious forms, and the migration and diaspora experience. He argues that cultural hybridization is the continuous balancing of the countervailing forces to unite and antagonize cultures and has been a perennial process, even if people are not necessarily aware of it. Although any category-crossing perspective runs the risk of sacrificing precision and creating confusion, several arguments of the hybridization perspective lend itself to being a more viable framework to understand globalization and cultural change (Nederveen Pieterse, 2009, pp. 54-89). First, it draws attention to a different conceptualization of culture than the one more compatible with the cultural distinctiveness perspective (see the section below). Second, by locating hegemony in neither polar extremes (global modernization vs. local cultures), it permits a continuum of variegated hybrid forms. Some cultures are more or less hybrid than others. The suggestion that cultural hybridization is not a uniform phenomenon itself behooves cultural researchers to develop an in-depth understanding of the particular form or extent of change and refrain from over-generalizing their findings. Third, what is being mixed can be either surface or deep-seated elements of a culture. Thus, it seems imprudent to assume a priori that cultural mixing is nothing butephemeral and touches only upon the tip of the cultural iceberg such as food, fashion, entertainment, consuming behaviour and so forth. Last, hybridization does not denote the cultural or individual license to be free of any constraints and shape itself in any possible ways. In fact, hybridity is often a matter of necessity. By implication, cultural change does not rise*ex nihilo*, but comes about as a pragmatic response to historical contingencies.

Beyond the hybridization perspective couched in terms of hybridity theory, the general conclusion from a multi-disciplinary analysis of cultural globalization remains essentially the same: Global and local forces interact in dialectical ways and neither alone is sufficient to explain the complexity of cultural globalization (Berger, 2002; Giddens, 1990; Hannerz, 1992; Hermans 2010; Holton, 2000; Robertson, 1995). I use cultural hybridization as a general framework in my dissertation to investigate how global modernization interacts with local heritage to produce change in the contemporary Chinese context. Thus, the theoretical framework of my dissertation is both similar to and different from the canonical perspective practiced in (cross-) cultural psychology. It shares the same view of the profound influence of culture on psychological functioning, but it differs in acknowledging both stable and dynamic aspects of culture in an ever-changing world we live in now.

What is Culture?

The concept of culture is perhaps as elusive as the concept of globalization (Baldwin, Faulkner, & Hecht, 2006). To aid the study of sociocultural change in China, I offer my own working definition of culture that is more compatible with the hybridization framework. I conceptualize culture as a repository of symbolic resources influenced by diverse traditions that evolves in a historically contingent way such that some constituents are carried on, some transformed, and yet others suppressed (R. Zhang & Kulich, in press).This definition has some appealing conceptual qualities that make it more tractable to the study of cultural dynamicsof globalization. For this reason, it differs from standard definitions of

culture in (cross-) cultural psychology (e.g., Heine, 2012). I briefly illustrate the main differences below.

In my conceptualization, culture is a dynamic and diverse pool of cultural resources. The first reason why culture is dynamic is that resources such as cultural knowledge cumulate over the course of cultural evolution (Tomasello, 2011). The pool of knowledge may expand over time, out-dated ideas may be supplanted by new ones (Henrich, 2001), or cultural evolution may be accompanied by losses of valuable information in unfortunate cases (Henrich, 2004). Thus, adaptive cultural evolution seems to consist of both stability (transmission of traditions) andchange (new adaptations). Such a historically oriented view favours an "ocean" rather than an "iceberg" metaphor of culture such that what is manifested or discovered by researchers at one point in time may only be a selective subsetof the cultural iceberg that bubbles to the surface (Fang, 2012).

Second, culture is defined as a diverse pool of resources because it interacts with other pools of cultural knowledge over the course of cultural evolution. This is consistent with the hybridization view of culture as deterritorialized, open-ended, outward-looking, and an organization of diversity (Barth, 1989; Hannerz, 1992; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009).

Third, culture is also dynamic in the sense that the compression of time and space by globalization is transforming local cultures into a meeting place of multiple cultures. The complexity of navigating through a multicultural space is not unique to the immigration experience (Chen, Benet-Martinez, & Bond, 2008;

Chiu & Hong, 2006). People in changing cultures can be said to live in multiple "intentional worlds" with different or even competing constructions of life (Anderson, Adams, & Plaut, 2008; Arnett, 2002). This perspective on culture highlights that cultural learning encompasses more than parent-child vertical transmission. It also includes dissemination of knowledge amongst peers and individualized exploration of a cultural tradition in a different location, made convenient by modern technologies (Gjerde, 2004; Jensen, 2003).

Finally, the use of resources to refer to cultural contents is intended as an umbrellaterm that accommodates different ways of understanding what constitutes culture.Some approaches, such as cognitive and epidemiological approaches to culture, tend to equate cultural contents with information and thus treat almost any knowledge or practice that is transmitted in a population as cultural (Atran, Medin, & Ross, 2005; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Sperber, 1996). Cultural information, ranging from technological knowledgeto spiritual values, is then subject to the same cultural transmission processes for changes to spread. In more ecological or environmental approaches, culture is instrumental to collective survival and the meeting of individual goals and change in subjective culture such as attitudes and beliefs is a pragmatic adjustment to changes in material conditions (Harrison, 2000; Hofstede, 2001). Yet meaning-centred approachestend toemphasize a more narrow set of moral ideals that contain strong evaluations and are not reducible to utilitarian considerations (Geertz, 1973; Shweder, 2000)."Resource" captures all the three senses in which cultural contents have been used.

In summary, culture is defined as much by a stockpile of established meanings as it is by current adaptive problems and a group of sense-making individuals in an ongoing process of renegotiation and consensus-building.

Current Psychological Research on Cultural Hybridization

As described above, past research tends to give lopsided emphasis on the power of either economic development or cultural heritage. However, existing research that did attend to their interaction has provided support for cultural hybridization. In the following, I review psychological research on cultural hybridization.

From a Chinese indigenous perspective, K. Yang (1998) advanced a limited convergence hypothesis and developed measures of individual modernity and traditionality. The basic tenet is that modernization will result in limited convergence of world cultures only; while traditional ethos that arrests the advancement of societal modernization will be replaced by corresponding modern ethos, traditional values or practices that are orthogonal to modernization will remain culturally intact. Findings from Chinese societies support the hypothesis (for a review, see K. Yang, 2003). The intercorrealtions of different traditionality/modernity components ranged from being negative (e.g., male dominance with sex equality), negligible (e.g., conservatism and endurance with optimism and assertiveness), to being positive (e.g., fatalism and defensiveness with social isolation and self-reliance). That is, depending on the domain, modernity and traditionality at the individual level can be conflictual, independent, or mutually reinforcing.

In one prominent model of family change, Kagitcibasi (1996; Kagitcibasi& Ataca,2005;also see, Keller, 2007) found support for the emergence of a hybrid autonomous-related self model in Turkey. In this model, independence that becomes adaptive as a result of urbanization and economicdevelopment recombines with emotional interdependence that is more valued in collectivistic societies. It is a hybrid model because it is different from both the independence model of family characterizing Western industrial societies (i.e., high independence and low interdependence) and the total interdependence model of family prevalent in traditional, economically deprived societies (i.e., low independence and high material and emotional interdependence). Therefore, the decrease in material interdependence, which satisfies autonomy needs, is accompanied by the continued functional value of emotional interdependence, which satisfies relatedness needs.

Another example is Greenfield's (2009) comprehensive theory of social change and human development. Using the classic sociological terms *Gemeinschaft* (i.e., community") and *Gesellschaft* (i.e., society) as two ideal types, she identified a number of universal sociodemographic variables underlying social change that shape a given culture's movement between the ideal types. The theory predicts that movement of any sociodemographic variable in a *Gesellschaft*direction such as urbanization, formal education, and commerce shifts cultural values and developmental pathways in a more individualistic direction (for a review, see Greenfield, 2009; Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003). Greenfield's theory also predicts cultural hybridization as a normative

model of cultural change. This is mainly because the theory does not view sociodemographic variables moving in concert as a coherent cluster. The rates of movement of different sociodemographic variables in either a *Gemeinschaft* or a *Gesellschaft* direction are not assumed to be uniform. Relaxing the assumption of uniformity in social movement addresses a common critique of the untenable cultural homogenization or Westernization thesis in modernization theory (Huntington, 1996; Inglehart &Baker, 2000; Kagitcibasi, 2005a). As such, Greenfield's theory accommodates different constellations of cultural forms that emerge from complex interactions among sociodemographic variables changing at differential rates.

More recent empirical research provides further support for cultural hybridization. Hamamura (2012) conducted cross-temporal analyses of social trends in individualism-collectivism in Japan and found divergent patterns of cultural change. Rising individualism was evident on societal indices (increasing urban population and divorce rate; decreasing household size) and some attitudinal indices (e.g., importance of independence for child socialization; importance of business engagement over family life). However, persistence of cultural heritage was found on other attitudinal indices (e.g., love and respect for parents; importance of social harmony). In a study of comparing East Asian countries with rapid socioeconomic changes (Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan) with African countries with limited changes (Algeria, Botswana, and Rwanda), Cheng et al. (2011)tested the applicability of cultural hybrid models. Consistent with their hypotheses, evidence for cultural hybridization was found

only in regions that had undergone rapid changes. Specifically, in East Asian and Algerian samples, positive links were found between independent self-construal and positive affect, independent self-construaland life satisfaction, as well as interdependent self-construal and life satisfaction. Because both independent and interdependent self-construals contributed to subjective well-being, the results indicated an integrationist hybrid model. In contrast, in African samples of Botswana and Rwanda, there was more support for a typical interdependence model. Positive links were found between interdependent self-construal and positive affect as well as interdependent self-construal and life satisfaction.

Together with other research (Lu & Yang, 2006; Pouliasi & Verkuyten, 2011; Sui, Zhu, & Chiu, 2007), the evidence reviewed above supports the coexistence and functional utility of both individualism and collectivism in modernizing societies and the value of cultural hybridization as a framework to understand cultural change.

The Chinese Case

Chinese societies present an interesting case to investigate the cultural consequences of globalization. Although one can certainly speak of a broadly defined Chinese culture, there exist different Chinese communities with diverse socioeconomic development and cultural histories. These communities include the greater China area (mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore) and various ethnic communities that have spread to the rest of the world, not just limited to Western countries (e.g., Chinese communities in Vietnam or Malaysia). So there is a need to differentiate Chinese culture as a symbolic resource from the

societal architecture constructed by its different inhabitants (Zhang & Kulich, in press). The heterogeneity within Chinese culture lends itself to the empirical assessment of how globalization interacts with local ecology to produce differences in local manifestations of the "same" culture (Bond, 1996; Fischer, 2012).

Chinese societies are also shaped by ongoing processes of globalization, the prime example of which is mainland China (Kulich & Zhang, 2010). Since the implementation of the "open-door" policy in the late 1970s, China has undergone tremendous socioeconomic change and a cascading influx of Western influence. The full-scale modernization has resulted in drastic industrialization and urbanization, unprecedented economic growth,massive movement of population, and a rapid expansion of global marketing and media influence (Guthrie, 2009; W. W. Zhang, 2000). For example, Cai, Kwan, and Sedikides (2012) identified economic growth, urbanization, exposure to Western values, and the implementation of the one-child-per-family policy as four key sociodemographic factors of change in China. The restructuring of everyday life in contemporary China challenges both the earlier depiction of China as conservative and inward-looking (e.g., Hsu, 1953) and the mainstay assumption in (cross-) cultural psychology that China is the paragon of a collectivistic cultural system organized around a cluster of ideologies related to relational orientation, group harmony, and respect for hierarchy (Ratner, 2011; R. Zhang & Kulich, in press). Thus, China is an important case for the study of cultural change.

Anthropological and Sociological Evidence

Current anthropological and sociological and research links contemporary China with two aspects of globalization processes – national modernization and individualization. First, many observers have noted the active role the Chinese communist party has played in orchestrating China's quest for modernization such that a strong and wealthy nation is considered the ultimate goal (Yan, 2010). Such party-sponsored modernization with its emphasis on economic freedom and prosperity while being wary of political liberalism has been termed "managed globalization" (Yan, 2002). This makes it different from the volatile transformation following the collapse of the political systems in East Europe and former Soviet Union. However, because of the lack of a political liberalism tradition in China, individual freedom and rights are not constitutionalized, hence not regarded as inalienable, as they are in Western democracies.

Second, the state-regulated modernization gives rise to the second feature of globalization, that is, the social processes of individualization in which individuals are pushed out of previously prescribed collective forms such as the ''iron rice bowl''of life employment in China. Individualization in this sociological sense lays the foundation for the development of individualism in the psychological sense that coexists with the collectivistic cultural heritage in East Asia (Beck & Grande, 2010;Han & Shim, 2010). The feeling of being disembedded from the fabric of tradition and having to be self-reliant, the desire for upward mobility and material comfort, and the need for self-expression are gaining momentum. In this sociological version of individualism, hybridization and change in contemporary China is perhaps seen in the fact that the rise of

individualism in China is a historically uneven and continuously contested process: “TheChinese case simultaneously demonstrates pre-modern, modern, and late-modernconditions, and the Chinese individual must deal with all of theseconditions simultaneously” (Yan, 2010, p. 510).

Psychological Evidence

The psychological evidence for sociocultural change in China can be found in terms of increasing internal complexity at different levels. Complexity of cultural representations is observed in the paradoxical juxtaposition of cultural products representing both traditional and modern values in urban China (Faure & Fang, 2008; Zhang & Harwood, 2004). There is also complexity in the sense of a generational divide. The discourse of individualism, disseminated through mass media, is pervasive in magazine advertisements in China, whose target readership is the younger elite generation. In contrast, television commercials promote more traditional or collectivistic values, which are aimed at the mass market (Zhang & Shavitt, 2003). Another layer of complexity is regional, particularly urban-rural differences in China. Although urbanization has relocated millions of rural families to urban areas, rural residents still account for approximately 53.4% of the population in the country (Bulletin, 2010). Given that major social transformation has been occurring in urban centres such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, rural residents presumably still inhabit a largely agricultural, hence more traditional, ecology (Fuligni & Zhang, 2004; W. Zhang & Fuligni, 2006). Moreover, there are also a considerable number of urbanized families who were born rural residents but obtained urban status in recent years (X. Chen & Li,

2012). Given the social complexity in China, there is a growing body of researchcomparing generational, regional, and social class differences at the level of individual personality and values (Egri & Ralston, 2004; Kohn, Li, Wang, & Yue, 2007; Zhang, Zheng, & Wang, 2003).

Furthermore, macro-level change in China hasalso penetrated to the "deeper" levels of cultural practices and psychological functioning. Chen and colleagues have led an impressive program of research on changing childrearing practices and children's socioemotional adjustment in China (for a review, see X. Chen, 2010; X. Chen & Chen, 2010). It has been long suggested that the primary socialization goal in traditional Chinese culture is to inculcate in children attitudes and behaviours that are adaptive to group functioning (X. Chen & French, 2008). It follows that traditional Chinese childrearing styles are described as parent-oriented, that is, more controlling, restrictive and punishing, and less supportive of children's exploratory and emotional needs (Chao, 1994; Ho, 1986). However, these traditional beliefs and practices seem ill-suited to prepare Chinese children for a more individual-oriented society nowadays. A comparison of parents of elementary schools between two cohorts (1998 and 2002) in Shanghai indicated that parents, particularly mothers, are now more likely to show warmth and encourage autonomy and less likely to endorse the use of power assertion (Cheng & Chen, 2010). In other words, the current trend is to move away from traditional parenting styles.

Social change in China has also left an imprint on Chinese children in terms of the adaptiveness of shy-inhibited behaviour. While shyness-inhibition

embodies the traditional Chinese virtues of modesty, self-control, and harmony, it is maladaptive in an environment that requires self-expressiveness and confidence in communication. Chen and colleagues conducted a three-cohort study of elementary school children in Shanghai that examined the relations between shyness and adjustment (Chen, Cen, Li, & He, 2005). Shy children in the 1990 cohort were accepted more by peers and perceived as more competent by teachers, when China had just begun its comprehensive reform of education policies. In contrast, shyness was negatively associated with peer acceptance and school adjustment in the 2002 cohort, when the reform was fully implemented. The 1998 cohort exhibited a mixed pattern, indicating a transitional period. Thus, this study is an important documentation of the change of shyness-inhibition from a culturally positive to a culturally negative characteristic in the changing China.

Finally, social change also contributes to the alarming rise of narcissism in China (Cai et al., 2012). The results measured by the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin &

Terry, 1988)were consistent with the sociodemographic factors identified by these researchers. Younger, urban, higher SES Chinese as well as those from one-child families were more narcissistic than older, rural, lower SES Chinese as well as those from families with multiple children. Moreover, vertical individualism predicted individual differences in narcissism.

To summarize, the existing psychological evidence on change in China is indicative of a cultural shift, under a collectivistic legacy, in a more individualistic

direction (also see, Leung, 2012). Such shift appears to be driving wider internal variations and altering more than the surface cultural landscape.

Contextualization of This Research

Before I present an overview of the studies to examine the psychological consequences of sociocultural change in China, it is imperative to situate the research in its proper context. Despite the tendency to treat China as one homogenous national culture in (cross-)cultural research, its internal diversity is greatly underestimated, not merely for the reason that China has the world's largest population. First, 56 ethnic groups are officially recognized in the present-day China, with Han being the majority groupcomprising 91.5% of the population (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). While there is a burgeoning of scholarly work on multiculturalism in China in other disciplines (e.g., Gladney, 1994; Hasmath, 2010), China's ethnic diversity is generally glossed over in psychology. As such, most of the "ethnically" Chinese people studied by (cross-)cultural psychologists, which include Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Singapore, are presumably Han Chinese. Given the high ratio of Han to ethnic minorities in urban centres such as Beijing and Shanghai, the psychological changes suggested by the following research are thus applicable to Han Chinese and perhaps urban ethnic minorities who are highly assimilated.

A second dimension of diversity in China is its regional cultures. Although some pioneering work on regional differences has been done in psychology (e.g., Rentfrow, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Vandello& Cohen, 1999), very little is known of regional differences in China so far (for one recent exception, see Van de

Vliert, Yang, Wang, & Ren, 2013).This research is not designed to reveal specific regional differences and, instead, focuses mostly on urban centres (i.e., Beijing and Shanghai) in China. However, to the extent that people from these two locations converge in their perceptions of traditional Chinese culture and its change, it would provide some evidence for the generalizability of these findings to urban China.

One aspect of internal variation that is highly relevant to the current project is China's uneven development and the growing rural-urban disparity mentioned above. Because the coastal area in which most urban centres are located has been at the forefront of transformations resulting from globalization and modernization, my research looks to China's two largest cities, namely Beijing and Shanghai, for evidence of psychological change. As a result, the findings are probably representative ofthe urban population with a middle-class background, which may be qualitatively different from both the rural population and the more than one million migrant workers in urban China who do not have permanent resident status.Wherever possible, however, comparisons are made between urban Chinese participants born in an urban vs. rural area.

Finally, the present research focuses mostly on young university students, who tend to represent a relatively elite population in developing countries. Thus on the one hand, my research cannot fully address how the older population in urban China is affected by sociocultural change compared with the younger population, although Study 3b provides some tentative answers with the use of nationally representative samples. On the other hand, with the continuous

expansion of higher education in China with an enrolment of about 31 million now (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010), university students are increasingly becoming the norm rather than the exception. This trend should be particularly true of the urban population born after the late 80s, who are the main target of my research.

Overview of Studies

The overall objective of my dissertation is to illuminate some psychological consequences of sociocultural change in contemporary China. Because societal change exists at the cultural or socio-structural level of analysis, my first goal is to find a way to translate macro-leveleffects into micro psychological or behavioural processes. Thus, the first part of my dissertation aims to establish an intermediate link between the cultural andthe individual levels of analysis: cultural representations or intersubjective perceptions. Applying the intersubjective approach to culture (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010), I hypothesized that in addition to a shared representation of traditional Chinese culture, two representations have emerged from the global-local interaction in contemporary China (see Figure 1 for a schematic illustration). The first representation concerns the recognition of an emerging global culture. Given the global power asymmetry (e.g., Liu et al., 2005), the globally diffused culture is predominantly Western and particularly American in its outlook. Thus, a shared representation of this globally dominant Western culture may be constructed. A second representation that may be constructed refers to an update on Chinese culture as the result of sociocultural



Figure 1. The intersubjective level: The theorized multicultural representations in contemporary China. The two curved arrows pointing to the contemporary Chinese cultural representation denote contemporary Chinese culture as a hybrid cultural form that is being shaped by both traditional Chinese culture and Western culture.

change. Therefore, a representation of contemporary Chinese culture would also be identified and distinguished from the antiquated representation of the same culture.

The first three studies (Study 1a, Study1b, and Study 2) thus culture as collectively shared representations. With student samples obtained in Shanghai and Beijing, Study 1a and 1b were designed to empirically identify and distinguish three distinct cultural representations: traditional Chinese, contemporary Chinese, and Western. Particularly, I hypothesized that how contemporary Chinese culture was perceived would correspond with the direction of social transformation in China. That is, contemporary Chinese culture would be perceived to shift away from traditional Chinese culture in the direction ofincreasing individualism and declining collectivism. Culture was measured in terms of basic values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994a). Values have long been considered the cornerstone of a culture or a cultural worldview (Johnson, Hill, & Cohen, 2011; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). In cross-cultural research, values continue to be an organizing concept for international comparisons or invoked to explain behavioural or psychological differences observed between cultures (Kulich, 2009).

To provide additional support to the hypothesis that the construction of a contemporary cultural representation in China arose in Chinese people's collective engagement with its sociocultural change, Study 2 adopted a novel method of comparing representations of the "same" culture across place. Specifically,it compared the representations of Chinese culture measured in

values among mainland Chinese, Chinese Canadians, and non-Chinese Canadians. It tested the idea that compared with mainland Chinese, Chinese immigrants in Canada may rely more than on traditional Chinese culture in constructing their representation of Chinese culture. A second goal of Study 2 was to investigate the social sources of the Chinese cultural representation constructed by Chinese Canadians.

As the preceding section examines the intersubjective level of analysis, the second part of my dissertation moves on to the individual level, viz.,individuals' psychological propensities. Study 3a and 3b go beyond perceptual consequences of change to examinepersonal values. It tested the hypothesis that individuals are responsive to change in the local cultural ecology and cultural change in China should shift the average value importance in the general population in the direction of the change. With a cross-sectional design, Study 3a compared personal values congruence with the three cultural representations identified in Study 1a and 1b among urban Chinese students. Results from these comparisons would reveal which cultural values contemporary China affords more in urban Chinese youth. Study 3b utilized datasets from the World Values Survey to track changes in more diverse indicators of individualism-collectivism in nationally representative samples over a span of more than a decade. The use of representative samples allowed generalization of the findings from Chinese young adults on which I focus in this dissertation; the use of diverse indicators of individualism-collectivismpermitted more nuanced analyses of cultural

hybridization by empirically distinguishing domains of stability from domains of change.

The third part of my dissertation investigates the effect of sociocultural change on the tendency to make self-enhancing social comparisons (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Alicke & Sedikides, 2011). Adopting the cultural priming paradigm (Hong et al., 2000), Study 4aexperimentally activated traditional Chinese culture, contemporary Chinese culture, American culture, and culture-neutral stimuli to differentiate their effects on a better-than-average measure. The main prediction was that priming contemporary Chinese culture would augment the tendency to make self-enhancing evaluations than priming traditional Chinese culture. Finally, Study 4b was conducted to clarify the unexpected finding from Study 4aby including an alternative better-than-average measure.Also,to provide direct support for the rise in self-enhancement in China, I conducted both within-culture and cross-cultural analyses. For the within-culture analyses, I compared mainland Chinese with varying identification/disidentification with traditional or contemporary Chinese culture to examine whether cultural identity would be implicated in their tendency to self-enhance. For the cross-cultural analyses, I used Chinese Canadians as a comparison group to represent more Westernized Chinese and compared them with mainland Chinese in terms of their tendency to self-enhance.

Finally, a note on the methodological strategies is in order. I adopt both top-down/deductive and bottom-up/inductive approaches in examining the psychological ramifications of both endogenous and exogenous changes in China.

This integrative approach is necessary to achieve the overarching goal of my dissertation. Given the relatively little attention to changes in China in (cross-)cultural psychology, it is important to first develop a general understanding of the scope of such changes. A bottom-up or exploratory approach is useful for understanding a phenomenon to which relatively scant evidence is available. I adopt this approach in Study 3b to empirically document whether different indicators of individualism-collectivism from the Chinese WVS datasets show evidence for cultural stability or change. On the one hand, the accumulation of these empirical facts serves as the basis of further theory construction in future research. On the other hand, wherever more specific and directional hypotheses are possible, I also adopt the top-down, hypothesis-testing approach. Such approach is implemented in Study 4a and 4b in which the hybridization framework and existing evidence lead to the hypothesis that direct forms of self-enhancement are on the rise in contemporary China. In the remaining studies, a mixture of both approaches is used. For example, in Study 1a and 1b, the hybridization framework makes the broad prediction that contemporary Chinese culture is influenced by both traditional Chinese culture and the globally dominant Western culture. However, I rely on empirical evidence to distinguish the contemporary Chinese representation from the other two in systematic and detailed ways.

CHAPTER 2:

Sociocultural Change and Intersubjective Perceptions of Cultural Values

(Study 1a, Study 1b, and Study 2)

Study 1a: Intersubjective Perceptions of Change in Values

Study Overview

The first study explores whether two intersubjective perceptions of Chinese culture (traditional vs. contemporary) can be distinguished among the mainland Chinese people with the use of Schwartz's Value Survey (SVS). To the extent that sociocultural change in China has transformed the local culture, Chinese people should have updated their cultural representation accordingly. Specifically, it was hypothesized that the revised representation would resemble the representation of Western culture more in that contemporary Chinese culture is perceived to be more individualistic and less collectivistic. An intersubjective representation of Western culture was also measured. In addition to showing that Chinese people also share a representation of Western culture due to its global dominance, the purpose of measuring the Western representation was to provide a meaningful frame of reference and help pinpoint where contemporary Chinese culture is located in relation to traditional Chinese and Western culture.

An Intersubjective Approach to Culture

According to this approach, culture can be conceptualized and measured as an intersubjective reality consisting of values and beliefs perceived to be widely shared by its members (Wan & Chiu, 2009; see Ritzer, 2011, for the sociological foundation of intersubjectivity). An intersubjective culture is distinct from the system of values and beliefs organized within any individual as values endorsed by individuals may or may not overlap greatly with perceived cultural

values (Chiu et al., 2010). Individual agency within a culture is manifested in personally identifying with or rejecting the intersubjectively important cultural values (Wan,Dach-Gruschow, No, & Hong, 2011). However, intersubjective perceptions of culture are powerfully linked with individual psychology because intersubjective knowledge can serve as efficient behavioural guide. For example, intersubjective perceptions have been shown to explain a number oftypical cross-cultural differences in individual psychological or behavioural tendencies (Fischer et al., 2009; Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 2009; Zou et al., 2009).

The intersubjective approach offers an efficient method to the study of cultural change as perceived by lay Chinese people. Differences observed between intersubjective perceptions of traditional and contemporary Chinese culture would suggest that Chinese people have updated their cultural representations as their cultural experiences change.Moreover, because intersubjective knowledge can be used as normative guide, the change in intersubjective perceptions also implies the corresponding change in the psychological and behavioural tendencies sustained by those perceptions. Thus, evidence for the emergence of a contemporary Chinese representation paves the way for searching evidence suggestive of change at the individual level.

Schwartz's Theory of Basic Values

In Schwartz's theory of values, consistent with the tradition of value studies, values are defined as desirable, trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people's lives. The SVS inventory provides a comprehensive list of basic values that cross-cultural research has shown is recognized around the

world (Schwartz, 1992, 1994a). Schwartz and colleagues postulated 10 motivationally distinct types of values such that each of the 57 value items underlies one type of motivational goal. The 10 value types are power (e.g., authority, wealth), achievement (e.g., successful, ambitious), hedonism (e.g., pleasure, enjoying life), stimulation (e.g., a varied life, an exciting life), self-direction (e.g., freedom, independent), universalism (e.g., broad-minded, wisdom), benevolence (e.g., honest, loyal), tradition (e.g., devout, moderate), conformity (e.g., obedient, politeness), and security (e.g., family security, social order). Alternatively, collapsing value types located next to each other yields two conceptual dimensions composed of four higher-order value types – openness to change (self-direction and stimulation) versus conservation (security, conformity, and tradition) and self-enhancement (achievement and power) versus self-transcendence (benevolence and universalism).

The relations among those value types were confirmed by multidimensional analyses to form the theoretically derived circumplex model of motivational oppositions and compatibilities (see Figure 2). In this spatial representation of the structural organization of values, values reflecting similar motivational goals are located adjacent to each other whereas those reflecting dissimilar or opposite motivational goals are located further away from each other. Thus, examining 10 value types with varying degrees of associations among each other has the advantage of obtaining richer information beyond the individualism-collectivism contrast.



Figure 2. Theoretical structure of relations among the 10 motivational value types.

Cross-cultural research has established the existence of a near-universal structure of such relations among the 10 value types. In other words, while cultures may differ in the importance they attribute to the values that constitute the value types, the same coherent structure organizes their values. Of the 57 value items in SVS, 45 were shown to have nearly equivalent meanings across cultures. Past research has shown considerable variation in the value priorities of individuals within as well as across societies (for a recent review, see Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). Study 1a adapts SVS to the purposes of measuring both individual endorsement of values, as it has traditionally been used, and intersubjective perceptions.

Method

Participants and Procedures

A total of 128 Chinese participants at two universities in Shanghai, China volunteered for this study. Most of them were undergraduate students in different years and the rest were graduate students. The data were first cleaned by identifying participants for careless responding for the SVS (see below). Eighteen participants were hence dropped, leaving the final sample of 110 (85 females, 24 males, one did not indicate gender) with a mean age of 21.47 years ranging from 18 to 45 (SD = 4.74). The participants completed a survey in group testing settings in their native language of Chinese. Chinese translation of the SVS (SVS-58 Chinese) was taken from previously translated versions provided by Shalom Schwartz.

Measures

The participants completed the Chinese SVS twice. First, they were presented with a randomized list of 58 values[1] with the following instruction that prompted them to think of their personal values: "Your task is to rate how important each of the following values is as a guiding principle in YOUR life. When you answer the following questions, think about how much the value influences YOUR goals, aspirations, beliefs, and actions." They rated the importance of those values on an 8-point scale (0 = *not important*, 7 = *extremely important*). These personal values data were analysed in Study 3a. After rating their personal values, the participants were randomly assigned to rate one of the three intersubjective perceptions. That is, they were instructed to rate the importance of the same list of values for a typical Chinese holding traditional Chinese (hereafter, TC) values, a typical Chinese holding contemporary Chinese (hereafter, CC) values, or a typical Westerner. The instructions for each condition were meant to shift their attention from their personal values to their perceptions of cultural values. The values were randomized in a different order from the first section.

To further understand how traditional and contemporary Chinese culture are externalized (Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008), we also had the participants in TC and CC conditions list the iconic cultural symbols they associated with the corresponding culture. To the extent that contemporary cultural icons can elicit meaning and even psychological response different than traditional cultural icons,

[1] The Chinese SVS contains one additional item ["observing social norms (to maintain face)"] compared to the widely used SVS-57. This item is supposed to reflect the value type of power.

it is necessary to find out what the typical exemplars are. These responses wereanalysed in Study 4a.

Finally, participants responded to two questions regarding the extent of cultural change in China on a 6-point scale (1 = *very little*, 6 = *very much*). The first question asked about their personal experience of change, while the second one about their overall impression of change. The two questions were moderately correlated with each other, $r = .40$, $p < .001$.

Results

Main Analyses: Are the Two Representations of Chinese Culture Distinct?

As mentioned above, the data were first cleaned based on the recommendations of SVS users' manual (Schwartz, 2009). Specifically, 18 participants who used a particular scale anchor 35 times or more for either personal or perceived values section were removed from analyses, because their response pattern suggested that they failed to discriminate among values.

To index the 10 value types, only the subset of value items shown to have nearly equivalent meanings across cultures were used (which is 47 out of 58 in the Chinese SVS). The reliability of the value types in this study was acceptable and comparable with previous research (Schwartz, 1992, 2005). Cronbach's αs ranged from .59 to .92 for perceived cultural values. The only anomaly in this sample was a negative item-total correlation (-.39) that appeared in the cultural perception section for the value item Devout. While it falls theoretically under the value type of Tradition, the negative correlation suggested

that it may have carried a different meaning to the participants in this study as a cultural value. Removing this item increased the Cronbach's α from .59 to .86.

To test whether the representations of traditional and contemporary Chinese values were distinct from each other and from the representation of Western values, I evaluated three pieces of evidence. First, I looked at the two questions that directly assessed the experience and perception of cultural change. Second, the 10 value types were compared across the cultural perception conditions. Finally, to get an idea of overall (dis)similarity among value profiles, we correlated the three cultural value profiles aggregated from each condition.

We examined the two change questions separately because they were developed to measure two aspects of cultural change: first-hand experience and overall impression. For each question, we performed a one-sample *t* test to compare its mean with the scale midpoint of 3.5. For personal experience of change, the mean was 3.20, which was just short of the midpoint, $t(109) = -2.39$, $p = .02$. The impression of societal change ($M = 4.66$), other the other hand, was significantly higher than the midpoint, $t(109) = 12.12$, $p < .001$. Therefore, although the participants reported having personally experienced a moderate degree of cultural change, they expressed having witnessed more drastic change[2]. It is important to note that scores for the two questions did not differ across the

[2] Due to the between-subjects design (i.e., each participant provided ratings for only one culture), change perception could not be correlated with individual perception of how different the three sets of cultural rating were on average. It needs to be tested directly with a within-subjects design whether those who perceive more change are also more likely to rate traditional and contemporary Chinese values on the one hand, traditional Chinese and Western values on the other hand, to be more different from each other.

conditions, both *F*s < 1, so participants' reaction to change was unaffected by the prior task.

To understand how Chinese culture has changed in the collective mind, a MANOVA was conducted on the 10 value types withintersubjective perceptionsof target culture (TC vs. CC vs. Western) as the grouping variable. Preliminary analyses showed no main effects of gender or ageon any of the value types, therefore these analyses were not considered further. Another concern was to control for individual differences in scale use (Schwartz, 2009). Two common methods for correcting for scale use are to use each participant's mean rating of all 58 value items as covariate in the analysis or to use each participant's centered scores by centering ratings for each of the value items are around each participant's main rating of all items. Because the two alternative methods tend to yield virtually identical results (Schwartz, 2009), centered scores were used in the MANOVA analysis for the sake of simplicity. With the use of Wilk's Lambda, there was a significant multivariate main effect of target culture, $F(20, 196) = 10.25$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .51$. Subsequent univariate analyses showed that all 10 value types differed significantly across the three target cultures, *F*s from 3.79 to 103.13, all *p*s < .01, partial η^2s from .07 to .66. Table 1 displays the unadjusted means and standard deviations of each value types as a function of conditions.

Post-hoc pairwise comparisons on the centered means were conducted to further understand the patterns of differences. Because the equality of variances assumption was not met for all comparisons, Games-Howell test was used whenever the assumption was violated and otherwise Tukey's test was used. First,

Table 1

Raw Means and Standard Deviations of the Ten Value Types in the Three Cultural Perception Conditions (Study 1a)

Value type	TC culture (n = 38)	CC culture (n = 33)	Western culture (n = 38)
Conformity	5.93	5.33	4.17
	(.85)	(.98)	(1.12)
Tradition	5.45	4.73	3.52
	(.89)	(1.13)	(1.05)
Security	5.78	5.38	4.69
	(.86)	(.92)	(.87)
Power	5.30	5.41	4.43
	(1.04)	(1.32)	(1.33)
Achievement	5.16	5.48	5.39
	(1.02)	(.88)	(.75)
Hedonism	3.40	3.98	6.08
	(1.44)	(1.61)	(.65)
Stimulation	2.61	3.14	6.05
	(1.52)	(1.54)	(.68)
Self-direction	3.99	4.03	6.33
	(1.32)	(1.22)	(.40)
Universalism	4.67	4.44	5.28
	(1.18)	(1.13)	(.72)
Benevolence	5.62	5.11	4.94
	(.90)	(.85)	(.72)

Note. TC = Traditional Chinese. CC = Contemporary Chinese.

The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

TC culture was perceived to be in stark contrast to Western culture on nine value types. The three value types representing Conservation dimension (conformity, tradition, and security) were rated significantly more important in TC culture compared with Western culture. The opposite pattern was found on the two value types representing Openness to Change dimension that opposes Conservation (stimulation and self-direction) – they were rated significantly less important in TC culture. For Self-Enhancement dimension, power was rated significantly more important in TC culture compared with Western culture, but there was no difference on achievement. For Self-Transcendence dimension, universalism was rated significantly less important but benevolence more important in TC culture. Hedonism was rated significantly less important in TC culture.

Second, after adding CCcultureto the analysis, the emerging picture lent support to the idea that contemporary Chinese culture was perceived to have shifted towards Western culture. In four out of the ten cases (conformity, tradition[3], hedonism, and stimulation), CC culture fell between the TC-W extremes and differed significantly from both TC and Western cultures. This pattern indicated cultural shift, although CC culture remained distinct from Western culture. In five cases (universalism, self-direction, benevolence, power, and security), they were rated similarly between TC and CC cultures, suggesting cultural stability. Finally, achievement was rated similarly between TC and Western cultures. However, it was rated more important in CC culture, although only the difference between TC and CC cultures was significant.

[3]When using the tradition score that excluded the problematic devout item, the same results were found.

Finally, to make use of the entire list of 58 value items, I created three perceived cultural value profiles by aggregating across participants' individual ratings from each condition and computed correlations among them. For instance, the correlation between the perceived TC and CC value profiles would indicate their overall similarity or lack thereof. Table 2 displays the zero-order correlations. The two Chinese value profiles were highly correlated, r = .88 and both were negatively associated with the Western profile, r = -.56 (TC) and r = -.38 (CC). The CC profile was then regressed simultaneously on the TC and the Western profiles. In this regression model, both predictors explained 79.8 % of the total variance, $F(2, 55) = 108.77$, $p < .001$.The results showed a different pattern than that of zero-order correlations. Not surprisingly, the TC profile strongly predicted the CC profile, β= .98, t = 13.37, $p < .001$, showing cultural continuity. In addition, the Western profile made an independent contribution to the prediction of the CC profile, β = .17, t = 2.28, p = .03. Unlike the zero-order correlation, the association was actually in the *positive* direction after partialling out the negative correlations between the two predictors. This suppression effect is consistent with the explanation that beyond its affinity with traditional Chinese culture, contemporary Chinese culture is also influenced by Western culture. Similar results were found when the 47 items with equivalent meanings were used.

In sum, different pieces of evidence were consistent in showing that contemporary Chinese culture measured by values has shifted towards, but remain distinct from Western culture, at least in the minds of these Chinese participants.

Supplementary Analyses

Table 2

The Correlation Matrix among the Value Profiles (Study 1a and 1b)

	1	2	3	4
1. Perceived TC value profile	----	.77***	-.49***	.19
2. Perceived CC value profile	.88***	----	-.20**	.43**
3. Perceived Western value profile	-.56***	-.38**	----	.50***
4. Actual value profile	.17	.18	.44***	----

Note. TC = Traditional Chinese. CC = Contemporary Chinese.

Correlations from Study 1a are below the diagonal; correlations from Study 1b are above the diagonal. The actual value profile was aggregated across participants based on the entire sample from each study.

** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$, two tailed.

The intersubjective approach assumes that intersubjective perceptions reflect a culturally shared understanding instead of one's idiosyncratic perception and therefore should exhibit a relatively strong consensus within the culture. To directly assess the degree of within-culture consensus over the three cultural profiles, I computed a_{wg} developed by Brown and Hauenstein (2005), which is an index of the extent to which individuals agree with each other and therefore provide similar responses. It is calculated as the ratio of observed agreement to maximum possible disagreement and ranges from –1 *(complete disagreement)* to 1 *(complete agreement)*. This index and similar agreement indices such as $a_{wg(j)}$ (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) have recently been used in cross-cultural research to assess within-nation sharedness or consensus (Fischer &Schwartz, 2011; Gelfand et al., 2011; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). For the TC profile, the α_{wg} coefficients of value types ranged from .62 to .80, with a mean of .75. For the CC profile, they ranged from .58 to .86, with a mean of .73. Finally for the Western profile, they ranged from .70 to .93, with a mean of .83. Table 3 lists the α_{wg} coefficients as a function of value types and profiles. Although there are no statistical significance tests associated with a_{wg}, I followed the recommendations from small-group research that treat values exceeding .70 as indicating substantial agreement (Brown & Hauenstein, 2005; James et al., 1984). Therefore, overall consensus over the three cultural profiles was high. In particular, participants showed similarly high agreement over traditional and contemporary Chinese culture.

Another issue concerning cultural change is to specify where change is

Table 3

Agreement Index (a_{wg}) for Each Value Type within Each of the Three Cultural Profiles (Study 1a and Study 1b)

Value type	a_{wg} TC profile	a_{wg} CC profile	a_{wg} Western profile
Conformity	.78 (.78)	.79 (.84)	.79 (.83)
Tradition	.77 (.84)	.69 (.84)	.70 (.75)
Security	.80 (.80)	.81 (.83)	.89 (.86)
Power	.77 (.81)	.61 (.72)	.90 (.76)
Achievement	.79 (.85)	.82 (.90)	.93 (.73)
Hedonism	.68 (.49)	.58 (.76)	.85 (.75)
Stimulation	.62 (.59)	.62 (.77)	.84 (.66)
Self-direction	.72 (.69)	.76 (.81)	.87 (.84)
Universalism	.75 (.83)	.78 (.88)	.70 (.81)
Benevolence	.80 (.87)	.86 (.82)	.87 (.82)
Average	.75 (.76)	.73 (.82)	.83 (.78)

Note. TC = Traditional Chinese. CC = Contemporary Chinese.

The numbers in parentheses are a_{wg} in Study 1b.

occurring quickly and where it is occurring slowly. It is likely that the most foundational aspect of the culture undergirded by core cultural values is more resistant to change, while more peripheral cultural values are undergoing more drastic change. Because the main analyses above focused only on overall degrees of change, those results cannot be used to make any inferences as to the extent of change in core versus peripheral values.

To examine core cultural values, I therefore compared the content of top-rated values between the two Chinese profiles. Specifically, core cultural values were operationalized as the 10 value items with the highest perceived importance from each profile. The number of items that were shared between profiles was counted. More overlapping among the top-rated items would indicate cultural continuity.There was an overlap of six items (60%) and they reflected the value types of conformity, tradition, security, and power. Except power, the shared items reflected goals typically associated with collectivistic cultures.

To examine peripheral cultural values, I compared the content of 11 values in the middle range of importance ratings (those that ranked 24^{th}-34^{th}) between the two Chinese profiles. Again, the number of items that overlapped between profiles was counted. In contrast to 60% overlap among the top-10 items, the overlap among the peripheral items was 36% instead. Therefore, the idea that core (vs. peripheral) cultural values would show cultural continuity and would be more resistant to change is supported.

Finally, to find out which broader motivations those core values that counted as new input to the CC profile represent, they were categorized into their

corresponding value types. Of the four distinctive items, two(successful and ambitious) representsthe achievementmotivation, one (preserve my public image) representsthe power motivation, while the remaining one (health) could not be categorized because it did not have culturally equivalent meaning. Thus the core cultural values that were indeed updated in the CC profile were particularly associated with achieving success and status.

Discussion

Study 1a provides preliminary support that sociocultural change is palpable among Chinese participants, as evidenced directly by their answers to the cultural change questions. Moreover, Chinese participants share an updated collective representation of Chinese values that seem to mirror the ongoing sociocultural change. The most important findings are that the contemporary Chinese representation is not redundant with the antiquated Chinese representation or the Western representation. Not surprisingly, the traditional Chinese profile represents closely the collectivistic "ideal type" with the prioritization of major collectivistic over individualistic value types. Likewise, the Western profile resembles closely the individualistic "ideal type". However, the contemporary Chinese profile does not fall neatly on either polar end of the continuum. The contemporary profile is partially collectivistic in that itwas rated similarly to the traditional profile on five value types. It diverged from the traditional profile, however, on the other five value types. Specifically, four of them shifted in the direction of the individualistic Western profile and because these value types represent both individualistic (hedonism and stimulation) and

collectivistic (conformity and tradition) dimensions, this suggests the co-occurrence of a decline in some traditional domains and an increase in aspiration for some individualistic goals in contemporary China. Therefore, these findings suggest that whileretaining most of its traditional roots, contemporary Chinese culture has evolved to incorporate Western values amidst the continual societal change (see also Kulich & Zhang, 2010).

Convergent evidence for a hybrid form of contemporary Chinese culture comes from profile correlations across the entire list of SVS items instead of comparisons of value types one at a time. The cultural common ground shared between traditional and contemporary Chinese culture was shown in a strong and positive correlation between the two value profiles. Although both Chinese profiles were correlated negatively with the Western profile at the bivariate level, the Western influence on contemporary Chinese culture was evident once the effect of traditional Chinese culture was statistically removed. Apart from its affinity with the traditional Chinese culture, contemporary Chinese culture also relates positively with Western culture.

Going beyond what contemporary Chinese culture looks like in broad strokes, a more focal question concerns whether the core elements of a culture are more resistant to change than elements on the periphery of the foundational culture. This was confirmed by showing that 60% of the top-rated value items in the traditional profile remained intact in the contemporary profile, while only 36% of the peripheral value items were shared between the profiles. Therefore, the findings are consistent with the theoretical propositions that core constructs that

are central to what defines an individual or a group of individualsare difficult to modify in light of changing circumstances because they form the basis of security for the individual or the collective (Linton, 1936; Kelly, 1955;Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Goldenberg, 2003). On the other hand, peripheral constructs, which do not serve to maintain the continuity of self-identity and symbolic existence, are more flexible in terms of accommodating change in objective reality and hence easily modifiable.

An analysis of the values that did make their way to the core contemporary culture, as perceived by Chinese participants, helps pinpoint where cultural change is felt most strongly. The fact that more values associated with achievement and power motivations are represented in the cultural coreand that achievement and power had the highest rankingsas value typesdovetail well with a number of scholarly observations about the social reality in contemporary China. China's economic reform was initiated in1978 with the goal of overhauling the stagnant economy. Although the reform and the ensuing changes have scored unprecedented success in improving objective living standards, the success is also accompanied by an alarming rise in income inequality and the disappearance of a bygone equalitarian society (Brockmann, Delhey, Welzel, & Yuan, 2009; Easterlin, Morgan, Switek, & Wang, 2012). Thus, the national occupation with economic prosperity and the diminished ability for most individuals to actually meet such expectation may lead Chinese people to perceive that the culture as a whole has shifted to placing premium on the self-enhancement dimension defined in Schwartz's model of values.

In fact, the ascendance of at least some values associated with achievement and power shown by cultural ratings from Chinese university students is foreshadowed bythe conclusion Schwartz drew based on personal values reported by Chinese teachers in the early 90s:

> These data suggest that China is not a prototypical 'collectivistic' society, if collectivism refers to a conception of the person as deeply embedded in the collectivity without legitimate autonomous interests … the major hallmark of this culture is an emphasis on entrepreneurship within highly regulated relationships. (Schwartz, 1994b, p. 111).

It may seem confusing that while some achievement and power values came on top of the CC profile, at the level of value types only achievement differed significantly between TC and CC profile. This discrepancy can be resolved by noting two things. First, cultural change may occur in piecemeal rather than wholesale fashions. That is, even if no mean difference is observed for one broad value type or dimension, differences in individual items may still be evident. For example, the difference in the achievement value type was driven primarily by the items "successful" and "influential" (as opposed to "capable" and "ambitious") being rated significantly more important in the CC profile. Second, examining shifts in the value rankings can be of substantive interest as well. Although only the achievement value type was rated significantly more important in the CC profile, it was also clear that the rankings of both achievement and power rose in the CC profile. Specifically, whereas achievement ranked the 6th and power the

5th in the TC profile, achievement ranked the 1st and power the 2nd in the CC profile. This shift in relative positions is noteworthy because the increased importance placed on them in the CC profile deviated substantially from the pancultural average provided by Schwartz (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001) based on student samples from 54 countries, where achievement ranked the 4th and power the 10th.

Finally, to directly test whether the three cultural profiles were the product of shared cognitions rather than idiosyncratic perceptions, an agreement statistic developed from small-group research was used (Brown & Hauenstein, 2005).Even judging by criteria derived from small-group research which are probably too stringent for a population as diffuse as a national culture (Anderson & West, 1998; Fischer &Schwartz, 2011), the consensus over each profile was high. This is reassuring as it suggests that Chinese participant's cultural ratings tend to converge and point to an intersubjective reality instead of a number ofsubjective realities unrelated to each other. This provides further support that the traditional-contemporary distinction is a shared perception among Chinese people[4].

[4] However, two limitations should be noted about the agreement results. First, because only students from the same region were used to provide cultural ratings, it is possible that consensus may weaken with a more diverse sample. Second, agreement can be assessed at multiple levels of aggregation; it was calculated at the level of value types in this study. However, recent research that has examined within-culture consensus typically assesses agreement at the item level and reports lower than moderate averaged agreement (Fischer et al., 2009; Fischer &Schwartz, 2011). So it is also possible that a higher level of aggregation inflates agreement because it decreases variability among raters. Therefore, the present findings are not meant to imply that members of a culture always agree on what is valuable or important in their culture. The degree of within-culture consensus for a particular cultural group is a function of many factors including what the value is (Fischer &Schwartz, 2011), whether the value refers to the self or the culture (Fischer, 2006), diversity of the sample (Fischer &Schwartz, 2011), and cultural tightness-looseness (Gelfand et al., 2011; Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006).

Study 1b: Replication

Study Overview

Study 1b was designed to replicate the main findings of Study 1a and examine their robustness in another mainland Chinese sample with extensive exposure to sociocultural change in China. If similar results were found, they would provide convergent evidencefor dual representations of Chinese culture and increase our confidence in the generality of the results from Study 1a across urban centres.

Method

Participants

Participants were 154 undergraduate students at a University in Beijing, who volunteered for this study. The same data screening used in Study 1a identified 32 participants with careless responding, so the final sample size was 122 (70 females, 51 males, one did not indicate gender). The mean age was 19.28 years, ranging from 17 to 23 (*SD* = .86). Most of them (76.2%) were born in urban areas.

Procedures and Measures

Participants completed a survey in classrooms in their native language of Chinese. As in Study 1a, they filled out the Chinese SVS twice, first in terms of their personal values and second in terms of perceived cultural values in one of the three conditions (TC, CC, and Western). The instructions were identical to those used in Study 1a. The only difference was that participants in this study

were not asked the two questions that directly assessed their perception of cultural change in Study 1a. Again, data for personal values were analysed in Study 3a.

Results

Main Analyses

Cronbach's αs for the 10 value types were similar to those in Study 1a. They ranged from .64 to .89 for perceived cultural values. Moreover, the same negative item-total correlation (-.13) for Devout was observed. This further confirms that Devout may not be considered an example of Tradition as a cultural value in China. Removing this item increased the Cronbach's α for Tradition from .66 to .83.

To compare value types across value profiles, a MANOVA was conducted on the centered value scores with intersubjective perceptions of target culture as the grouping variable.Because there was no effect of gender or birthplace, these variables were not considered further. With the use of Wilk's Lambda, there was a significant multivariate main effect of target culture, $F(20, 220) = 9.73$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .47$. Subsequent univariate analyses showed that except forachievement and universalism, 8 value types differed significantly across conditions, Fs from 11.40 to 94.35, all ps $< .001$, partial η^2s from .16 to .61.

Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with either Tukey or Games-Howell replicated the TC-Western contrast; TC culture was rated to differ significantly from Western culture on 8 value types (except achievement and universalism). Compared with Westernculture, Conservation, Self-Transcendence, and Self-

Enhancement were rated more important and Openness to Change was rated less important in TC culture.

Similarly, most of the TC-CC similarities and differences were replicated. In 7 cases (conformity, tradition, benevolence, self-direction, hedonism, stimulation, and security), CC culture was significantly different from TC culture and was perceived to be more similar to Western culture. In the remaining 3 cases (universalism, power, and achievement), TC and CC cultures were rated similarly. Table 4 displays the uncentered means and standard deviations of each value types as a function of conditions.

To examine overall similarity among value profiles, the three profiles were aggregated in the same way from the entire list of 58 value items as Study 1a. The zero-order correlation between the two Chinese profiles was .77, again showing substantial overlap between the two. Both profiles were negatively correlated with the Western profile (TC: r = -.49; CC: r = -.20, although the latter was not significant (see Table 2). When the TC and the Western profiles were entered simultaneously in a regression model to predict the CC profile, they explained 63.7 % of the total variance, $F(2, 55) = .48.22$, $p< . 001$. The TC profile was positively associated with the CC profile, $\beta = .89$, $t = 9.51$, $p< .001$. Similar to Study 1a, the association between the CC and the Western profile became positive after the influence of the TC profile was partialled out, $\beta = .24$, $t = 2.55$, $p = .01$. Thus, results based on both zero-order correlations and regression analysis were replicated.

Supplementary Analyses

Table 4

Raw Means and Standard Deviations of the Ten Value Types in the Three Cultural Perception Conditions (Study 1b)

Value type	TC culture (n = 38)	CC culture (n = 39)	Western culture (n = 45)
Conformity	6.29	5.28	4.78
	(.71)	(.86)	(.96)
Tradition	6.25	5.20	3.61
	(.62)	(.87)	(1.24)
Security	6.17	5.55	5.03
	(.72)	(.84)	(.85)
Power	5.56	5.36	4.71
	(.89)	(1.13)	(1.15)
Achievement	5.64	5.36	5.60
	(.76)	(.67)	(1.03)
Hedonism	3.81	4.64	5.95
	(1.79)	(1.17)	(.91)
Stimulation	3.02	4.14	6.02
	(1.59)	(1.18)	(1.01)
Self-direction	4.08	4.54	6.23
	(1.38)	(1.04)	(.62)
Universalism	5.09	4.90	5.35
	(.93)	(.78)	(.92)
Benevolence	5.91	5.15	5.44
	(.65)	(.93)	(.89)

Note. TC = Traditional Chinese. CC = Contemporary Chinese.

The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

To assess agreement within this sample, the a_{wg} index was computed for each value profile. For the TC profile, the a_{wg} coefficients of value types ranged from .49 to .87, with a mean of .76. For the CC profile, they ranged from .72 to .90, with a mean of .82. Finally for the Western profile, they ranged from .66 to .86, with a mean of .78. There was more variation in agreement over specific value types for traditional Chinese culture, although the mean agreement was comparable to that in Study 1a. Agreement over contemporary Chinese culture was even stronger in this sample. Table 3 lists the a_{wg} coefficients as a function of value types and profiles.

To confirm that cultural continuity was more evident among core than peripheral cultural values, I first compared the content of top-rated values between the two Chinese profiles. Thirteen value items with the highest perceived importance[5] were selected from each profile and compared. There was an overlap of five items (38%) and they represented the value types of conformity, tradition, security, and power. I also compared the content of 11 values in the middle range of importance ratings (those that ranked 24th-34th). In contrast, there was no overlap of peripheral items (0%).

Finally, the core cultural valuesidentified as unique to the CC profile were categorized into their corresponding value types. Of the eight distinctive items, two (successful and capable) represents the achievement motivation, one (wealth) represents the power motivation, one (social order) represents the security motivation, one (wisdom) represents the universalism motivation, while the

[5] Top 13 instead of top 10 items were chosen because the last 3 items were tied in importance ratings.

remaining three (healthy, social recognition, and self-respect) could not be categorized.

Discussion

With a student sample from a different region, Study1b replicated all major findings of Study 1a. Both cultural stability and cultural change were implied by the intersubjective ratings of contemporary Chinese culture; where differences between the Chinese representations were evident, the contemporary representation was moving in the direction of Western individualism. Second, contemporary Chinese culture was perceived to share more core cultural values with traditional Chinese culture than peripheral cultural values. Third, more items associated with achievement and power were incorporated as core values of the contemporary profile; whereas they were ranked in the 5th and 6th place respectively in the traditional profile, they ascended to the 2nd and 3rd place in the contemporary profile. Finally, there was a strong degree of agreement among participants over the relative importance of values in each cultural profile. These results are consistent with the explanation that with both internal change and transnational influence, Chinese culture has shifted in the more individualistic direction while retaining its ancient roots.

Compared with Study 1a, the only noteworthy difference was that strongerevidence for what sets contemporary apart from traditional Chinese culture was found in this sample.The two profiles were found to differ significantly in seven (as opposed to five in Study1a) value types that cut across individualistic and collectivistic dimensions. They also shared a smaller

percentage of top-rated items (38% vs. 60%); in fact, they shared no content at all among the peripheral items (0% vs. 36%).

One possible explanation for this difference between studies is suggested by research on the perceptual effects of simultaneous presence of cultures (Chiu& Cheng, 2007). This line of research shows that as globalization brings symbols or products of different cultures together, one cognitive consequence of simultaneously activating representations of two or more cultures is perceptual contrastive effects. Once invoked, the perceptual contrast leads people to perceive cultures in more essentialist terms and exaggerate cultural differences and incompatibility (Cheng, Rosner, Chao, et al., 2010; Chiu, Mallorie, Keh, & Law, 2009; Fu & Chiu, 2007). Pertinent to the present study is Chen and Chiu (2010)'s finding that some regular exposure to foreign cultures may be required to facilitate the enhanced perception of cultural differences.They found that urban Chinese were better at differentiating Chinese culture fromWestern culture than rural Chinese in that the former were more likely to attribute Chinese moral values to Chinese exemplars and Western moral values to Western exemplars. This is presumably because compared with rural towns in China, foreign cultures have a strong and routine representation in urban centres and urbanites are more conditioned to attend to cultural differences. Based on this logic, what differentiates Beijing from Shanghai may be that as both historical and cultural centre of China, Beijing has a more vibrant presence of traditional culture preserved in the form of both symbolic resources and real historical relics. This

heightened sensitivity to cultural traditions may be responsible for perceiving more tension between traditional and contemporary Chinese culture.

In sum, Study 1b extends the generality of the Shanghai findings to another major urban centre. With the dual Chinese representations established in these two studies, Study 2 assesses the representation of Chinese culture shared among Chinese Canadians to see how it is similar to or different from these dual representations.

Study 2: Intersubjective Perceptions of Chinese Values "Home and Abroad"

Study Overview

The goal of Study 2 is to compare the dual representations in the mainland Chinese sample from Study 1b with Chinese representations in a group of Chinese Canadians and a group of European Canadians. Extending cross-cultural research on social representations of world history (Liu et al., 2005) and national character (e.g., Terracciano et al., 2005), this study focuses on representations of the "same" culture held by groups with varying engagement with Chinese culture. Comparing different groups helps test whether representations of Chinese culture are constructed in part by incorporating one's lived experiences from the local social conditions. Because the results of Study 1 suggest that mainland Chinese people's contemporary cultural representations correspond with the macro-level change, it is expected that Chinese Canadians' representations may be a manifestation of the intergroup context in which they are situated and their diasporic experience.

Specifically, I expected that perception of Chinese values among Chinese Canadians, particularly those without direct exposure, would be more traditional. That is, I expected their perception to be closer to the perception of traditional Chinese values held by mainland Chinese. This prediction is based on the different ways Chinese descendants gain knowledge and understanding of their heritage culture. First, many Chinese Canadians are unlikely to hold a well-defined representation of contemporary Chinese values. This is because they are personally removed from the sociocultural change in China and even though some

have secondary exposure through personal ties to China, the image of contemporary China will hardly be salient enough to override their overall perception of Chinese culture. On the contrary, for a pan-Chinese cultural representation to be shared among various distinct Chinese populations around the worldsuch as Chinese Canadians, such representation is most likely to be rooted in a common cultural denominator rather than what goes on in China in the present time. So a pan-Chinese representation shared beyond the borders of China may be stripped down to traditional forms at its core. Second, Chinese Canadians' engagement with Chinese culture may be qualitatively different from that of mainland Chinese'. Given limited direct access to heritage culture especially among later-generation minorities, family plays a more prominent role in the transmission and retention of heritage cultural traditions and practices (Hong & No, 2005; Phinney, Ong, & Madden, 2000; Umaña-Taylor, Bhanot, & Shin, 2006). The cultural representations transmitted to offspring from parents and grandparents may not be in sync with the culture of origin that continues to evolve since their migration. Cultural encapsulation occurs when descendants of immigrant families inherit cultural values that characterize an earlier historical era from their ancestral homeland (Kim, Yang, Atkinson, Wolfe, & Hong,2001). Because Chinese descendants born outside of a Chinese society may never have been fully exposed to or socialized into Chinese culture, let alone the culture of contemporary China, their perception of Chinese culture is more likely to be shaped by the processes described above. Thus, it was hypothesized that second-

generation (vs. first-generation) Chinese Canadians would hold a more traditional perception of Chinese values.

Another source of Chinese cultural knowledgeis stereotypes of Chinese culture from an out-group's perspective, that is, hetero-stereotypes that exist in the multicultural Canadian society. Although ethnic minorities often face negative stereotypes or evaluations imposed by the dominant out-group (e.g., Markus, 2008; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002), many stereotypes are mixed in content (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) and some stereotypical beliefs that emerge in the intergroup context may not be rejected but incorporated by ethnic minorities into the social process of in-group sense making. For Chinese Canadians, Chinese cultural knowledge also comes pre-packaged in the form of prevailing stereotypes of Chinese or similar Asian values. The hetero-stereotypes ofChinese values may serve to organize Chinese Canadians'understanding oftheir own ethnic group. So it is plausible thattheir own group perceptions or auto-stereotypesare shaped by the hetero-stereotypesthat exist in the Canadian society. Moreover,holding a stereotypical representation couldalso stem from the need to affirm Chinese Canadians' heritage identity as predicted by social identity theory and self-categorization theory (Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, Crisp, & Redersdorff,2006; Kosmitzki, 1996). This need for identity distinctiveness may increase the reliance on readily available hetero-stereotypes. Again, because Chinese descendants born outside of a Chinese society may not have expert knowledge of Chinese culture and instead are recipients of cultural stereotypes for extended periods of time, it

was hypothesized that second-generation (vs. first-generation) Chinese Canadians would hold a more stereotypical perception of Chinese values as well.

The distinction between auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes raises another question of how Chinese values defined by mainland Chinese compare with stereotypes of Chinese values in the Canadian society. Although not the main focus of this study, recent research on national character stereotypes suggests that the economic and political prowess of a nation facilitates intergroup sharing ofitsnational stereotypes and the convergence of auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes (Boster & Maltseva, 2006; Realo et al., 2009).For example, a strong agreement over the Big Five profile of a typical American was found between ratings provided by people from 49 cultures and ratings provided by Americans (Terracciano & McCrae, 2007). To the extent that the influence of Chinese culture is spreading around the world, it seems reasonable to expect at least a moderate degree of sharing of stereotypes of Chinese values between mainland Chinese and European Canadians.

A more interesting follow-up question is whether Canadians' stereotypes resemble mainland Chinese' traditional or contemporary representation more closely. Stereotypical beliefs tend to exaggerate or accentuate the differences between the in-group and the out-group (Hrebícková& Graf, 2013; Operario & Fiske, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Given the clear-cut contrast between traditional Chinese culture and Western culture shown in Study 1a and 1b, a focus on traditional Chinese values would allow maximum differences to be drawn between Chinese culture and Canadian culture. In addition, once formed,

stereotypes tend to be resistant to change. Canadians' stereotypes may be insensitive to actual change in Chinese culture either because it will take a considerable amount of time before they are revised to reflect an updated representation or because change in one Chinese society will not motivate the effort to overhaul the overall stereotype content. Therefore, it was predicted that Canadians' hetero-stereotypes would be more similar to mainland Chinese' auto-stereotypes of traditional culture.

To the extent that the construction of a Chinese representation is influenced by the broader context in which people are situated, a final question concerns whether perception is linked with identity for Chinese Canadians. A plethora of research on ethnic minorities has focused on different dimensions of racial and ethnic identity known as the identity content models (e.g., Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998;Yip& Fuligni, 2002). Thus,it will be interesting to examine whether and how Chinese Canadians' perception of Chinese value priorities affects the content of their Chinese identity, viz., the importance they attribute to their Chinese identity, evaluation of their Chinese identity, and emotional attachment to their Chinese identity. A tripartite model of social identity (Cameron, 2004) was adapted to measure these aspects of Chinese ethnic identity.

Method

Participants

Chinese participants were the same as those in Study 1b. The Canadian sample consisted of 111 Chinese Canadians and 50 European Canadians recruited

from introductory psychology students at the University of Alberta. Canadian participants were all Canadian permanent residents or citizens. After data screening, 102 Chinese Canadians (59 females, 42 males, one did not indicate gender) and 49 European Canadians (33 females and 16 males) were retained in the final Canadian sample. The mean age was 18.91 (*SD* = 1.65). Of the Chinese Canadian participants, half were born outside of Canada. To better capture the distinction between direct and indirect exposure to Chinese culture, generational status was recoded such that only those born in a Chinese society or its neighbouring countries were categorized as "first-generation" (G1; n = 46) Chinese Canadians and the rest were categorized as "second-generation" (G2; n = 56) Chinese Canadians. That is, those born in a non-Chinese society (e.g., USA and Germany) were treated as G2 instead of G1 Chinese Canadians. They were categorized this way because

they would have only indirect exposure to Chinese culture.The mean length of stay in Canada was 11 years (*SD* = 5.62) for the G1 group.

Procedures and Measures

Canadian participants completed the same value survey online in several group-testing sessions. After providing their personal value ratings, Chinese Canadian participants were asked to rate their perception of Chinese values without any further specification. This ensured that only their spontaneous representations of Chinese culture would be assessed. For European Canadian participants, to tap cultural stereotypes, they were instructed explicitly to provide

value ratings based on how Chinese culture is typically viewed in the Canadian society instead of their own personal judgment.

To measure Chinese ethnic identity for Chinese Canadian participants, Cameron's (2004) social identification scale was adapted. The scale consists of 12 items and the participants were asked to rate how much they agree with each statement on a 6-point scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 6 (*strongly agree*). Centrality refers to the importance of Chinese identity and was assessed by four items (e.g., "I often think about the fact that I am a member of my heritage group"). In-group affect reflects one's evaluation associated with being Chinese and was also measured by four items (e.g., "Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as a member of my heritage group"). In-group ties refers to the sense of connectedness to the Chinese community (e.g., "I have a lot in common with other members of my heritage group"). Internal consistency for the three subscales was satisfactory in this Chinese-Canadian sample: .74 (centrality), .76 (affect), .79 (hybridity). Composite scores were thus created for each subscale.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Cronbach's αs for the 10 value types ranged from .48 to .77 in the Chinese Canadian sample and from .38 to .82 in the European Canadian sample. The fact that αs were more variable for European Canadians may be because heterostereotypes tend to be less fine-grained than autostereotypes.However, the degree of within-group agreement over value types among Chinese and European Canadians, calculated as the a_{wg} index, was comparable to previous studies with

Chinese participants (see Table 5 for details). The a_{wg} coefficients had a mean of .78 (from .68 to .86) among G1 Chinese Canadians, .77 (from .63 to .86) among G2 Chinese Canadians, and .79 (from .72 to .86) among European Canadians.

Comparing Perceptions of Chinese Values

To systematically compare and contrast G1 and G2 Chinese Canadians' perception, European Canadians' stereotype, and mainland Chinese' dual perceptions, a single categorization variable was created to categorize the five different types of perception. A MANOVA was then conducted on centered value type scores with perception type (traditional by mainland Chinese, contemporary by mainland Chinese, G1 Chinese Canadians, G2 Chinese Canadians, European Canadians) as the grouping variable. Because age and gender ratio did not vary significantly across the groups, they were not considered in the following analyses.

MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate main effect, $F(40, 809.526) = 6.81$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .24$. Subsequent univariate analyses showed that all 10 value types differed significantly across the groups, Fs from 2.41 to 14.00, all ps $< .05$, partial η^2s from .04 to .20. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with either Tukey's test or Games-Howell test were conducted to test the hypotheses. The results are organized in three sets of comparisons: contrasting Chinese Canadians with mainland Chinese, contrasting Chinese Canadians with European Canadians, and contrasting mainland Chinese with European Canadians.

In the first set of comparisons, to test whether Chinese Canadians' representation was more traditional, a reasonable strategy would be to compare

Table 5

Agreement over Chinese ValuesIndexed by a_{wg} for Each Value Type within the Three Canadian Samples (Study 2)

Value type	a_{wg} G1 Chinese Canadians	a_{wg} G2 Chinese Canadians	a_{wg} European Canadians
Conformity	.78	.71	.77
Tradition	.86	.84	.81
Security	.82	.83	.83
Power	.79	.70	.76
Achievement	.68	.86	.76
Hedonism	.75	.63	.72
Stimulation	.73	.65	.74
Self-direction	.80	.82	.79
Universalism	.78	.85	.86
Benevolence	.80	.83	.84
Average	.78	.77	.79

only those value types that distinguished traditional Chinese profile from contemporary Chinese profile. Because Study 1b showed that the two profiles differed in 7 of the 10 value types (i.e., conformity, tradition, benevolence, self-direction, hedonism, stimulation, and security), comparisons were made only on these ones. Ratings from the G1 group were similar to the traditional representation in three value types (conformity, self-direction, and security) and they differed significantly from it in the other four (tradition, benevolence, hedonism, and stimulation). The differences were all in the direction of the contemporary Chinese representation. For the G2 group, their ratings were similar to the traditional representation in five value types (conformity, self-direction, hedonism, stimulation, and security). They differed significantly from it in the remaining two (tradition and benevolence); these differences were also in the direction of the contemporary representation. It appears that insofar as traditional culture is in the sense mainland Chinese define it, Chinese Canadians' spontaneous perception of Chinese values is not traditional across the board. However, compared with G1, the G2 group's representation leaned more toward the traditional end. Therefore, the hypothesis that second-generation Chinese Canadians would hold a traditional representation of Chinese values also received some support[6].

[6] If it is true that the more removed one is from China, the more traditional one's perception of Chinese culture is, we should also observe this trend even within the G1 group. That is, the longer they had been in Canada, the more traditional their perception would be. For this purpose, I correlated their length of stay with the centered cultural ratings. The two significant (or close to being significant) correlations were with hedonism (p = .03) and stimulation (p = .057). Both correlations were in the expected direction – the longer they had been in Canada and hence more removed from direct exposure to Chinese culture, the less importance they attributed to hedonism and stimulation for Chinese culture.

The second set of pairwise comparisons contrasted Chinese Canadians' representation with the stereotypical profileprovided by European Canadians. It was found that Chinese Canadians held a perception of Chinese values that is more similar to the stereotypical view. Specifically, six value types were rated similarly between the G1 group and European Canadians; eight value types were rated similarly between the G2 group and European Canadians. Thus, the hypothesis that second-generation Chinese Canadians would hold a more stereotypical view of Chinese values received limited support. Among the value types that did differ significantly (ps < .05), the G1 group rated tradition and universalism less important and hedonism and power more important in Chinese culture than did European Canadians. Similarly, the G2 group rated universalism less important and power more important in Chinese culture than did European Canadians.

Finally, the set of contrasts between mainland Chinese and European Canadians helps tease the meaning of traditional values apart from the meaning of stereotypes of Chinese values in the Canadian society. Again, the comparisons were made on the 7 value types that distinguished traditional Chinese profile from contemporary Chinese profile. The stereotypical representation was comparable tothe traditional representationin five value types. The two representations differedin tradition (p = .056) and benevolence (p = .001). European Canadians rated both of them less important than did mainland Chinese. These findings suggest that although stereotypes of Chinese culturein the Canadian society

comprise mostly of antiquated Chinese values, these two representations are not identical.

In addition to comparing value types across groups, additional support was sought by computing correlations among value profiles similar to Study 1a and 1b. These correlations would show how closely the Chinese representations were associated with each other at the profile level. Instead of comparing mean differences across groups, profile correlations reflect the degree of similarity in terms of the profile shape (Furr, 2010; De Leersnyder, Mesquita, & Kim, 2011). A high correlation indicates a similar pattern of scores between the profiles. Only 47 value items with culturally equivalent meanings were used.

The profile correlations strengthened the results from comparing individual value types. First, G1's representation resembled mainland Chinese' contemporary representation slightly more (r = .79) than mainland Chinese' traditional representation (r = .73). When both traditional and contemporary profiles were entered simultaneously in a regression model, both profiles independently predicted G1's representation ($\beta_{traditional}$= .28, p = .06;$\beta_{contemporary}$ = .57, p< .001). In contrast, G2's representation was closer to the traditional representation (r = .75) than the contemporary one (r = .67). In a similar regression with both traditional and contemporary profiles entered simultaneously, only the traditional profile independently predicted G2's representation, β = .58, p = .001. Second, the G2 held a representation of Chinese values that was correlated more strongly with the stereotypical view provided by European Canadians (r = .91) than did the G1 (r = .77). Finally, European

Canadians' stereotypical representation was correlated more strongly with the traditional representation (r = .74) than the contemporary one (r = .57). When both traditional and contemporary profiles were entered simultaneously in a regression model, only the traditional profile independently predicted the stereotypical representation, β = .77, p< .001.

Linking Perception with Identity

To test whether G1 and G2 Chinese Canadians' perception of Chinese values was associated with the three dimensions of Chinese identity, I correlated the centered cultural ratings on the 10 value types with identity centrality, affect, and ties respectively.

Among the G1, identity centrality was correlated positively with universalism (r = .45, p = .002) and negatively with achievement (r = -.41, p = .005) and power (r = -.49, p = .001). Affect was correlated positively with universalism (r = .28, p = .06) and benevolence (r = .29, p = .05) and negatively with power (r = -.33, p = .03). Finally, ties was correlated negatively with power (r = -.25, p = .09).

Among the G2, centrality was correlated positively with hedonism (r = .29, p = .03) and negatively with conformity (r = -.25, p = .06) and achievement (r = -.25, p = .06). Affect was correlated positively with self-direction (r = .31, p = .02) and negatively with achievement (r = -.32, p = .02). Finally, ties was correlated positively with hedonism (r = .26, p = .05) and negatively with conformity (r = -.30, p = .03), tradition (r = -.29, p = .03), and achievement (r = -.33, p = .01).

To summarize, the pattern of the associations indicates that representing Chinese culture in more traditional or stereotypical ways had a generally negative effect on maintaining a positive ethnic identity among Chinese Canadians.

Discussion

Study 2 examined how the concept of "Chineseness" is represented among Chinese Canadians and non-Chinese Canadians and compared and contrasted these representations with the traditional and contemporary representations generated in China. Below, each set of the comparisons is discussed separately.

Supporting the hypothesis that the more removed from a Chinese society Chinese descendants are, the more traditional their Chinese representation will be, Chinese Canadians born outside of a Chinese society perceived Chinese values to be more similar to what mainland Chinese attributed to traditional Chinese culture. Chinese Canadians born in a Chinese society, if anything, perceived Chinese values to be more similar to what mainland Chinese attributed to contemporary Chinese culture. Comparable results were obtained via either mean comparisons of individual value types or analysis of profile similarity. Because a pan-Chinese representation is likely founded on common cultural traditions that unite different Chinese communities, these results suggest that the G2 group hasn't quite incorporated cultural change in China into their relatively traditional representation. Presumably because of more direct exposure, however, the G1 group showed more sensitivity to the traditional-contemporary divide in Chinese culture and hence did not lean towards either side in its own representation. By including a group of people who are both cultural insiders and outsiders, the

current study extends recent research on the relations between auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes (Hrebícková& Graf, 2013; Terracciano & McCrae, 2007). People's representation of the same in-group culture may diverge because of their differential access to the pool of evolving cultural knowledge. Therefore, the comparison between mainland Chinese and Chinese Canadians provides support to the general thesis that the notion of Chinese culture is not fixed; rather, its construction evolves to the extent that the "manifest culture" some, but not others, are embedded under changes.

Further evidence for the fluidity of Chinese representation comes from the comparison between Chinese Canadians and European Canadians. Given the substantial overlap between G2's representation and Chinese stereotypes in the larger Canadian society, another source of Chinese cultural knowledge for Chinese immigrants beyond the first generation seems to be how Chinese culture is perceived by the majority group. This finding may come as a surprise from the theoretical perspective that differentiates frameworks of meaning shared among and appreciated by in-group members from the set of ideas which are imposed by people outside the group and arise in the intergroup context(Markus, 2008, 2010). This latter set of ideas including stereotypes are often contested, if not resisted, by the ethnic groups subjected to them
(in the case of Asian minorities, see Cheryan& Bodenhausen, 2000; Cheryan& Monin, 2005; Siy& Cheryan, 2013).On the contrary, the current finding is consistent with the classic "looking-glass self" perspective that people's appraisal of their in-group lines up with reflected appraisal (Cooley, 1956; Mead, 1934).

There are a number of reasons why G2 immigrantsmight be particularly influenced by hetero-stereotypes. First, stigmatized groups such as African Americans and African immigrants tend to dissociate their private evaluation of the in-group from the generally negative public views, for example, with the use of the collective self-esteem scale (Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Brodnax, 1994).This separation of private and public regard presumably serves as a strategy that protects members of a stigmatized group from negative evaluations from the society at large while maintaining a positive group identity on its own terms (Crocker& Major, 1989; Wiley, Perkins, &Deaux, 2008). So the finding that Chinese Canadians are receptive to the hetero-stereotypes in the Canadian society may reflect the fact that Chinese immigrants are not generally stigmatized or that East Asian cultures stress the importance of assimilating the views of generalized others intoself-views (Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). As a matter of fact, in contrast to African Americans, private and public regard are found to be associated positively with each other among Asian immigrants (Crocker et al., 1994; Wiley et al., 2008). Second and relatedly, stereotypes of Chinese culture were measured in terms of values in this study, the content of which is largely neutral or positive in valence. So it is also possible that Chinese immigrants are more willing to incorporate the majority views of Chinese culture on relatively positive dimensions. Third, the generational differencein the extent of drawing on Chinese cultural stereotypes is consistent with research on the different contexts of socialization as a function of generational status (Deaux et al., 2007; Wang, Minervino, & Cheryan, 2012; Wiley et al., 2008). While the

frame of reference for G1 is more likely to include the country of origin, G2 immigrants' experience with their heritage culture is more likely to result indirectly from prolonged socialization into the Canadian society. Last, while this study provided evidence that Chinese Canadians incorporated stereotypes in constructing a Chinese representation, it did not test the idea that theywould be equally willing to assimilate stereotypes intotheir self-appraisals. On the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that Asian immigrants sometimes resist the application of reflected appraisals to themselves (Noels, Leavitt, & Clément, 2010), even when the stereotype is positive (Cheryan& Bodenhausen, 2000; Siy& Cheryan, 2013).

The different context of Chinese cultural socialization for G2 immigrants was also noteworthy inanother way. G2 immigrants rated achievement more important to Chinese culture than mainland Chinese did for either traditional (p = .001) or contemporary Chinese culture (p< .001).In comparison, this tendency was weaker among the G1 immigrants. This acculturation pattern might be explained by increasing exposure to Asian stereotypes in North American such as the "model minority" stereotype (Cheryan &Bodenhausen, 2011; Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005). The "model minority" label describes Asian immigrants as a hardworking and achievement-oriented group that has attained educational and financial success relative to other immigrant groups. A common explanation attributes the achievements solely to cultural values Asian immigrants inherit from their cultures of origin. However, these data are more consistent with an alternative explanation that achievements of Asian immigrants are a joint product

of cultural values and their minority status (Sue & Okazaki, 1990; see also Steinberg, Dornbusch, & Brown, 1992). The advantage of this alternative explanation is that it highlights the functional fitness of cultural values such that achievement values serve as an important means of upward mobility for Asian minorities. Being more exposed to the outcome of this interplay between traditional values and minority status such as the "model minority" stereotype, G2 Chinese immigrants may therefore construct a representation of Chinese culture that is particularly high on achievement values. Similarly, this functionalism perspective that considers the social conditions a group faces also explains why the importance of achievement and power is on the rise in mainland China nowadays.

Finally, it was found that hetero-stereotypes of Chinese values provided by European Canadians converged more with mainland Chinese auto-stereotypes of traditional Chinese values than those of contemporary Chinese values. Apart from providing additional support for previous research showing that auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes can be similar (Terracciano & McCrae, 2007), the current finding further suggests that the content of stereotypical beliefs from an out-group's perspective persists despite being obsolete from anin-group's perspective (Shimpi&Zirkel, 2012).If hetero-stereotypes were to be updated at all,they seem to change only over longer periods of time (Madon et al., 2001; Terracciano & McCrae, 2007).Once formulated, the hetero-stereotypes of Chinese culture seem to continue to retaina relatively traditional profile to this date in Canada. So the stickiness of this antiquated representation in the Canadian society may be an

important reason why G2 Chinese immigrants hold on to a similar representation as well.

The current study also isolated a factor that influences Chinese Canadians' attitudes toward and beliefs of their ethnic identity. Several perceived Chinese values were found to correlate with identity centrality, affect, and ties. The correlational pattern suggests that holding a more traditional or stereotypical perception of Chinese culture (in terms of prioritizing conformity, achievement and power over hedonism, universalism, and self-direction) might actually preclude Chinese Canadians from attaching importance to, thinking positively about, or feeling connected to their ethnic identity. This was true in both generations. Although preliminary, the current findinghas implications for the broader ethnic identity research in that perception of the content of ethnic values may be consequential for ethnic pride and connection. It is noteworthy that in general, representing Chinese culture in more traditional or stereotypical ways has a negative effect on Chinese Canadians' ethnic identity. Although more research is needed to clarify this relation, it seems that several factors are at work. This negative effect of holding a more traditional or stereotypical representation of ethnic values may be the result of feeling conflicted about a larger gap between ethnic and mainstream values (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005), ethnic values being more difficult to internalize (Phinney, Ong, & Madden, 2000), feeling pressured and constrained by an antiquated and stereotypical portrayal of their ethnic group (Cheryan& Bodenhausen, 2000; Siy& Cheryan, 2013), or any combination of the above. Therefore, although some Chinese immigrants such as

the G2 are willing to incorporate antiquated hetero-stereotypes into their auto-stereotypes of Chinese values, the former nevertheless exerts a negative effect on subjective identification with Chinese culture.

CHAPTER 3:

Sociocultural Change and Personal Values

(Study 3a and Study 3b)

Study 3a: Person-Culture Congruence in Values

Study Overview

Study 1a and 1b established that the dual representations of Chinese culture coexist with a representation of Western culture in contemporary China. Study 2 found that the notion of Chinese culture is somewhat fluid and its construction reflects local social dynamic; while mainland Chinese' perception of Chinese values has shifted to accommodate the sociocultural change they experience, Chinese Canadians' perceptions, especially that of those born outside of a Chinese society,seems to be informed more by traditional Chinese culture and cultural stereotypes in the Canadian society. Thus, Study 2also provides indirect support for the notion that mainland Chinese' updating of their cultural representation is the unique consequence of living through change in China.

So far, the studies have only addressed the collective perceptual consequences of sociocultural change in China. Little is known of whether the influence ofchanging cultural representation uncovered also extends to individual psychological tendencies. In fact, there is a concern that intersubjective perceptions of contemporary Chinese culture do not reflect actual change but a lay theory of social change. The concern is substantiated by recent research (Kashima et al., 2009) showing that people typically believe societies evolve from more moral but less competent communities (i.e., collectivism) to more competence but less moral communities (i.e., individualism). Thus, the logical next step is to complement the intersubjective approach to sociocultural changein China with

further evidence at the individual level. To be consistent with the previous focus on values, the next two studies explore the impact of change and the concomitant revision of the older representation on personal values. A straightforward hypothesis is that individuals are responsive to change in the local cultural ecology and cultural change should result in change in the average value importance in the population affected by it. For example, Bardi and Goodwin (2011) proposed a model of individual value change and outlined five processes of change through both automatic and effortful routes (priming, adaptation, identification, consistency maintenance, and direct persuasion).

Study 3a takes an initial step in this direction with a cross-sectional design. Unlike cross-sectional studies that compare demographic differences in personal values, this study assesses the degree of congruence between personal values and perceived cultural values within the same group of people. By measuring values at both individual and intersubjective level, the cultural importance ratings provide a reference point against which personal values can be evaluated, a standpoint that is missing in studies that only assess personal values. Thus, measuring values at both levels allows for a direct comparison of the match between personal values and each of the three cultural representations (traditional Chinese, contemporary Chinese, and Western). It was hypothesized that personal values among Chinese university students are more adapted to contemporary China and therefore they should be more similar to the cultural values associated with contemporary Chinese culture and imported values associated with Western culture than antiquated cultural values.

Another goal was to test the value congruence in another independent sample in which people were not prompted to think of cultural values at all. This would further demonstrate that the hypothesized results were not dependent on explicitly contemplating on cultural values first. A secondary purpose was to explore whether value congruence would also extend to cultural identification (Wan, Chiu, Peng &Tam, 2007; Wan et al., 2007). Specifically, will a stronger congruence with Western cultural values be associated with more strongly identifying with Western culture? Likewise, will a weaker congruence with traditional Chinese cultural values be associated with weaker identification with traditional Chinese culture?

Method

Participants and Measures

Chinese participants were from the same Shanghai and Beijing samples in Study 1a and 1b. As mentioned above, before making cultural ratings everyone rated the importance of SVS values to the self first. Those self-importance ratings were thus used as a measure of actual values of individuals, which are distinct from intersubjective values as shared cultural representations. By having participants complete the SVS for personal values before making cultural ratings, this procedure reduced the concern that rating perception of cultural values first would bias their responses on personal values.

In addition, a separate group of 47 participants was recruited in Beijing. These participants rated the importance of SVS values to the self only. After data screening, the final sample consisted of 37 participants (22 males and 15 females)

with a mean age of 19.54 years. Seventy-three percent of them were born in urban areas.

To address value congruence would extend to cultural identification, I included a measure of identification with traditional Chinese culture and Western culture respectively. Participants indicated on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (*not at all*) to10 (*very strongly*), how strongly they identified with traditional Chinese/Western culture, how important traditional Chinese/Western culture was to their identity, and how much they liked traditional Chinese/Western culture. Internal consistency for both identification measures was satisfactory (traditional Chinese identification, .82; Western identification, .75), hence responses to each measure were averaged.

Results

Samples from Study 1a and 1b

Because the following procedures to assess congruence made use of either value profile or individual value items, reliability of the value types measured at the individual level was not a concern. Nonetheless, Cronbach's αs are reported here to be consistent with previous research. They ranged from .55 to .80 in the Shanghai sample and from .38 to .78 in the Beijing sample.

I adopted three analytic strategies to assess the degree of congruence between personal values and one of the three cultural representations. In the first strategy, congruence was computed at the group level. In other words, I correlated the actual value profile aggregated across participants with the aggregated cultural value profiles from Study 1a and 1b. A higher correlation would indicate that as a

whole, the group's actual value profile resembles a particular cultural profile. In the second strategy, I adopted profile analysis (Rohan & Zanna, 1996; Wan et al., 2007) to create congruence indices at the individual level. Specifically, I correlated each participant's actual value profile with one of the cultural value profiles (i.e., TC, CC, and Western). These correlations represented the extent to which one's actual value profile matches the collective perception of the value profile for the target culture. Because three congruence indices were created for each participant, a within-participants ANOVA would reveal which cultural profile the sample was most congruent with. The third indication of congruence is also computed at the individual level. It indexes personal endorsement of culturally important values. Instead of examining overall fit, this procedure focuses on one's internalization of core cultural values, that is, those with highest perceived importance. Each participant's mean personal endorsement of top-rated cultural values in each profile was calculated. Strongly endorsing culturally important values would denote fuller acceptance and internalization. In all three cases, the whole list of 58 value items was used.

In Study 1a, following the first strategy, the actual value profile was correlated positively with the Western value profile, $r = .44$, $p < .001$, but not significantly with either TC or CC value profile (see Table 2). Given the shared variances among the three cultural profiles, I also entered them simultaneously as predictors of the actual profile in a regression model. Only Western and TC profiles made independent contribution to the prediction of the actual profile ($\beta_{Western} = .83$, $p < .001$; $\beta_{TC} = .88$, $p = .001$). The model explained 46.0 % of the

total variance, $F(3, 54) = 15.35$, $p < .001$.In the second profile analysis, a within-participants ANOVA was performed on the three congruence indices after they were Fisher *r*-to-Z transformed. This yielded a significant effect, $F(1.09, 118.62) = 22.55$, $p < .001$. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment showed that the sample congruence with the Western profile ($M = .29$) was significantly higher than both congruence with the TC ($M = .12$) and the CC profile ($M = .12$), $ps < .001$. In the third analysis, an ANOVA was conducted with personal endorsement of 10 TC, CC, and Western values with the highest perceived importance as repeated measures. This yielded a significant effect, $F(1.23, 133.68) = 6.78$, $p = .007$. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment showed that participants rated both top 10 Western ($M = 5.34$) and CC cultural values ($M = 5.28$) as more personally important than top 10 TC values ($M = 5.10$), $ps < .05$.

Moving to Study 1b, the actual value profile was correlated positively with both Western profile, $r = .50$, $p < .001$ and CC profile, $r = .43$, $p = .001$, but not significantly with TC profile (see Table 2). When the actual profile was regressed simultaneously on all three cultural profiles, only Western and CC profiles made independent contribution to the prediction of the actual profile ($\beta_{Western} = .70$, $p < .001$; $\beta_{CC} = .39$, $p = .01$). The model explained 56.4 % of the total variance, $F(3, 54) = 23.31$, $p < .001$.Moreover, a within-participants ANOVA performed on the Fisher *r*-to-Z transformed congruence indices revealed a significant effect, $F(1.21, 154.98) = 30.472$, $p < .001$. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment showed that the sample congruence with

both Western (M = .29) and CC profile (M = .24) was significantly higher than congruence with the TC profile (M = .11), ps < .001. Finally, an ANOVA conducted with the three variables of personal endorsement of core cultural values as repeated measures revealed a significant effect, $F(1.45, 185.59) = 15.84$, $p <$ .001. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment showed that the actual importance ratings of top 10 CC cultural values (M = 5.83) were significantly higher than those of top 10 W cultural values (M = 5.66) or top 12 TC cultural values (M = 5.56), ps < .01.

In both studies, students' personal values bore more overall resemblance with the Western value profile at both group and individual levels. Even when the influence of all three profiles was considered all at once, the Western profile consistently made independent contribution to the prediction of the actual profile. When personal endorsement of core cultural values was examined, it seemed to be aligned with the CC profile most, the Western profile next, and the TC profile the least. Overall, personal values of the two samples were most congruent with the Western profile in terms of overall similarity and were most congruent with the contemporary profile in term of core cultural values.

New Sample

Using the intersubjective data from Study 1b, the congruence findings above were all replicated in the new sample. The actual value profile of the sample was positively correlated with both Western profile, r = .57, $p <$ .001, and CC profile, r = .28, p = .03.When the actual profile was regressed simultaneously on all three cultural profiles, only Western and TC profiles made independent

contribution to the prediction of the actual profile ($\beta_{Western}$ = .77, p< .001; β_{TC} = .32, p = .07). The model explained 52.0 % of the total variance, $F(3, 54) = 19.47$, p< .001.With the same post-hoc pairwise comparisons, the sample congruence with both Western (M = .32) and CC profile (M = .17) was significantly higher than its congruence with the TC profile (M = .07), ps < .01. Its actual importance ratings of top 10 CC cultural values (M = 5.52) were significantly higher than those of top 12 TC cultural values (M = 5.29), p = .02. The importance ratings of top 10 W cultural values (M = 5.58) were also higher than those of top 12 TC cultural values, but the difference was not significant, p = .20, presumably because of the relatively small sample size.

When the two types of cultural identification were compared, a pattern that ran counter to the consistent congruence findings emerged. A repeated-measures ANOVA showed that while participants identified strongly with TC culture (M = 7.34), their identification with Western culture was moderate (i.e., just above the midpoint, M = 5.40), $F(1, 36) = 28.21$, p< .001. In other words, despite the clear tendency to exhibit a stronger congruence with Western than traditional Chinese culture in values, participants' identity claims showed the opposite pattern. Interestingly, however, the two identities were not correlated, r = .04.

To further investigate this issue, I regressed TC cultural identification on overall congruence with TC cultural values and personal endorsement of top 12 TC cultural values (while controlling for main ratings of all values) respectively. In both cases, congruence predicted TC cultural identification significantly, ps

<.01, and explained a moderate amount of its variance, 20.3% and 27.5%. Thus, consistent with research showing that value congruence serves as a meaningful basis for cultural identification to occur (Wan et al., 2007), the more one's values are congruent with perceived traditional Chinese values, the stronger their identification with the culture. When identification with Western culture was regressed on overall congruence with Western cultural values and personal endorsement of top 10 Western cultural values (while controlling for main ratings of all values) respectively, however, neither congruence index predicted Western cultural identification, *p*s > .77. Unlike the case of identification with traditional Chinese culture, Western cultural identification was disassociated from the match between one's values and Western cultural values.

Discussion

Study 3a looked beyond revisions of the collective representation of Chinese values in contemporary China and instead focused on values held by individuals. Because personal values and cultural representations were measured independently, person-culture congruence could be directly calculated and compared across different cultural profiles. Results from this initial examination showed that across three analytic methods, Chinese university students' personal values were consistently more congruent with perceived Western and contemporary Chinese values than perceived traditional Chinese values. The same results were replicated in a new sample in which they did not first rate their perception of any cultural values. These findingsare consistent with the hypothesis

that personal values change in a direction similar to the change of the larger sociocultural environment.

It was also found that when congruence was assessed in terms of overall profile similarity, Chinese students' personal values were most congruent with perceived Western values. When congruence was assessed in terms of personal endorsement of core cultural values, however, it was the important contemporary Chinese values that Chinese students tended to value most themselves. Because overall similarity considers the entire list of value items and core cultural values only consist of top-rated ones, attending to the differences between these indices of congruence reveals a nuanced pattern in the personal value profiles. It appears that while the actual university students' profiles resemble the Western profile most closely across both relatively unimportant and relatively important values, these students haven't assimilated core Western values to the same extent as core contemporary Chinese values into the top of their value systems. Therefore, core Western values such as freedom, independence, and equality have not been accepted as most personally important. It is also interesting to note that despite some overlap in core values between the Chinese profiles (see Study 1a and 1b), personal endorsement of core contemporary values was consistently stronger than that of core traditional values. Taken together, these facts may suggest that contemporary China is most affordant to valuing core Chinese valuesthat are unique to its contemporary cultural form.

A secondary purpose of this study was to explore whether value congruence would also extend to identification with an in-group (Chinese) and an

out-group (Western) culture. Consistent with the intersubjective approach that theorizes core value endorsement as antecedent to cultural identification (Wan & Chiu, 2008; Wan et al., 2007), both overall congruence with traditional Chinese values and personal endorsement of core traditional values predicted identification with traditional Chinese culture. Contrary to the intersubjective approach, neither overall congruence nor personal endorsement predicted identification with Western culture.

These findings have a couple of implications for understanding the relations between value congruence and cultural identification in contemporary China. First, although aligning oneself with traditional Chinese values predicted identification with traditional Chinese culture, the overall strong identification coincides with the overall lack of value congruence as demonstrated across three independent samples. These somewhat contradictory results suggest that there may be people whose value hierarchies are not congruent with traditional values nonetheless expressing a strong traditional Chinese identity. So in addition to affirming people whose values are more traditional, a strong sense of identification with traditional Chinese culture may serve other psychological functions than value congruence (see Study 4b).

Second, personally endorsing core Western values is insufficient to lead to stronger identification with Western culture. Contrary to the positive relation betweenpersonal congruence with traditional Chinese values and strength of cultural identification, the overall moderate identification with Western culture coincides with the overall strong value congruence. This dissociation of value

concordance from identity suggests that they may be distinct processes in contemporary China. On the one hand, some Chinese people may desire a westernized identity for its status symbol resulting from the global dominance of Western culture, but not for its compatibility with their value systems. Just like some non-English users profess a desire to learn English because of their romanticized imagination of the English-speaking culture (Piller & Takahashi, 2006), people in non-Western cultures may also aspire to a Western selfhood even if they judge their actual self to be different from this ideal self (Hashimoto, 2011). On the other hand, although value congruence can lead to a positive attitude towards an out-group culture (Guan et al., 2011), it may take more than just value congruence for non-Western people to come to embrace a Western culture as an in-group culture. For example, acculturation research suggests that extended physical contact with a new culture may be necessary to perceive oneself as an accepted member of a newly acquired culture (e.g., Sam & Berry, 2006). However, it is also important to note that although these data uncover likely distinct processes of value endorsement and cultural identification for Western culture, its broader implications resonate with the message of the emerging research on globalization-based acculturation (S. X. Chen, Benet-Martínez, & Bond, 2008) that change in both values and cultural identity should be studied as a growing number of adolescents and young adults worldwide grow up in local cultures transformed by global forces (Arnett, 2002; Jensen, 2003; Jensen & Arnett, 2012).

Overall, Chinese university students residing in Shanghai and Beijing embraced imported Western values in their personal values, particularly those compatible with contemporary Chinese values that have gained central importance amidst the concurrent societal change. At the same time, their personal values were least congruent with traditional Chinese values, although interestingly this lack of value congruence did not seem to undermine their retention of a strong identification with traditional culture on average. Finally, although value congruence with Western culture and identification with Western culture were found to be distinct processes, the latter was nevertheless moderate in strength and seemed to coexist with a traditional Chinese identitythat was stronger in strength.

Study 3b: Change in Individualism-Collectivism: A Cross-Temporal Analysis of the World Values Survey

Study Overview

Study 3a showed that Chinese university students' personal values were more congruent with contemporary Chinese values and Western values than with traditional Chinese values. Illuminating as the findings are, they are limited in two significant ways. First, their generalizability is restricted by the use of university samples from two of the largest urban centres in China. Nationally representative samples are needed before any conclusion about value change in the general population can be drawn. Second, the cross-sectional data in Study 3a cannot speak directly to the effect of change on values. Because a corollary of the hypothesis on cultural change implies mean-level change in the average value importance in the population affected by it, cross-sectional data is principally ill-suited for this question.A more appropriate analysis should be a time-lagged analysis (e.g., Twenge & Campbell, 2001; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008) such thatdifferent birth cohorts who are similar in age but grew up in different historical periods are compared. For these two reasons, Chinese data in the present study were obtained from the World Values Survey (WVS). As the largest international project conducted on attitudes, values, and beliefs, WVS has been administered to representative samples in more than a total of 70 countries since its inception in 1981. As of 2009, five waves of WVS have been completed, which provide invaluable time-series data.

Two broad dimensions of cultural variation that emerged from WVS research are traditional versus secular-rational dimension and survival versus self-expression values (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The first dimension contrasts the importance of religion, authority, and traditional family values with preference to the opposite. The second dimension contrasts materialist values such as economic security with postmaterialist values such as tolerance and well-being. Most importantly, it has been shown that economic development is associated with somewhat predictable cultural change on the two dimensions. Industrialization promotes a shift from traditional to secular-rational values, whereas the transition into post-industrial society brings a shift towards self-expression values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

In addition, several changes were made to suit the specific purpose of the present study. First, because the purview of the WVS investigation is broad, items measuring the two dimensions are not all consistent with psychological conceptualization of values. Thus, the original items were trimmed first to form a conceptually tighter cluster. National samples from Chinese WVS datasets were then compared on the mean scores of those smaller sets of items across waves. Second, additional items that were not selected to tap the WVS dimensions were used as well. Again, to be consistent with the conceptual definition of individualism-collectivism values, they were obtained from previous research that has empirically validated them against external indices of individualism-collectivism (Hamamura, 2012).

Method

Data

Chinese data were available in four out of the five waves of WVS (1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2007). Because the earliest Chinese survey (1989-1993) sampled mostly urban centres located in East Coast instead of based on a nationally representative sample (Welzel, 2012), data from this wave were excluded from the following analyses. The more recent three waves were each based on a representative sample of 1000-2000 respondents (n = 1000, n = 1500, and n = 2015), aged 18 years and older.

First, to select items that could approximate the conceptualization of values consistent with Schwartz's framework, several changes were made to the traditional vs. secular-rational and survival vs. self-expression dimensions. Following Li and Bond (2010), I first removed those items that are best thought of measuring constructs related to, yet distinct from values. Examples include "Abortion/homosexuality is very justifiable" (injunctive norm), "Respondent has not signed and would not sign a petition" (behaviour or behavioural intention), and "Respondent describes self as not very happy" (subjective well-being). The items that were retained were from the autonomy index tapping traditional/secular-rational dimension and the material/postmaterial index tapping survival/self-expression dimension. The autonomy index was an expanded composite of 8 items (see Li & Bond, 2010), which represented qualities respondents could consider important for children to learn. These qualities were independence, obedience, good manners, imagination, determination, religious faith, and thrift. A score of 0 was assigned if a particular quality was not

mentioned by the respondent and a quality that was mentioned would receive a score of 1. The material/postmaterial index was a composite of 4 items, which measures the relative priority to self-expression and quality of life over economic and physical security. The index had three categories, with 1 being materialist, 2 being mixed, and 3 being postmaterialist.

Second, five additional items used in previous research to represent individualism-collectivism were obtained from the WVS questionnaire (Hamamura, 2012). The reason for using them is that their conceptual linkage with individualism-collectivism were verified by correlating mean scores on these items across societies from the most recent wave with three international indices: Hofstede's (2001) national scores on individualism, the index of pronoun drop (Kashima & Kashima, 1998), and the index of pathogen prevalence (Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008; Murray & Schaller, 2010). For each of the retained items, the average correlation with the three indices was at least |.30| in the theorized direction (Hamamura, 2012). The items are as follows: "Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them" (family relationships; collectivism if answering "always", individualism if answering "earned"; only available in two waves), "Do you agree that one of your main goals in life has been to make your parents proud?"(family relationships; collectivism if agreeing on a 4-point scale;),"How important is friend?" (importance of friendship; individualism if answering important on a 4-point scale;), "Do you agree that you make a lot of effort to live up to what your friends expect?" (social relationships; collectivism if agreeing on a 4-point scale;),

and "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" (general trust; individualism if choosing the former, collectivism if choosing the latter;).

Results

Analyses were conducted on the traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression dimensions first. Because different items were selected to measure the traditional/secular-rational dimension, a principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted to test whether a one-factor solution was warranted. A one-factor solution was considered acceptable if all items loaded in the same direction on this factor in all three waves. Because two items (good manners and religious faith) did not appear in all waves, a series of PCA was first performed on the remaining six items that were constant across the waves. Determination loaded on a second factor after the first one was extracted in all three waves and thrift's loading was in the opposite direction in the 2005-2007 wave compared with the earlier waves. These two items were thus removed from the autonomy index and the remaining four items were factor analysed again. There was clear support for a one-factor solution. Only one factor had an eigenvalue larger than 1 in data from any of the time periods and it accounted for 34.7%, 34.9%, and 33.1% of the total variance, respectively. All factor loadings exceeded |.32| across the three waves. Therefore, the final autonomy index consisted of independence, obedience, imagination, and responsibility. Because of negative loadings, the obedience item was subtracted from an average of the other three items to form a composite score on the traditional/secular-rational

dimension for each respondent. The composite scores ranged from -1 to 1. The higher the scores, the more important autonomy values are considered.

A one-way ANOVA was performed on the autonomy index and it was found that the assumption of homogeneity of variances[7] was violated, $p < .001$. Given the violation and different sample sizes across the waves, the Welch statistic that adjusted for F ratio was used instead. The autonomy index differed significantly across the waves, adjusted $F(2, 2455.54) = 165.11$, $p < .001$ (see Table 6). Post-hoc comparisons with the use of Dunnett's C revealed that mean scores on autonomy increased from 1994-1999 ($M = .06$) to 1999-2004 ($M = .43$), $p < .05$ but declined slightly from 1999-2004 to 2005-2007 ($M = .37$), $p < .05$. Thus the trend did not appear to be linear based on only three time points.

Similarly, a one-way ANOVA performed on the material/postmaterial index showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, $p < .001$. With the use of Welch statistic, it was found that material/postmaterial index also differed significantly across the waves, adjusted $F(2, 2133.26) = 105.14$, $p < .001$ (see Table 6). Post-hoc comparisons with Dunnett's C revealed that citizen scores increased from 1994-1999 ($M = 1.31$) to 1999-2004 ($M = 1.54$), $p < .05$. Unlike the autonomy index, however, the same level of materialist/postmaterialist values was observed from 1999-2004 to 2005-2007 ($M = 1.56$). Because a mean of 2 denotes a mixed type of materialist and postmaterialist values, these results suggest the tendency for average Chinese people to transition into the mixed type

[7] In addition to mean scores, change in variances may be of substantive interest as well. However, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to address this dispersion aspect of cultural change. Interested readers should refer to Schwartz and Sagie (2000) and Gelfand et al. (2011) for related research.

Table 6

Changes in Personal Values and Other Indicators of Individualism-Collectivism across the Three Waves of Chinese WVSs (Study 3b)

	Wave			
	1994-1999	1999-2004	2005-2007	*p*-value
The autonomy index	$.06_a$ (.60)	$.43_b$ (.51)	$.37_c$ (.55)	< .001
The material/postmaterial index	1.31_a(.46)	1.54_b (.57)	1.56_c (.58)	< .001
Always respect and love your parents	$79.6\%_a$	$94.5\%_b$		< .001
Make your parents proud	2.90_a (.74)	2.67_b (.65)	2.85_a (.65)	< .001
Importance of friends	3.15_a (.67)	3.02_b (.64)	3.12_a (.68)	< .001
Live up to what my friends expect	3.05_a (.60)	2.82_b (.56)	2.82_b (.59)	.48
Most people can be trusted	$52.3\%_a$	$54.5\%_a$	$52.3\%_a$	

Note. The autonomy index consisted of independence, responsibility, imagination, and obedience. The material/postmaterial index represented priority to self-expression and quality of life over economic and physical security.

The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Within each rows, mean scores that do not share the same subscripts differed at $p < .05$.

on this dimension. Again, based on only three time points, the increase in materialist/postmaterialist values seems to have levelled off since mid-2000s.

Next, changes in the additional five items were analysed separately. Because the questions were either in the forced-choice format or on a rating scale, appropriate analyses (chi-square test, ANOVA, or adjusted ANOVA) were used.Table 6 lists the descriptive statistics and the statistical results for each comparison. The results revealed a more nuanced picture of cultural continuity and change in China. There was a significant increase in the percentage of people who agreed with the statement "one must always respect and love their parents" from 1994-1999 (79.6%) to 1999-2004 (94.5%), indicating a strengthening of collectivism. However, the extent of agreement with the statement "one of your main goals in life has been to make your parents proud" changed in a non-linear fashion, decreasing from 1994-1999 (M = 2.90) to 1999-2004 (M = 2.67) but rising back up during 2005-2007 (M = 2.85), which did not differ significantly from the 1994-1999 level. The change in the extent of agreement with the importance of friendship was similar but smaller in magnitude. Agreement decreased from 1994-1999 (M = 3.15) to 1999-2004 (M = 3.02) and increased during 2005-2007 (M = 3.12). Because research has suggested that people in individualistic societies tend to hold more positive attitudes toward friends than people in collectivistic societies (Adams & Plaut, 2003), whose attitudes tend to be more ambivalent, an increase in importance attached to friendship is interpreted as a strengthening of individualism. The trend toward individualism in attitudes toward friendship was more evidence in response to the statement "I

make a lot of effort to live up to what my friends expect".There was a significant decrease in the extent of agreement from 1994-1999 (M = 3.05) to 1999-2004 (M = 2.82) and 2005-2007 (M = 2.82). Finally, there was no significant change in the percentage of people who agreed that most people can be trusted from 1994-1999 (52.3%), 1999-2004 (54.5%), to 2005-2007 (52.3%).

To zone in on younger Chinese, the same foregoing analyses were performed on the 18-29 age group to test whether changes among younger people deviated from the general population over the same period of time. For the most part, findings regarding the direction of changes in the general population were replicated among the younger demographics. One major difference was that younger Chinese were on average more individual-oriented, which was expected. Two minor differences were also found. First, unlike the general population, mean scores on the autonomy index did not decrease from 1999-2004 (M = .55) and 2005-2007 (M = .52) among younger Chinese. Second, although the extent of agreement with making parents proud strengthened from 1999-2004 (M = 2.58) to 2005-2007 (M = 2.79), which was similar to the general trend, agreement during 2005-2007 was still significantly less than the 1994-1999 level (M = 2.93), p< .05.

Finally, to get a sense of the macro change in economic modernization and globalization across the three time periods during which the Chinese WVSs were administered, three societal indices were used. First, GDP was used as an indicator of change in economic development (International Monetary Fund, 2012). The second index was KOF Index of Globalization, which covers the economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher,

Gaston, & Martens, 2008). Only indices for the economic and social dimensions are reported here. The economic globalization index was calculated from variables that measure long distance flows of goods, capital, and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. The social globalization index was based on data on the spread of ideas, information, images and people. The last index was the Human Development Index (HDI) that has been used by the United Nations since 1990. The HDI is a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income (UNDP, 2011). It is regarded as a robust alternative to conventional measures of national development such as GDP. Table 7 lists both national means of personal values and societal indices across the weaves. There was a steady increase in all societal indices during the periods when the Chinese WVSs were taken, indicating that values change reported above occurred in the context of accelerated economic modernization and globalization.

Discussion

The present study extends Study 3a in three ways. First, it goes beyond the typical cross-sectional data and implements a cross-temporal analysis. Second, it also overcomes the limitations involving convenience samples by relying on nationally representative samples. Third, it tracks changes in specific value content and related indicators of individualism-collectivism over more than a decade. So it complements the profile similarity approach based on a more comprehensive list of values adopted in Study 3a.

Table 7

Changes in Societal Indicators across the Three Waves of Chinese WVSs (Study 3b)

	Wave		
	1994-1999	1999-2004	2005-2007
GDP per capita[a] (in US dollars)	702.67	1122.08	2144.83
KOF index of globalization[b]	44.17	54.37	60.16
Economic	40.67	47.56	55.75
Social	26.70	43.46	47.47
HDI[c]	.49	.59	.64

Note. GDP = Gross Domestic Product. HDI = Human Development Index.

[a] The GDP per capita for each time period was calculated as an average of annual GDPs per capita within the same time frame.

[b] The indices of globalization range from 0 to 100. The index for each time period was calculated as an average of annual scores within the same time frame.

[c]The HDI is expressed as a value between 0 and 1. The HDI for the 1994-1999 period is based on the single data point in 1990, the HDI for the 1999-2004 period is based on the data point in 2000, and the HDI for the 2005-2007 period is based on an average of data points in 2005, 2006, and 2007.

Findings from the autonomy index, conceptually similar to the traditional/secular-rational dimension, and the materialist/postmaterialist index, conceptually similar to the survival/self-expression dimension, are largely consistent with those from Study 3a. The overall trend was an increase in individualistic values in the general population. Since these value changes occurred in the context of China's accelerated economic modernization and globalization, as shown by the three societal indices, societal changes seem to be the driving force behind population-level value shifts. However, this conclusion cannot be taken too far, because the correspondence was imprecise. While China's economic development and connections with the rest of the world were growing steadily, value changes did not move in the same linear fashion over the same period of time. Endorsement of materialist/postmaterialist values levelled off after the 1999-2004 period; endorsement of autonomy values actually declined slightly from 1999-2004 to 2005-2007.

Results from other indicators of individualism-collectivism revealed an even more nuanced picture of cultural change. In addition to non-linear changes in some items (making parents proud and importance of friends), another noticeable pattern was differential directions of change in different domains. As a matter of fact, continuity, change in individualistic direction, and change in collectivistic direction were all evident. Cultural stability was reflected in the same level of general trust over time. The individualistic trend was seen in the decline in importance of being sensitive to the expectations of friends, whereas the collectivistic trend was observed in the almost unanimous consensus over

unconditional respect and love for parents during the 1999-2004 period. Although not coherent enough, this pattern of findings is not an anomaly. Hamamura (2012), after which the present study was modelled, found a similarly complex pattern of cultural stability and change in Japan. Furthermore, some findings are supported by research. For example, filial piety is a core familial value in Chinese culture (Ho, 1996).Familial values such as filial piety are still well and alive in contemporary China (S. X. Chen, Bond & Tang, 2007), as shown in self-mother overlapping in memory and brain activation (Sui, Zhu, & Chiu, 2007; Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007) and the familial self as a self-affirming source (Cai, Sedikides, & Jiang, 2012). In some cases, the importance of familial values has risen in China in recent years (e.g., Ho, Xie, Liang, & Zeng, 2012). Therefore, research on this topic is consistent with the finding in Study 1a and 1b that core cultural values are more resistant to change.

Analyses focusing on younger Chinese indicated the relatively independent effects of age from those of sociocultural change. In other words, although younger age cohorts tended to be more individualistic relative to older age cohorts at a given historical time, all age cohorts seemed to be affected by societal change to similar degrees, at least within the relatively narrow windows of time assessed. This suggests that the psychological effects of change in China are pervasive across the age spectrum.

Two important limitations related to the quality of cross-temporal data need to be noted. The first limitation concerns the equivalence of meaning over time. Although the majority of the WVS questions were kept identical across

waves, the connotations of some items may have changed over time. For example in the Chinese samples, thrift with money and things correlated negatively with individualism in the earlier waves but positively with individualism in the more recent one. A more specific issue is validation. As described above, additional indicators of individualism-collectivism were validated independently against existing international indices. However, the worldwide data used to validate the items were from the latest Wave 5 (Hamamura, 2012). Hence, those items cannot be guaranteed to have equivalent meanings in the earlier waves. One example is the question about the importance of friends. To the extent that it captures the basic difference in the form of friendships between individualistic and collectivistic cultures uncovered in previous research (Adams & Plaut, 2003), an increase in the importance attached to friends would indicate a trend toward individualism. However, if the meaning of friendships has also changed, the fluctuation in the importance of friends over time would be more difficult to interpret. Filial piety is another example. Although there is little doubt that the general value of filial piety has remained strong in China, what is considered filial behaviour is adapted to the evolving cultural ecology (R. Zhang, 2007; X. Zhang, Zheng, & Wang, 2003). An authoritarian form of filial piety (Ho, 1994) as opposed to a reciprocal and emotional form is unlikely to thrive in modern Chinese societies (Yeh& Bedford, 2003). To be sure, non-equivalence in meaning threatens the validity of any cross-cultural or cross-temporal comparisons. However, one aspect of cultural change is precisely the change in the subtlety of meanings attributed to cultural constructs (e.g., X. Chen, 2010). Thus, it is beyond

the scope of the present study to examine change in concepts laden with cultural meanings in contemporary China, which is worth investigating in and of itself.

The second limitation is that the Chinese data were available within only a short span of time (i.e., three time points). Because of this, patterns of results based on a narrow timeframe may be misleading. As an example of this limitation, the importance of both autonomy and materialist/postmateralist values has levelled off and it is not clear what this amounts to in the long run. It could indicate a minor fluctuation in the general linear trend toward individualism or on the contrary, an early sign of retreat to traditionalism. More generally, only with more time points will it be possible to ascertain whether cultural change in China is a relatively linear or a more complex curvilinear trend.

To conclude, autonomy and materialist/postmaterialist values,extracted from three waves of Chinese WVSs, were changing in the direction of societal change in China and these changes were applicable to the general population. With expanded indicators of individualism-collectivism, divergent patterns of cultural change were found. These findings suggest that as a general principle, cultural change unfolds as a complex interaction of pre-existing cultural architecture with long-term shaping of external sociocultural influence(Hamamura, 2012).

CHAPTER 4:

Sociocultural Change and Self-Enhancement

(Study 4a and 4b)

Study 4a: Cultural Priming and the Better-Than-Average Effect

Study Overview

Study 3a and 3b provide convergent evidence for a shift in at least some personal values that is consistent with the direction of sociocultural change in China. The current study examines another potential consequence of change, the tendency to make positive self-evaluations. In addition, it adopts the cultural priming paradigm to test the differential causal effects of invoking traditional vs. contemporary Chinese culture on the tendency to make favourable self-evaluations. Chinese participants were randomly assigned to a traditional Chinese culture priming, a contemporary Chinese culture priming, an American culture priming, or a neutral priming condition. To the extent that response in the contemporary culture priming condition was more self-enhancing than response in the traditional culture priming, this would provide evidence that contemporary Chinese culture affords a more direct expression of self-enhancement. Alternatively, if there were no differences between these two priming conditions, this would suggest instead that priming contemporary culture does not invoke a different cultural norm or script than traditional culture. The inclusion of a neutral priming condition would allow me to observe the default tendency and to test whether it would resemble the response in the contemporary Chinese culture priming condition.

Rationale

There are several reasons why I choose self-enhancement as another psychological tendency that is possibly linked with cultural change. The first reason concerns with the distinction between implicit and explicit psychological tendencies. Cultural variation in individualism and collectivism can be studied as explicit or consciously held views people have about themselves, of which self-report values are one example. However, these explicit tendencies can be distinguished from implicit tendencies that are habitual and largely non-self-reflective (Kitayama, 2002; Kitayama & Imada, 2010). Because implicit psychological tendencies are likely acquired through early socialization and fortified by long-term engagement with one's culture on the one hand and explicit self-views may reflect more recent experiences on the other (Kitayama & Imada, 2010), measures of both tendencies have been found to be independent from each other (Kitayama, Park, Servincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009). Although there are a number of features that make a psychological tendency implicit (De Houwer & Moors, 2007), the motivation for a positive self-image is arguably a more implicit tendency than explicitly held values because the former reflects how people habitually think of themselves. Therefore, examining self-enhancement could provide insight to whether implicit psychological tendencies are also beginning to change in China in addition to personal values.

The second reason lies in the continued interest in the relevance of positive self-regard in East Asian cultures. This is underscored by several meta-analytical exchanges bearing on the universality of the self-enhancement motive, particularly regarding the better-than-average effect (BTAE) (e.g., Heine

&Hamamura, 2007; Heine, Kitayama, & Hamamura, 2007a, 2007b; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005, 2007a, 2007b). The BTAE refers to a form of self-aggrandizing social comparison, in which people compare their characteristics favourably against the average standing of their peers on the same characteristics (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). One position holds the view that self-enhancement is elusive in East Asia, while the SCENT (self-concept enhancement tactician) model maintains that people self-enhance universally but in culturally tactical ways (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). In a balanced review of current evidence, Boucher (2010; see also Chiu, Wan, Cheng, King, & Yang, 2011) concluded that while the self-enhancement motive may be universal, the normative pressure in East Asian cultures constrains how it is expressed. More recent research has supported this view. For example, people with East Asian backgrounds self-enhance in more subtle ways such as denying the possession of negative traits rather than touting the possession of positive traits (Kim,Chiu, Peng, Cai, & Tov, 2010).

A sociocultural change perspective provides a novel way of understanding the operation of the self-enhancement motive in East Asia (see also Cai et al., 2012). It suggests that change in the culture that loosens the normative constraints on the expression of the self-enhancement motive should augment the self-enhancing tendency. For example, cross-national differences in self-enhancement were better explained by economic inequality indexed by national Gini coefficientsthan individualism-collectivism indexed by Hofstede's (2001) national individualism scores (Loughnan et al., 2011). This is presumably because

economic inequality instigates the tendency to compete for the upper echelon of the society. Of particular interest is their finding that mainland China was relatively high on both economic inequality and self-enhancement. Given thatthe yawning gap between the wealthy and the poor in China occurred only in recent decades and was a well-documented consequence of rapid economic growth (Brockmann et al., 2009; Easterlin et al., 2012), this provides indirect support that contemporary Chinese culture may foster a more overt expression of self-enhancement. Relatedly, previous research has shown that a weaker self-enhancement tendency in East Asia is partly due to modesty concerns (Cai, Brown, Deng, & Oakes, 2007; Kurman, 2003; Takata, 2003). However, the importance of modesty may be losing ground as a byproduct of sociocultural change as well. Indeed, in Study 1a and 1b the cultural rating of the value of being humble, the item conceptually most similar to modesty, was significantly lower for contemporary Chinese culture, compared with traditional Chinese culture.

Another curious, albeit often neglected, fact about this cultural debate on self-enhancement is the heterogeneity within East Asian cultures. While prior research in support of the absence of self-enhancement was done almost exclusively in Japanese samples, evidence against it was found mostly in Chinese samples (e.g., Cai, Wu, & Brown, 2009; Falbo, Poston, Triscari, & Zhang, 1997; Hepper, Sedikides, & Cai, 2013). There is some indication that overt self-enhancement is more prevalent in contemporary China. For example, in a meta-analysis of self-serving attributional bias, it was found that while the effect size in Japan largely indicated an absence of such bias, the size of the bias in China and

Korea was positive and comparable to that observed in European American samples (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004). Apart from underscoring the necessity of going beyond the assumed East Asian monolith, those findings further highlight the need to include sociological or socioeconomic factors in understanding differences among culturally similar societies. Indeed, this rising self-enhancement trend in China has been attributed to sociocultural change (Cai et al., 2012) such as economic inequality (Loughnan et al., 2011) and the implementation of the one-child policy (Kwan, Hui, & McGee, 2010; Tobin, Wu, & Davidson, 1989). So if it is true that cultural change makes the expression of self-enhancement more acceptable among mainland Chinese nowadays, priming traditional Chinese culture which places a premium on being humble and fitting in should decrease self-enhancement tendency (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). In other words, those in the traditional cultural mindset should respond in a less self-enhancing way than those in the contemporary cultural mindsetor those responding with the default tendency.

The Cultural Priming Paradigm

The cultural priming paradigm draws on the social cognitive principle that when contextual cues make a body of cultural knowledge accessible, it momentarily increases the likelihood that this body of knowledge will be used. Typical cultural primes are language and culturally indexical icons. Given the explicated link between psychology and cultural products in the sociocultural environment (Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008; Shavitt, Johnson, & Zhang, 2011) and the within-culture heterogeneity of cultural products (Zhang & Shavitt, 2003),

cultural priming lends itself to testing the differential effects of various, potentially competing, cultural representations in contemporary urban China.

Three things about how the cultural priming paradigm is used in this research are noted. The first concerns the nature of Chinese cultural icons commonly used in previous research. At face value, those icons (e.g., the Great Wall, Chinese dragon, or Confucius) seem to tap the network of knowledge more closely related to traditional Chinese culture. Granted that almost all iconic symbols of any culture have historical significance, because China is undergoing change, presenting these historical symbols seems particularly suited to priming traditional Chinese culture. Therefore, several cultural icons used in previous research are used to prime traditional Chinese culture in this study.

Second, cultural priming research has mostly been concerned with demonstrating dynamic influences of culture by comparing between culture priming conditions. This study places more emphasis on the control condition. The reason is that control condition reveals people's default tendency and comparison with the traditional culture condition can provide a useful gauge of the extent to which people's default response has changed. In several cultural priming studies of Hong Kong Chinese (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Wong & Hong, 2005), it is typically found that people's default responses fall between those in the two cultural priming conditions. This confirms the fact that Hong Kong is a multicultural society with a unique colonial history and that Hong Kong Chinese people's typical cognition and behaviour are a joint reflection of traditional Chinese and Western cultural influence. Similar studies

conducted with mainland Chinese samples are rare so far, and the limited evidence for shifting default tendencies has been mixed (Cheng, Wang, & Golden, 2011; Sui et al., 2007). This study thus aims to further examine this critical issue.

Last, contemporary Chinese cultural stimuli are introduced in this study. Priming contemporary Chinese culture with these icons is expected to lead to more positive self-evaluations than priming traditional Chinese culture. Furthermore, insofar as the cultural landscape of contemporary urban China routinely exposes people to contemporary Chinese culture, the level of self-enhancement should be comparable between the control and the contemporary culture priming condition. This prediction is based on the assumption that priming information that is redundant with what people are chronically exposed to should have little impact (Heine et al., 2001). That is, priming contemporary Chinese culture should not render accessible any novel cultural knowledge compared with the control condition.

To summarize, it was predicted that priming contemporary Chinese culture would augment the tendency to perceive oneself as better than the average than priming traditional Chinese culture. I also expected the self-enhancement tendency in the control condition that captures the default strategy to be similar to that found in the contemporary cultural priming condition. Finally, the American cultural priming condition was included to invoke an individualistic cultural norm.

Method

Pilot Test of Stimulus Pictures

In the initial selection of contemporary Chinese culture priming materials for pilot testing, I adopted the following criteria. First, because Study 1a and 1b showed both similarities and differences between traditional and contemporary Chinese values, I focused on symbols that are clearly associated with individualistic values represented in contemporary China such as power, status, materialism, success, achievement, and self-expression. Second, two main sources of the contemporary priming materials were the economic sector in which arguably the majority of change has taken place and recent national or international events because globalization in China is closely associated with aspiring for national prosperity and international power (Cheng, Chao, Kwong, et al., 2010). I also selected additional pictures representing traditional Chinese culture that matched contemporary Chinese pictures in terms of category or content domain.

Based on the criteria above and popular examples generated by the participants in Study 1a, I assembled a list of 39 pictures representing traditional and contemporary Chinese culture. They were then presented to a sample of 27 Chinese international students studying at the University of Alberta. Those participants rated each picture in terms of three questions on separate 7-point scales. Specifically, they rated the extent to which the picture represented traditional or contemporary Chinese culture (1 = *very traditional*, 4 = *equally traditional and contemporary*, 7= *very contemporary*), how negative or positive the picture was (1 = *very negative*, 4 = *neutral*, 7= *very positive*), and how

Chinese or foreign the picture was (1 = *completely foreign*, 4 = *equally foreign and Chinese*, 7= *completely Chinese*). A series of paired-sample *t* tests were then conducted to determine which pictures were clearly associated with either traditional or contemporary culture but not both, which were neutral or positive in valence, and which were not associated exclusively with imported cultures. Only those that met all the three criteria were retained. Some pictures such as the Beijing Olympics logo were discarded because they were considered to reflect a mixture of traditional and contemporary Chinese values (i.e., ratings for the first question did not differ significantly from the midpoint). Pictures of McDonald's and Starbucks shops in China were judged to be mostly foreign products (i.e., ratings for the third questions were significantly lower than the midpoint), so they were discarded as well. This analysis resulted in a final list of 8 pictures for traditional Chinese culture and 8 pictures for contemporary Chinese culture[8]. Among the former, five were taken from Chinese culture priming materials used in previous cultural priming research.

Participants

Chinese data were collected in two ways. The first subsample consisted of 118 students at a large university in Shanghai, who participated in a study conducted at the Department of Psychology for an exchange of 15 RMB (approximately $ 2.44). Two participants were excluded for suspicion or

[8] The only exception to meeting all three criteria was the picture of Deng Xiaoping. An important political leader in China's recent history, he is widely regarded as the main architect behind China's economic reforms that commenced in the 1970s. Perhaps because the participants felt personally removed from this part of recent history, they rated him closer to a representation of traditional Chinese culture ($M = 2.74$), $p < .001$ compared with the midpoint. However, because of the historical significance of his contribution that set the ensuing change in motion and the fact that he was still rated as less representative of traditional culture than most symbols chosen for traditional culture, I included his picture in the final contemporary culture priming material.

computer failure. Another subsample of 47 university students residing in Shanghai was recruited online via www.sojump.com, which is a Chinese crowdsourcing website similar to Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Members on this website complete different tasks posted there for a monetary payment made by the website. To identify participants who were not diligent in following instructions or distracted during the experiment, I used Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko's (2009) instruction check. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked "Were you in any way distracted while completing the survey?". They were also presented with a Likert-type scale from 1 to 9 and the number 99 beside it. The instruction read "Please click on 99. Do not click on the scale items that are labelled from 1 to 9.". In other words, if participants read the instruction carefully, they would click on 99. Data for four participants who answered yes to the question and failed the test were removed from analyses.

Therefore, the combined example consisted of 159 participants in total (43 females, 116 males, and two did not indicate gender). The mean age was 20.31 ranging from 17 to 25. Most participants (73.6%) were born in an urban area. To examine the potential difference in results between the two methods of data collection, method was coded as a variable in the main analysis.

Procedure and Measures

Participants were told to complete two short, unrelated studies. In the first "study", I followed the standard procedure used in previous research to prime culture (Hong et al., 2000). Participants were asked to view 8 pictures in a slideshow and write down their answers to the following questions: "What is the

object/figure in the picture?", "What are the ideas represented by the object/figure in the picture?" They were randomly assigned to view pictures of traditional Chinese culture (n = 40), contemporary Chinese culture (n = 38), American culture (n = 39), or culture-neutral stimuli (different weather conditions; n = 42). To allow sufficient time to activate cultural constructs, the slideshow was set up such that each slide lasted for one minute before the next slide came up.

Immediately after the cultural priming procedure, participants completed a self-evaluation questionnaire that contained a BTAmeasure of self-enhancement. The measure was comprised of 16 items that have been used in Chinese samples (Brown & Cai, 2010). Eight items assessed personal qualities that are commonly thought to be important in individualistic, Western cultures (capable, competent, independent, intelligent, original, self-reliant, talented, and unique). Eight assessed interpersonal qualities that are commonly thought to be important in collectivistic, East Asian cultures (agreeable, considerate, cooperative, friendly, kind, loyal, respectful, and sincere). For each item, participants were asked to evaluate themselves in comparison to most other students at their university using a 9-point scale (1 = *bottom 10%*, 5 = *middle 50%*, 9 = *top 10%*).

To confirm the two Chinese cultural primes were indeed associated with the respective culture, I also included three manipulation check items at the end of the questionnaire. Participants assigned to the two Chinese cultural priming conditions were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed the pictures they had viewed showed that China has risen internationally, China is modernized, and

China is influenced by Western culture. Their responses were recorded on separate 7-point scales (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7= *strongly agree*). Finally, participants answered a number of demographic questions such as age, gender, and place of birth.

Results

BTA Traits

To determine whether the BTA traits were categorized as independent or interdependent, a factor analysis with principal axis factoring as the extraction method was performed on the 16 traits. The results provided clear support for a two-factor solution that corresponded with the conceptual distinction between independence and interdependence. All the independent traits loaded on the same factor and all but one interdependent trait loaded on the other factor[9]. Based on this factorial structure, traits that belonged to the same factor were averaged to form independence and interdependence composite scores.

Manipulation Checks

Results for the manipulation checks confirmed that pictures used in the two Chinese priming conditions were perceived in the intended way. Participants in the CC condition perceived the pictures to better capture China as rising internationally, being modernized, and being influenced by Western culture than those in the TC condition, *p*s < .001.

Preliminary Analyses: Demographic Differences

[9] Interestingly, being considerate, one of the interdependent traits, loaded on the independence factor instead.

The effects of age, gender, and birthplace (urban vs. rural) on the tendency to make favourable self-evaluations were explored. Age was found to be correlated positively with both independent (r = .23, p = .005) and interdependent self-evaluations (r = .20, p = .02). Male participants were more likely to self-enhance on independent traits than female participants, p = .008. No gender difference was found on self-evaluations of interdependent traits, p = .49. Participants born in a rural area did not differ from their urban counterparts with regards to interdependence traits, but were more likely to self-enhance on independent traits than those born in an urban area, p = .04. The last finding may be explained by a self-selection process whereby only those people born in the rural areas who possessed more independent traits made their way to pursuing university education in Shanghai.

Main Analyses

To examine priming effects on self-enhancement, I conducted a 4 (Priming Condition: contemporary vs. traditional vs. American vs. neutral) X 2 (Method: traditional vs. online) X 2 (Trait Type: interdependent vs. independent) mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor as repeated measures. First, the main effect of Method was not significant; nor did it interact with Priming Condition ps> .16. These results were reassuring and confirmed that results were comparable across the two methods of data collection. Second, there was a significant main effect of Trait Type, $F(1, 151) = 67.89$, p< .001, partial η^2 = .31. Consistent with the SCENT model (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003), Chinese participants showed a stronger BTA effect for the interdependent traits (M = 7.28) than the

independent traits (M = 6.31). However, Type did not interact with Method or critically, Priming Condition, meaning that priming had a uniform effect on both types of traits. Finally, the critical main effect of Condition was significant, $F(3, 151) = 3.19$, $p = .025$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$. When the test was re-run without the method factor, the main effect of priming remained, $F(3, 155) = 3.45$, $p = .018$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$. Therefore, the magnitude of positive self-evaluation differed significantly across the priming conditions (see Figure 3 for cell means).

Because I had specific predictions about the priming effects, I conducted a number of contrasts instead of post-hoc tests. Also in light of the finding that trait type did not interact with the experimental conditions, independent and interdependent traits were averaged to form one single self-evaluation dependent variable. First, the TC condition was contrasted with the CC condition. Contrary to the prediction that those primed with TC culture would make less positive self-evaluations than those primed with CC culture, the opposite was found. Self-evaluation ratings were significantly higher in the TC condition, $t(155) = 2.47$, $p = .014$, $d = .40$.

A second contrast was conducted between the CC priming condition and the control condition. The two conditions did not differ significantly ($p = .77$), thereby supporting the predictionthat the default tendency would resemble the response in the contemporary culture priming condition. In light of this finding, a third contrast was conducted between the average of the CC priming and the control condition and the TC priming condition. Participants in the TC priming



Figure 3. BTA ratings as a function of priming conditions (Study 4a). Error bars represent standard errors.

condition were more self-enhancing than those in either control or CC priming condition, $t(155) = 3.06$, $p = .003$, $d = .49$.

To examine the effect of priming American culture relative to priming contemporary Chinese culture or the default tendency, a final contrast was conducted between the American priming condition and the average of the CC priming and control condition. Participants in the American priming condition were marginally more self-enhancing than those in either control or CC priming condition,$t(155) = 1.87$, $p = .06$, $d = .30$.

To summarize, priming traditional Chinese culture was found unexpectedly to lead to a stronger BTA effect relative to priming either contemporary Chinese culture or neutral stimuli. The latter two conditions did not differ from each other, which supports the prediction that response in the contemporary culture priming condition resembles the default tendency. Last, priming American culture also led to a marginally strongerBTA effect relative to the contemporary culture or neutral priming condition.

Discussion

The purpose of Study 4 was to test the differential effects of priming traditional vs. contemporary Chinese culture on the self-enhancement tendency. Based on the hypothesis that cultural change in China has afforded a more direct expression of self-enhancement, it predicted that priming contemporary culture would augment the BTA effect relative to priming traditional culture. Unexpectedly, the opposite was found – traditional cultural primes produced a

stronger BTA effect across both independent and interdependent traits. Why did this occur?

One potential explanation for the result comes from the SCENT model (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Sedikides et al., 2003). It argues that people everywhere self-enhance on personally important qualities, but culture moderates what is found desirable such that different qualities are valued and internalized in different cultures. Because individualistic attributes are more culturally important in North America, North Americans tend to value individualistic attributes themselves and are motivated to self-enhance more on them. Similarly, East Asians tend to internalize collectivistic attributes and are motivated to self-enhance more on them (see Sedikides et al., 2005 for a review of evidence for this theoretical account). The tactical self-enhancement account can explain the general tendency for Chinese participants to show a stronger BTAE on interdependent than independent traits. Of course, this explanation rests on the assumption that those Chinese participants found interdependent traits more personally important than independent traits. More importantly, the tactical self-enhancement account would also predict that priming traditional Chinese culture would result in a stronger BTAE on interdependent traits and a weaker BTAE on independent traits. However, this prediction was not born out. Chinese participants enhanced both the agentic self and the communal self in the traditional cultural priming condition.

A second explanation is a social cognitive explanation and is derived from the priming literature. A prime typically produces an assimilative response, that

is, perception, behaviour, or a motivational state that is consistent with the primed concept. However, a prime sometimes produces a contrastive response when the resulted perception, behaviour, or motivational state contrasts away from the primed concept. For example, whereas priming professor (acategory) led people to perform better on a knowledge test (i.e., behavioural assimilation), priming Albert Einstein (an exemplar of the category)led people to perform worse (i.e., behavioural contrast; Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). From the social cognitive perspective, what was observed in the traditional cultural priming condition is a contrast effect because participants' response contrasted away from the self-effacing norm traditional Chinese primes are theorized to cue. Indeed, contrast effects are not new to research adopting the cultural priming paradigm. In the case of bicultural individuals such as Asian Americans, those with less integrated bicultural identity are more likely to show contrast effects in response to different (Asian vs. American) cultural primes (Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002;Mok & Morris, 2009; Zou, Morris, & Benet-Martínez, 2008).

Drawing on recent theoretical accounts of priming effects (Loersch & Payne, 2001;Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007), the situated self-concept plays a crucial mediating role of determining whether a prime will trigger assimilative or contrastive priming effects. Contrast effects are more likely to occur when the primes activate a self-concept that is inconsistent with the content of the primes. When primes are extreme or highly self-discrepant, they become a salient standard against which the self is compared.This comparative mindset results in the perception of dissimilarity between the prime and the self (e.g., Mussweiler,

2003; Mussweiler, Ruter, & Epstude, 2004). Whatbecomes accessible in the active self-concept is then the opposite of the content of the prime and it is the opposite contentthat presumably drives the contrast effects (Wheeler et al., 2007). These theoretical accounts suggest that the reason why traditional cultural primes produced a contrast effect is that the content was too extreme or highly discrepant (also see Cheng, Lee, & Benet-Martínez, 2006). The pictures selected to be traditional culture priming material may have been processed as extreme exemplars because most of them were rated near the "very traditional" end in the pilot study. They may also have been experienced as discrepant from the self because participants perceived less congruence between personal values and traditional cultural values, as shown in Study 3, although participants also identified strongly with traditional culture. The self-discrepant traditional primes may be less likely to be confused with the self to exert downstream influence (Loersch & Payne, 2001).However, since participants tend to perceive more personal congruence with contemporary Chinese and Western culture, the associated primes were perhaps easier to assimilate into the active self-concept. Although admittedly speculative, a social cognitive explanation may be partly responsible for the contrast effect.

Yet another explanation calls into question the assumption that traditional Chinese primes necessarily activate a self-effacing norm. This explanation draws on acritical perspective on cultural priming that although cultural priming is assumed to activate the entire network of knowledge associated with a culture, it is often not clear whether a specific subset of activated knowledge is causally

implicated in the observed priming effect (Kashima, 2009).Because the greater emphasis on the self-presentation norm of modesty in collectivistic cultures is well-supported (Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1978; Kurman, 2003),it was assumed in this study that a modesty norm was activated by the traditional primes. If, however, some other meaning associated with traditional Chinese culture was instead activated and prescribed the opposite of a modest self-presentation, the resulted increase in self-enhancement would be considered an assimilation effect instead of a contrast effect.Which self-enhancing norm would be activated by the traditional primes? Although seemingly counterintuitive, one possibility is to look at broad psychological functions of culture to the self. One important function, from the perspective of terror management theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997), is that culture confers existential security such that by immersingthemselves in a meaning system, individuals are protected from the potentially paralyzing anxiety about their own mortality. The self-culture connection is symbiotic. On the one hand, individuals, including those in collectivistic cultures, are motivated to enhance and protect positive views of their group or culture (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Carnaghi, 2006; Heine & Harihara, & Niiya, 2002; Tam, Chiu, & Lau, 2007). On the other hand, investing in a cultural worldview confers a sense of personal significance and positive self-worth (Greenberg, 2008; Pyszczynksi, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004).

In a culture that is undergoing tremendous change, its cultural tradition may be particularly effective in assuaging existential fear. This is because what

transcends the finitude of an individual's life is precisely an enduring cultural legacy that has been passed down through history instead of a relatively recent appendage to it that might prove to be nothing more than ephemeral (Chiu & Hong, 2006; Kesebir, 2011).At times of uncertainty and confusion, cultural continuity preserved through transmission of tradition canhelp connect people to firmly established meaning and hence maintain a positive view of themselves (Chiu et al., 2011; cf. Hermans, 2010). This theoretical analysis implies that in a changing culture such as China, traditional primes may activate more than the motivation to live up to the modesty norm prescribed by traditional Chinese culture; traditional culture may serve an alternative function of attaching the self to a historically significant source of meaning, which manifests itself in positive self-evaluations.

Because of this expectedly higher self-enhancement in the traditional priming condition, the hypothesis that the expression of overt self-enhancement is more acceptable in contemporary China cannot be confirmed or rejected. Despite this major limitation, two findings about the effect of priming contemporary Chinese culture are clear from the experiment.First, contemporary primes yielded the same extent of BTAE as neutral primes and both effects differed from that of traditional primes. This supports the hypothesis that contemporary culture is chronically accessible among contemporary Chinese and their default response is in line with the self-presentation norm of contemporary culture. Second, American primes led to a stronger BTAE than either contemporary or neutral primes. So even though self-enhancement is on the rise in contemporary China, it

seems to remain lesser than and distinct from "American-style" self-enhancement, at least in the minds of Chinese university students. This finding is consistent with the cultural representation results in Study 1a and 1b.

Study 4b: The Better-Than-Average Effect: The Role of Cultural Identification and A Cross-Cultural Comparison

Study Overview

Study 4b is designed to address two questions that followed from Study 4a. First, because of the unexpected contrast effect in the traditional culture priming condition, Study 4a did not provide direct support for change in the expression of self-enhancement in contemporary China. I thus turn to the same cross-cultural method in Study 2 as an alternative way of testing this hypothesis. The current study compares the BTAE between mainland Chinese and Chinese Canadians. It is based on the same premise that the more removed Chinese descendants are from China, the less they will exhibit psychological tendencies associated with contemporary Chinese culture. So if self-enhancement is rising in contemporary China, mainland Chinese would show a stronger BTAE than their counterparts in Canada. However, another characteristic of Chinese Canadians is likely to make them self-enhance more than mainland Chinese. Immigrants and children of immigrants undergo the experience of acculturating to the host culture. It has been suggested and found that the more contact and involvement immigrants have with the host culture, the more their psychological characteristics resemble the average psychological characteristics of the host culture (De Leersnyder, Mesquita, & Kim, 2011; Güngör et al., 2013; Heine & Lehman, 2004). Given the evidence for a stronger self-enhancement tendency in North American culture (Heine et al., 1999; Thomsen, Sidanius, & Fiske, 2007), it is

possible that acculturated Asians in North American are self-enhancing more relative to Asians in Asia. Indeed, meta-analyses on self-enhancement showed that Asian immigrants tend to fall in between European Americans/Canadians and Asians in Asia (Heine & Hamamura, 2007; also see, Falk, Heine, Yuki, & Takemura, 2009). Therefore, the inclusion of Chinese Canadians as a comparison group is a conservative test of the hypothesis regarding rising self-enhancement in China. In light of these two countervailing forces, a more realistic hypothesis is that mainland Chinese would show a BTAE as strong as do Chinese Canadians.

Second, one proposed explanation for the unexpected contrast found in Study 4a is that traditional primes activate a motivation to attach oneself to an enduring cultural tradition in a positive way. In this study, I directly tested this possibility. Central to this hypothesis is the notion that by connecting the self to the "good old days" (Cheng, Chao, Kwong, et al., 2010), traditional Chinese culture may have begun to take the unique meaning of affirming the symbolic self in the contemporary context. So the current study examined the association between self-enhancement and traditional or contemporary Chinese identity. If it is true that a traditional Chinese identity entails this newfound function of affirming a positive self, more self-enhancing individuals would also report having a stronger traditional Chinese identity. If, however, a traditional Chinese identity consists primarily of obeying the traditional cultural norms such as modesty, the opposite was expected; more positive self-evaluations would be associated with a weaker traditional Chinese identity. For this purpose, a survey assessing the BTA effect and traditional and contemporary Chinese cultural

identity was administered. It should be noted that an empirical test of the self-enhancement function of traditional identity does not shed direct light on why a contrast effect was found in Study 4a. Even if this hypothesis proves to be correct, it does not principally rule out other explanations for the contrast effect.

To measure BTAE, the current study uses a similar measure to Study 4a but with a larger number of traits. This allows the findings from both studies to be comparable. At the same time, the current study introduces one additional evaluative dimension of trait desirability, which makes possible a second way of assessing self-enhancement i.e., via the association between BTA and desirability ratings. This operational definition draws from the SCENT model that the expression of the self-enhancement motive is tactical and the most common tactical strategy is to self-aggrandize on personally important traits (Sedikides & Strube, 1997).In fact, there is a growing body of evidence that in both Western and Eastern cultural contexts, the magnitude of the BTAE is linked with personal importance of traits (Brown & Kobayashi 2002; Gaertner, Sedikides, &Chang, 2008; Sedikides et al., 2003).Given individual and cultural differences in what traits are considered important, examining the correspondence between BTAE and trait importance helps eliminate the concern that differences in BTAE may be driven by differences in trait importance (Sedikides et al., 2005). So far, most research adopting this approach has focused on personal importance of traits. However, there is more than one source of trait importance. Personal trait importance is conceptually distinct from cultural trait importance (Chiu et al., 2010; Tam et al., 2012). I follow Loughnan et al. (2011) and measure trait

importance in terms of social desirability. It is based on the notion that self-enhancement is evident to the extent that people rate socially desirable traits as more self-descriptive relative to an average person (Guenther & Alicke, 2010).

Method

Participants and Procedure

Mainland Chinese participants were recruited online in the same way as Study 4a, i.e., via www.sojump.com. A total of 124 university students residing in Shanghai participated (77 females, 46 males, one did not indicate gender). The mean age was 21.76 years (*SD* = 2.68) and 71.0 % of them were born in an urban area.

The Chinese Canadian sample consisted of 81 students enrolled in introductory psychology classes at the University of Alberta (57 females, 24 males) with a mean age of 19.23 years (*SD* = 1.71). They were recruited based on a number of demographic questions they answered (e.g., ethnicity, ethnicity of their parents, and language spoken other than English) on a prior mass-testing survey. About half (54.3 %) were born in Canada and of those foreign-born, their mean length of stay in Canada was 10.63 years (*SD* = 3.94). To make the research participation as equivalent to the anonymous survey completed by mainland Chinese participants as possible, Chinese Canadian participants completed the questionnaire online in a computer lab in small groups. The survey was completely anonymous such that once the participants submitted it, it would be impossible to identify them.

Measures

TheBTA measure used in this study was modelled after Loughnan et al. (2011). Participants were first asked to evaluate themselves in comparison to most other university students on 32 personality traits and values. These traits were adapted from Loughnan et al. (2011) which sampled all domains of basic values and Big Five personality factors to create the list. They were rated by the mainland Chinese participants on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (*bottom 10%*) to 9 (*top 10%*). However, a 10-point scale was presented to the Chinese Canadian participants because of a formatting error. Participants' ratings on these traits constituted the BTA measure. Next, participants rated the same set of traits in terms of social desirability, that is, the extent to which each trait was desirable and was what university students generally want. This time, the traits were rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all desirable*) to 7 (*very much desirable*). The order in which they were presented in both times was randomized for each participant. Self-enhancement was also operationalized as the association between the BTA and the desirability ratings. Because trait desirability is obtained in an idiographic way, this self-enhancement measure has the advantage of overcoming the problem of non-equivalence due to individual or cultural differences in trait desirability (Sedikides et al., 2005). Therefore, this approach does not assume that a trait such as hedonistic is similarly desirable or undesirable across both individuals and cultures. For Chinese participants, the BTA measure was translated into Chinese and back-translated for linguistic equivalence (Brislin, 1980).

To measure traditional and contemporary Chinese cultural identities among the mainland Chinese participants, a 24-item scale based on Cameron (2004) and Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) was developed for this study. Because past research suggested that identification and disidentification are relatively distinct (Newcomb, 1950; Zou, Morris, & Benet-Martínez, 2008), I created an equal number of identification and disidentification items with traditional and contemporary Chinese culture respectively. These items were rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The scale was then submitted to an EFA using principal axis factoring with oblimin rotation. An inspection of the eigenvalues and the scree plot supported four factors along the traditional/contemporary and identification/disidentification dimensions. These four factors explained 61.66 % of the total variance. To refine the subscales, seven items that either cross-loaded on more than one factor or failed to load on the factor they were conceptualized to were deleted and a second EFA was performed on the remaining items. Table 8 displays the resulting factor structure. Thus, the final scale consisted of traditional Chinese identification (3 items; α = .80), traditional Chinese disidentification (4 items; α = .81), contemporary Chinese identification (6 items; α = .88), and contemporary Chinese disidentification (5 items; α = .91). The subscale intercorrelations ranged from -.24 to .58, thus supporting that they represent relatively distinct dimensions.

Participants from both cultures also answered some demographic questions such as age, gender, generational status (Chinese Canadians) and whether they born in an urban or rural area (mainland Chinese).

Table 8

Factor Loadings for Identification and Disidentification with Traditional/Contemporary Chinese Culture (Study 4b)

Statements	Traditional Chinese Culture		Contemporary Chinese Culture	
	Identify	Disidentify	Identify	Disidentify
I have a lot in common with people holding traditional Chinese values	.61			
Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as a traditional Chinese person	.71			
I would describe myself as a traditional Chinese person	.76			
I don't identify with traditional Chinese culture		.45		
It is hard for me to feel proud oftraditional Chinese culture		.57		
I find it difficult to form a bond with people holding traditional Chinese values		.69		
I sometimes feel uncomfortable being perceived as a traditional Chinese person		.90		
In general, contemporary Chinese valuesare an important part of my self-image			.78	
I have a lot in common with people holding contemporary Chinese values			.63	
Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as acontemporary Chinese person			.59	
I feel strong ties to people holding contemporary Chinese values			.73	
ContemporaryChinese culture is important to my identity			.71	
I would describe myself as a contemporary Chinese person			.69	
I don't identify with contemporary Chinese culture				1.0
It is hard for me to feel proud of contemporary Chinese culture				.86
I don't feel good about contemporary Chinese culture				.72
Overall, I often feel contemporary Chinese culture is not valuable				.75
Eigenvalue	2.83	1.68	6.85	.96
Variance explained	14.58%	8.05%	38.32%	3.47%

Note. N = 124. Excluded statements were: In general, traditional Chinese valuesare an important part of my self-image.I feel strong ties to people holding traditional Chinese values. Traditional Chinese culture is important to my identity.I don't feel good about traditional Chinese culture. Overall, I often feel that traditional Chinese culture is not valuable. I find it difficult to form a bond with people holding contemporary Chinese values. I sometimes feel uncomfortable being perceived as a contemporary Chinese person

Results

Self-Enhancement and Cultural Identity within the Chinese Sample

For preliminary analyses, I compared the means of the four identity subscales. On average, identification with traditional and contemporary Chinese culture were relatively strong ($M_{traditional}$ = 4.84, $M_{contemporary}$ = 4.95) and significantly different from the scale midpoint, ps < .001. Moreover, they did not differ significantly from each other, p = .22. In comparison, disidentification with traditional and contemporary Chinese culture were weak overall ($M_{traditional}$ = 2.41, $M_{contemporary}$ = 2.23), although disidentification with traditional culture was slightly stronger, p = .07.

Onegoal of the study was to explore the correlations between the tendency to make favourable self-evaluations and identification/disidentification with traditional/contemporary Chinese culture among mainland Chinese participants. The BTA ratings were examined first. Because the BTA measure in this study consisted of both positive and negative traits, only positive ones were included in the calculation of BTA ratings. To do so, the desirability ratings for each trait were compared to the scale midpoint. One-sample t tests revealedthat the mainland Chinese participants considered 26 traits to be desirable (those excluded were conventional, shy, moody, stubborn, selfish, and lazy). The BTA ratings were then averaged across these 26 traits[10] and correlated with the four identity variables. The correlations between the traditional subscales and the BTA ratings were in the hypothesized direction. Traditional identification was correlated

[10] It was reassuring that the average BTA ratings obtained in this study (M = 6.55) were almost identical to those from the neutral priming condition (M = 6.59) in Study 4a. This increased my confidence in the comparability between the two studies.

positively (r = .25, p = .005) and traditional disidentification was correlated negatively (r = -.20, p = .026) with the BTA ratings. The correlations with the contemporary subscales were also significant. Contemporary identification was correlated positively (r = .42, p< .001) and contemporary disidentification was correlated negatively (r = -.25, p = .006) with the BTA ratings. Because of intercorrelations among the identity subscales, a hierarchical regression analysis was carried outto predict the BTAE (see Table 9). In the first step of the regression model, demographic variables (age, gender, and birthplace) were entered as predictors. None of them significantly predicted the BTAE, ps > .19. In the second step, the four identity variables were entered as predictors. The R^2 change (19%) was significant, $F_{change}(4, 114) = 6.96$, p< .001. Once the shared variance among the identity variables was removed, only contemporary identification made a unique contribution to the prediction of the BTAE, β = .38, p = .001. Therefore, although both traditional identification and disidentification were associated with the BTAE in the predicted directions, only contemporary Chinese identity was uniquely associated with a stronger BTAE.

Further analyses were conducted to understand why contemporary identification led to a stronger BTAE. Amidst the 26 positive traits, there was a mixture of individualistic and collectivistic traits based on face validity. It is possible that stronger identification with contemporary Chinese culture makes one desire a wider array of traits, individualistic or collectivistic, and it is this increased desirability of more traits that gives rise to a stronger BTAE as

Table 9

Summary of the Hierarchical Regression Analysis in Predicting BTAE within the Mainland Chinese Sample (Study 4b)

Predictor	β	ΔR^2
Step 1		.02
Age	-.05	
Gender (female = 0, male = 1)	.03	
Birthplace (rural = 0, urban = 1)	.12	
Step 2		.19***
Age	-.05	
Gender	.05	
Birthplace	.14	
Traditional identification	.00	
Traditional disidentification	-.14	
Contemporary disidentification	-.01	
Contemporary identification	.38**	
Total R^2		.21***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

predicted by the SCENT model. In other words, this possibility suggests that trait desirability would mediate the relation between contemporary identification and BTAE. To test the mediating effect of trait desirability (Baron & Kenny, 1986), I regressed BTAE on contemporary identification and as expected, found a significant effect, $\beta = .42$, $p < .001$. Next, I regressed trait desirability (averaged across the 26 traits) on contemporary identification, and again, the effect was significant, $\beta = .33$, $p < .001$. Finally, I regressed BTAE on contemporary identification and trait desirability simultaneously. In this regression, the effect of contemporary identification was attenuated, albeit still significant,$\beta = .28$, $p = .001$, while trait desirability remained significant, $\beta = .44$, $p < .001$. The indirect effect of trait desirability was also tested by the bootstrapping procedure (Preacher &Hayes, 2008). With 5000 bootstrap samples, the bias corrected confidence intervals did not contain zero (.06, .27), suggesting a significant mediating effect. The mediating effect remained significant after traditional identification or disidentification was controlled for. Therefore, trait desirability partially mediated the effect of contemporary identification on BTAE.

Next, BTA and desirability ratings were examined together. Because both measures were nested within persons,the multilevel data structure called for the use ofhierarchical linear modeling (HLM; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). HLM allows for simultaneous analyses of nested data at multiple levels. Analyses were conducted in two steps. First, the within-person association between self-ratings and desirability ratings was estimated by regressing BTA ratings on trait desirability. This analysis would indicate the average strength of self-

enhancement across individuals. Second, each of the fourcultural identity variables (traditional identification, traditional disidentification, contemporary identification, and contemporary disidentification) was included as a separate person-level moderator in the within-person equation. Demographic variables such as age, gender, and birthplace were entered as person-level controls. In all multilevel analyses, trait desirability as the within-person predictor was centered around the individuals' means (i.e., group mean centering;Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). For between-person predictors, while gender and birthplace were contrast coded (male = -1, female = 1; urban = -1, rural = 1), age and identity variables were grand mean centered (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; see also Nezlek, 2010).

In the first step, I examined the within-person association between BTA ratings and trait desirability. The Level-1 (within-person) model was as follows:

$$Trait_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}*(Desirability_{ij}) + r_{ij}$$

$Trait_{ij}$ and $Desirability_{ij}$ are BTA and desirability ratings for person *j* on trait *i*,β_{0j} is the coefficient representing the intercept for person *j*, β_{1j} is the slope for desirability ratings, and r_{ij} represents the error term.

The Level-2 (between-person) model was as follows:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + u_{1j}$$

In this Level-2 model, γ_{00} represents the average intercept and u_{0j} represents a random component of the within-person intercept. γ_{10} is the intercept of the effect of desirability on the average with-person level of BTA ratings and u_{1j} represents a random component of the desirability coefficient.

Results indicated that the fixed effect of the desirability slope $\beta_{1j}$was significant, *b* = .40, *p*< .001 (Table 10a). On average, there was a positive correlation between BTA ratings and desirability ratings; participants were more likely to self-enhance on traits they found socially desirable. This supported a robust self-enhancement tendency within this Chinese sample. The random effect of this coefficient was significantly greater than 0, suggesting substantial variability in this association across the individuals in the sample, $\chi^2(121) = 773.61$, *p*< .001. Therefore, the within-person association may vary based on person-level variables.

In the second step, to examine whether person-level variation could account for the within-person association, each of the identity variables was included as a moderator and demographic variables were included as controls. The Level-1 model was specified in the same way as the one before. The Level 2 model was specified as follows:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00}+\gamma_{01}*(\text{Age}) + \gamma_{02}*(\text{Gender}) + \gamma_{03}*(\text{Birthplace}) +\gamma_{04}*(\text{Cultural Identity}) + u_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10}+\gamma_{11}*(\text{Age}) + \gamma_{12}*(\text{Gender}) + \gamma_{13}*(\text{Birthplace}) + \gamma_{14}*(\text{Cultural Identity}) + u_{1j}$$

In this model, γ_{00} represents the average intercept. γ_{01} represents the effect of age, γ_{02} represents the effect of gender, γ_{03} represents the effect of birthplace, and γ_{04} represents the effect of cultural identity on the average within-person level of BTA ratings. u_{0j} represents a random component of the within-person intercept.

Table 10a

Estimates of HLM Model for the Within-Person Association between BTA and Desirability Ratings (Study 4b)

Fixed effect	Coefficient (*SE*)	*T*-ratio	*p*-value
For intercept 1, β_{0j}			
Intercept 2, γ_{00}	6.26 (0.072)	87.11	.000
For desirability slope, β_{1j}			
Intercept, γ_{10}	0.40 (0.034)	11.75	.000

γ_{10} is the intercept of the effect of desirability on the average with-person level of the BTA ratings. γ_{11} is the effect of age, γ_{12} is the effect of gender, γ_{13} is the effect of birthplace, and γ_{14} is the effect of cultural identity on the association between BTA and desirability ratings. u_{1j} represents a random component of the desirability coefficient.

Two findings were noteworthy. First, the fixed effect of γ_{13} was significant,b =-.12, p = .002, indicating that those born in an urban area self-enhanced more than those born in a rural area. Second, unlike what was found when only BTA ratings were examined, the only identity variable that significantly moderated the strength of self-enhancement was traditional disidentification. This moderation effect (γ_{14}) held even when the effect of birthplace was controlled for,b = -.08, p = .007. Table 10b displays the results from HLM analysis. Simple slopes analyses probed the interactionat ±1 SD from the mean of traditional disidentification. As shown in Figure 4, BTA and desirability ratings were positively correlated at high levels of traditional disidenfication, b = .26, p< .001 and this association was stronger at low levels of traditional disidentification, b = .43, p< .001. The less disidentified participants were with traditional Chinese culture, the stronger their self-enhancement bias was. In particular, compared with disidentified participants, less disidentified participants self-enhanced more on highly desirable traits (Figure 4). Adding the remaining three identity variables one at a time in the model did not diminish this effect. Therefore, disidentification with traditional Chinese culture uniquely predicted the strength of self-enhancement. Finally, the random effect of the

Table 10b

Estimates of HLM Model for the Within-Person Association between BTA and Desirability Ratings Moderated by Disidentification with Traditional Culture (Study 4b)

Fixed effect	Coefficient (*SE*)	*T*-ratio	*p*-value
For intercept 1, β_{0j}			
Intercept 2, γ_{00}	6.25(0.081)	76.77	.000
Age, γ_{01}	-0.026 (0.027)	-0.94	.35
Gender, γ_{02}	-0.047 (0.080)	-0.58	.56
Birthplace, γ_{03}	-0.059 (0.084)	-0.70	.48
Traditional disidentification, γ_{04}	-0.097 (0.061)	-1.58	.12
For desirability slope, β_{1j}			
Intercept, γ_{10}	0.35 (0.036)	9.57	.000
Age, γ_{11}	0.0087 (0.013)	0.69	.49
Gender, γ_{12}	-0.026 (0.036)	-0.72	.47
Birthplace, γ_{13}	-0.12 (0.037)	-3.31	.002
Traditional disidentification, γ_{14}	-0.077 (0.028)	-2.76	.007



Figure 4. The association between BTA and desirability ratings as a function of disidentification with traditional Chinese culture (Study 4b). Trait desirability scores were plotted ± 1 SD from the sample mean.

desirability slope coefficient was still significantly greater than 0, $\chi^2(117) = 656.54$, $p < .001$. This suggests that beyond the effects of birthplace and traditional Chinese disidentification, the remaining variation in the within-person association was still substantial enough to be accounted for by other individual differences.

Cross-Cultural Comparisons

To test the hypothesis regarding the rise in the default self-enhancement tendency in China, the BTAE was compared between mainland Chinese and Chinese Canadian participants. Two separate analyses were carried out in the same way as before.

Before the analyses, demographic differences between the samples were examined. The two Chinese groups did not differ significantly in gender ratio, $p = .25$. However, the mainland Chinese sample was significantly older, $t(199.86) = 8.22$, $p < .001$.

To compare the two groups on the BTA ratings on positive traits, desirable traits were selected in the same way for Chinese Canadian participants as they were for mainland Chinese participants. It resulted in the removal of 6 traits as well (hedonistic, shy, moody, stubborn, selfish, and lazy) and the ratings on the remaining 26 traits were averaged. As mentioned above, because of a mistake, the BTA traits were rated on a 9-point scale by the mainland Chinese participants but on a 10-point scale by the Chinese Canadian participants. Thus, mainland Chinese participants' BTA ratings were first converted to a 10-point scale. An ANOVA was then performed on these BTA ratings with group membership as the independent variable. Mainland Chinese participants showed a significantly

stronger BTAE (M = 7.31) than did Chinese Canadian participants (M = 6.53), $F(1, 203) = 25.89$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .11$. The effect remained when trait desirability ($p < .001$) or age ($p < .001$) was controlled for. Therefore, the group difference on BTAE was not because mainland Chinese participants found the BTA traits more desirable or they were older. This supported the hypothesis that self-enhancement is on the rise in contemporary China.

To compare the two groups on the association between BTA and desirability ratings, the same HLM technique was employed. Group membership was included as a person-level moderator (Chinese Canadians = -1, mainland Chinese = 1). The analyses were run without controlling for the effect of age first. Results indicated that the moderating effect of group membership was almost significant, $b = .05$, $p = .056$. The sign of the coefficient suggested that mainland Chinese participants actually self-enhanced more than their Chinese Canadian counterparts. When the analyses were re-run while controlling for the effect of age, however, this group difference largely disappeared, $b = .04$, $p = .26$ (see Table 11). Therefore, it seems that this group difference was driven by the fact that the mainland Chinese participants were generally older.

To summarize, there was no evidence that self-enhancement was weaker in the mainland Chinese sample; mainland Chinese participants self-enhanced as much as, if not more than, the Chinese Canadian participants.

Discussion

Table 11

Estimates of HLM Model for the Within-Person Association between BTA and Desirability Ratings Moderated by Group Membership (Study 4b)

Fixed effect	Coefficient (*SE*)	*T*-ratio	*p*-value
For intercept 1, β_{0j}			
Intercept 2, γ_{00}	6.30 (0.06)	101.07	.000
Age, γ_{01}	-0.0057 (0.026)	-0.23	.83
Group membership, γ_{02}	-0.026 (0.07)	-0.38	.71
For desirability slope, β_{1j}			
Intercept, γ_{10}	0.35 (0.028)	12.52	.000
Age, γ_{11}	0.014 (0.012)	1.17	.24
Group membership, γ_{12}	0.036 (0.032)	1.14	.26

The first goal of the current study was to re-examine the default self-enhancement tendency among mainland Chinese by comparing them with Chinese Canadians. I found no evidence that Chinese Canadians self-enhanced more than mainland Chinese. If anything, it is mainland Chinese who self-enhanced more. When the BTA ratings were compared, mainland Chinese showed a stronger BTAE than Chinese Canadians even after age and trait importance were controlled for. Similarly when the association between the BTAE and trait desirability was compared, there was a trend for mainland Chinese to self-enhance more once the age difference was controlled for. As mentioned above, the use of Chinese immigrants as a comparison group is a conservative test because immigrants tend to acculturate toward the norms of their host culture and as a result, Asian immigrants fall in between people in the culture of origin and European descendants in the host culture on emotional experiences, personality traits and self-esteem (Güngör et al., 2013; Heine & Lehman, 2004;Leersnyder et al., 2011). The same is true of the self-enhancement motive (Falk et al., 2009; Heine & Hamamura, 2007). Therefore, these results provide strong support for the thesis that the default tendency has shifted to being more self-enhancing in contemporary China.

There are at least two explanations for the observed difference in positive self-evaluations. The first explanation is socioeconomic. Since cross-national differences in the self-enhancement bias are partly explained by income inequality (Loughnan et al., 2011), the stronger bias among mainland Chinese may reflect rising income inequality in China (Brockmann et al., 2009; Easterlin et al., 2012).

Another contributing social factor that is specific to China is the implementation of the one-child policy, which has led to most of the younger generation being single children. As children, many of them receive excessive attention from parents and grandparents (Falbo et al., 1997; Kwan et al., 2010), so this may explain the elevated tendency to feel special about oneself and superior to others. Second, given the links between the self-enhancement bias and cultural identification/disidentification observed among mainland Chinese, the rising trend in positive self-evaluations is likely to be driven by cultural change as much as socioeconomic change. In other words, there are likely to be cultural factors that translate the macro-social effect into the psychological level. Loughnan et al. (2011) suggested that increased competitiveness (Green, Deschamps, & Paez, 2005; Takata, 2003) that results from economic inequality may be an important intervening mechanism. Another mechanism may be through the perception of the olden modesty cultural norm becoming less important. Both mechanisms are supported by Study 1a and 1b, which reported increasing cultural importance of self-enhancement values (i.e., achievement and power) and decreasing cultural importance of modesty. Therefore, both socioeconomic and cultural explanations for rising self-enhancement in contemporary China are tenable and in all likelihood, they are reinforcing each other. This speculation is consistent with recent research on the rise of narcissism in China (Cai et al., 2012).

The second goal of the current study was to test one explanation for the unexpected results from Study 4a by examining the associations between making favourable self-evaluations and different dimensions of Chinese identity. I

reasoned that if mainland Chinese with a stronger traditional Chinese identity were more likely to self-enhance, this would provide evidence that the increased BTAE as a result of priming traditional culture in Study 4a might be an assimilation effect. Evidence from the present study is mixed. On the one hand, when the BTA ratings were examined without trait desirability, they were positively associated with identification with contemporary Chinese culture. Those with a stronger contemporary Chinese identity are more likely to make self-enhancing social comparisons. Although the BTA ratings were also correlated positively with identification with traditional Chinese culture, the effect of traditional identification was trumped by that of contemporary identification once their shared variance was removed. Only the latter made a unique contribution to the prediction of the BTAE. Since only a BTA measure was used in Study 4a, the present findingsfail to support the hypothesis that the traditional cultural priming result was an assimilation effect.

On the other hand, when the BTAE was examined in conjunction with trait desirability, a different pattern was found. Replicating recent research with the same method (Loughnan et al., 2011), Chinese university students showed a robust self-enhancing bias; on average, trait desirability was correlated positively with magnitude of the BTAE. More importantly, only disidentification with traditional Chinese culture uniquely predicted the association between BTAE and desirability. An absence of discontentment with traditional culture was associated with a stronger self-enhancing bias. Less disidentified participants were more likely to self-enhance on highly desirable traits. Therefore, when trait desirability

was considered, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis regarding the alternative function of tradition as a means to bolster a positive self-concept, although they cannot presumably shed light on the issue of assimilation vs. contrast effects raised in Study 4a.

Why is it that depending on how favourable self-evaluations are assessed, different patterns of results are found? Insight can be gained by taking a closer look at trait desirability, which distinguishes the two assessments. When trait desirability is not attended to, as was true of Study 4a, BTA ratings on generally positive traits do not differentiate their relative desirability. Thus, those with a stronger contemporary Chinese identity self-enhance on generically positive traits but they seem to do so in a way that is indiscriminate in terms of the relative social desirability of those traits. This is underscored by one identified mechanism by which contemporary identification leads to a stronger BTAE.The mediating effect of trait desirability reveals that a stronger contemporary Chinese identity predicted the tendency to attribute more desirability to *all* traits on average and consistent with the SCENT model, this increased trait desirability in turn predicted a stronger BTA bias. Thus, contemporary cultural identification seems to reflect a motivation to claim superiority on most positive traits without heeding their relative standings in perceived social desirability.

However, when trait desirability is factored in, the self-enhancement strategy exhibited by those with less disidentification with tradition looks particularly tactical. This is because, instead of showing a uniform bias on most positive traits, they evidencedsensitivity to which traits are more or less desirable

in a relative sense. They showed a pronounced bias on highly desirable traits and the bias became rather muted one on not-so-desirable ones. Thus, compared with contemporary cultural identification an absence of traditional cultural disidentification reflects a subtler or more tactical approach to self-enhancement. Beneath their differences, however, underlie the commonality both approaches share – both seem to be deployed in the service of self-enhancement.An asymmetry effect was also observed such that identification with traditional culture did not predict the self-enhancement bias. The reason may lie in the distinction between identification and disidentification motives. Disidentification is more than simply a lack of identification; it involves treating traditional Chinese culture as a negative frame of reference. Therefore, it appears that an active form of identification with traditional culture isn't necessary for the traditional identity motive to influence self-enhancement; the minimum precondition is simply that one is not vehemently opposed to it.

Thefindings regarding traditional disidentification are surprising because they run counter to what is expected from canonical cultural psychological theorizing.On the surface, the heightened sensitivity to trait desirability among less disidentified people appears to embody the cultural mandate of interdependence (Kitayama et al., 2009) via the route of attending to contextual considerations (e.g., Kitayama,Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). However, this social sensitivity has the ironic effect of augmenting a psychological tendency that serves to set individuals apart from others, i.e. BTAE, a clear violation of the cultural mandate of interdependence.Even when

the BTA ratings were examined alone, there was no indication of a negative association with traditional identification or a positive association with traditional disidentification. These findings seem hard to interpret from a canonical perspective without a critical reevaluation of the contemporary functions of traditionality. Instead, they are consistent with the hypothesis that in the context of rapid change, traditional culture may serve an alternative function of maintaining a positive self by attaching people to a historically significant and nostalgic source of shared meaning (cf. Vess, Arndt, Routledge, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012; Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006). So in contemporary China, tradition is perhaps more than a way of life to be practiced, but appropriated symbolically for the "here and now" purposes as well. One crucial "here and now" purpose argued throughout this dissertation is to adapt to a changing sociocultural environment. Supportive evidence for an active construction of tradition comes from studies in the immigration context (Gans, 1979; Verkuyten & deWolf, 2002). A subjective connection with a heritage tradition can be felt withouthaving to follow the dictates of tradition in structuring everyday life. The current study suggests that it may be happening in the context of cultural change as well.

Apart from the main goals, it wasalso found that mainland Chinese participants born in an urban (vs. rural) area did not show a stronger BTAE, but a stronger association between the BTAE and trait desirability. Combined with the finding in Study 4a that those born in the rural area self-enhanced more on independent traits, the evidence is not clear regarding rural-urban differences in

self-enhancement. However, one major limitation of these two studies is that only urban residents were sampled, so there may be systematic differences between rural residents and those who were born in rural areas but moved to urban areas later on. Therefore, rural residential samples are needed for any definitive test of rural-urban differences. There are good theoretical reasons for city dwellers to show a more individualistic orientation than their rural counterparts (J. Chen, Chiu & Chan, 2009; Georgas, 1989; Oishi, 2010). Moreover, studies that included rural samples in China did discover regional differences in the expected direction (Cai et al., 2012).

A final issue concerns the validity of the new method of self-enhancement used in this study. Following Loughnan et al. (2011), self-enhancement bias was also operationalized as the association between BTA ratings and trait desirability. On the one hand, this operationalization makes sense as it is consistent with the motivational account of self-enhancement (Guenther & Alicke, 2010) and hence addresses the concern with individual and group differences in trait importance (Sedikides et al., 2005). On the other hand, it raises the question of whether the magnitude of the self-enhancement bias will also depend on how trait importance is measured. To the best of my knowledge, it can be measured in at least three ways: personal importance, cultural importance, and peer desirability, the last of whichwas adopted in the current study. There is some recent evidence for the measurement of the self-enhancement bias being differentially influenced by the choice of trait importance in different cultural groups. For example,Tam et al. (2012) found that whereas the correlations between BTA ratings and personal trait

importance was positive in both Hong Kong Chinese and European American samples, the correlations between BTA ratings and cultural trait importance differed across groups. The latter correlation was virtually zero in the European American group. In contrast, it was negative in the Hong Kong Chinese group. Their interpretation was that because East Asian "face culture" (Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010) cautions against claiming more than one is granted by others, it is not socially wise to self-enhance on traits of particular cultural import. Supporting this interpretation, Hong Kong Chinese participants displayed tactful self-enhancement. They showed the strongest BTAE on personally important but culturally unimportant traits. Therefore, depending on how trait importance is measured, some people may show the motivation opposite of claiming superiority on highly important traits.

Taken together, the current study provides support for a relatively self-enhancing default tendency for mainland Chinese. Comparisons with Chinese Canadians suggest that mainland Chinese's self-enhancement is uniquely tied to their experience with economic or cultural change in China, or a complex interaction of both[11]. Finally, the current study identified two individual motives

[11]Convergent evidence was also found from comparing the extent to which domain-specific satisfaction predicted general subjective well-being (SWB) among mainland Chinese and Chinese Canadian participants. Because this finding is less connected with the rest of the studies, it is briefly reported in this footnote. Basically, what predicts SWB has been shown to vary along the individualism-collectivism dimension (Tov & Diener, 2007). Specifically, whereas satisfaction with the self-related domain was a stronger predictor of SWB in more individualistic cultures, satisfaction with the relationship-related domain was a stronger predictor of SWB in more collectivistic cultures (e.g., Tam, Lau, & Jiang, 2012).
Following Tam et al. (2012), both mainland Chinese and Chinese Canadian participants rated their domain-specific life satisfaction (self-related: self-image and freedom; relationship-related: family and friendships) before indicating their general life satisfaction on the satisfaction with life scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). Regression analyses showed that 1) satisfaction with self-image and freedom was each a stronger predictor of SWLS among mainland Chinese relative to Chinese Canadian participants, 2) satisfaction with friendships was an equally

that augment the self-enhancing bias among mainland Chinese. On the one hand, a stronger connection with contemporary Chinese culture emboldens mainland Chinese university students to self-enhance more, regardless of the relative desirability of traits. On the other hand, the motive not to distance oneself from traditional Chinese culture enablesthem toclaim more desirable traits as particularly self-descriptive.

strong predictor of SWLS in both groups, but satisfaction with family was a stronger predictor of SWLS among the mainland Chinese as well. Thus, satisfaction with both self-related and relationship-related domains were equally conducive to SWB among mainland Chinese participants. Paradoxically, it was the mainland Chinese who exhibited an integrative bicultural orientation (cf. C. Cheng et al., 2011).

CHAPTER 5:

General Discussion

Summary of Major Findings

The overarching objective of my dissertation is to illuminate some psychological consequences of sociocultural change in China. To this end, I conducted seven studies that examined the dynamics of change at both intersubjective and individual levels. The first three studies (Study 1a, Study1b, and Study 2) were informed by the intersubjective approach to culture (Chiu et al., 2010; Wan & Chiu, 2009) and posited change as collectively shared representations. Moving down to the individual level of analysis, the remaining four studies (Study 3a, Study 3b, Study 4a, and Study 4b) sought direct and indirect evidence in change in personal values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994a) and the tendency to make self-enhancing social comparisons (Alicke& Govorun, 2005; Alicke& Sedikides, 2011). Overall, these studies provide consistent evidence that both cultural representations and some psychological tendencies in contemporary China have shifted away from the prototypical characteristics of what has been known as cultural collectivism or traditional Chinese culture in particular. Here, I briefly summarize the major findings of each study.

Study 1a and 1b identified among university students in Shanghai and Beijing three distinct cultural representations that coexist in contemporary China. Analyses based on both profile similarity and mean comparisons demonstrated that contemporary Chinese culture was perceived to shift away from traditional Chinese culture, yet remain distinct from Western culture. Study 1a and 1b also shed light on the process of cultural evolution in China. While core Chinese values have remained relatively intact, more drastic change was suggestedby

peripheral cultural values. Against this general trend was the unique ascendance of power and achievement values to the cultural core in contemporary China. Finally, it was also found that perceived importance ratings for the three cultural profiles were product of shared cognitions rather than idiosyncratic perceptions.

Study 2 assessed Chinese Canadians' spontaneous representation of Chinese values and the hetero-stereotypes of Chinese values that exist in the Canadian society. In accordance with the idea that cultural representations are socially constructed, Chinese immigrants further removed from direct contact with contemporary China were more likely to hold a traditional representation defined by mainland Chinese. They were also more likely to incorporate the prevailing hetero-stereotypes of Chinese values in the Canadian society, which overlapped with the traditional representation as well. These findings lend further support to the main argument of this dissertation that the construction of a contemporary Chinese representation in China arose in the collective engagement with its sociocultural change over the last few decades. Another interesting finding is that holding a more traditional or stereotypical representation of Chinese values was consequential for Chinese Canadians. It had an overall negative effect on developing positive identification or a close connection with Chinese culture.

Study 3a launched into personal values by comparing personal congruence with the three cultural profiles obtained in Study 1a and 1b. Across three analytic methods and three independent samples (two taken from Study 1a and 1b and one new sample), Chinese university students' personal values were consistently more

congruent with perceived Western and contemporary Chinese values than perceived traditional Chinese values. It was also found that their personal values were most congruent with Western values in terms of overall profile similarity but most congruent with contemporary Chinese values in terms of personal endorsement of top-rated values. These results suggest contemporary China is most affordant to Western values and distinctive contemporary Chinese values. Moreover, Study 3a also revealed that value endorsement and cultural identification were likely distinct processes. The findings suggest that change in one domain did not affect change in the other in a straightforward manner. This dissociation was true of both traditional Chinese culture and Western culture. An overall lack of personal congruence with traditional values did not underminerelatively strong identification with traditional culture. Personal congruence with Western values did not predict the strength of identification with Western culture.

Study 3b went beyond cross-sectional data and tracked changes in personal values and other indicators of individualism-collectivismin China from the WVS. With nationally representative samples over a span of more than a decade (1994-2007), autonomy values increased in importance from 1994-1999 to 1999-2004 and decreased slightly from 1999-2004 to 2005-2007. Materialist/postmaterialist values increased from 1994-1999 to 1999-2004 but did not change from 1999-2004 to 2005-2007. Indicators of family relationships, friendships, and general trust showed evidence for both cultural stability and

cultural change. These changes co-occurred with accelerated economic modernization and globalization, as indexed by objective indicators.

Study 4aexperimentally tested the effect of sociocultural change on the tendency to make self-enhancing social comparisons with the use of cultural priming paradigm (Hong et al., 2000). The main prediction was that priming contemporary Chinese culture would augment the BTAE whereas priming traditional Chinese culture would attenuate it. Contrary to the prediction, traditional Chinese led to an increase in the BTAE compared with contemporary Chinese and neutral primes, which did not differ from each other. This was true of both independent and interdependent traits. American prime also increased BTAE relative to contemporary Chinese and neutral primes.

Study 4b was conducted to clarify the unexpected finding from Study 4a and provide direct support for the rise in self-enhancement in China. Specifically, two findingsprovided suggestive evidence forsociocultural change in China as the driving force of the default self-enhancing tendency. First, identification with contemporary Chinese culture uniquely predicted the BTAE among mainland Chinese. Second, mainland Chinese exhibited a stronger BTAE than Chinese Canadians even after controlling for demographic differences and trait desirability. Another noteworthy finding is that disidentification with traditional Chinese culture uniquely predicted the association between the BTAE and trait desirability. Less disidentified participants were more willing to express superiority over others for highly desirable traits, indicating a hitherto unexplored function of traditionality in the contemporary context.

Evidence forCultural Hybridization

In this dissertation, I adopt cultural hybridization as a general framework to understand how global modernization interacts with cultural heritage to shape an evolving contemporary form of Chinese culture that is distinct from both its historical predecessor and the imported Western culture. Throughout a series of studies, cultural hybridizationhas received the most consistent support. On the contrary, the collection of the findings summarized above is hard to make sense of from the perspective of the homogenization or resilience thesis.

A remaining issue is which style of hybridization contemporary Chinese culture is evidencing. Here, I review evidence that bears on this issue and make a preliminary attempt to distinguish three patterns of cultural hybridizations.

The most rudimentary pattern of hybridization is perhaps an overall linear movement on an underlying continuum between collectivism and individualism. Because very few cultures occupy the very opposite ends of the continuum, many cultures appear hybrid in this relativesense, for a period of time in history at least. In the current research, the finding that contemporary urban Chinese are becoming more self-enhancing (Study 4b) can be taken as evidence for Chinese culturebeing en route to the North American style of individualism. Urban Chinese students' personal value profile, which was shown to be least congruent with the traditional Chinese value profile (Study 3a), also provides support for this transitional sense of hybridization.

A problem with the first pattern of hybridization is that when change is evaluated more than one indicator at a time, it is not clear whether relative distinct

indicators move in the same coordinated fashion. A second sense in which a cultureis considered hybrid is to posit the co-existence of cultural resilience in some domains and cultural change in others.Much psychological theorizing on cultural change seems to resonate with this understanding of hybridization (Greenfield, 2009; Kagitcibasi, 2005b; Yang, 1996, 1998). Such braided or layered imagery of hybridization in the contemporary Chinese context receives consistent support. Study 1a and 1b demonstrated that once the shared variance with the traditional Chinese representation was statistically removed, contemporary Chinese representation was positively correlated with the Western representation. Moreover in Study 3b, different indicators of individualism-collectivism extracted from the WVSshowed a complex pattern of cultural stability and change. My research also points to a perhaps common process of how such co-existence comes about. Since core cultural values are more resistant to change than peripheral ones (Study 1a and 1b), endogenous or exogenous changes are most likely to be effective first on the periphery of a culture and slowly penetrate to a culture's core, resulting in the second pattern of hybridization.

A third pattern of hybridization is perhaps most true to lay people's idealization of it – a third space into which diverse cultural influences are seamlessly fused into a creative whole. If the second pattern of hybridization results more from an reaction to external pressuresand imposesa boundary between what is hybridizable and what is not, this most radical form of hybridization places more emphasis on the role of active negotiation and the

relative equality among different cultural elements or inputs (cf. Nederveen Pieterse, 2009, p. 118). Based on this conceptualization, hybridization is less of a site of conflict and there is more room for a genuine sense of choice and generativity. Indeed, this kind of agentic and equalitarian cultural borrowing and mixing can produce highly creative outcomes at both cultural (Chiu & Kwan, 2010; Simonton & Ting, 2010) and individual levels (Cheng, Sanchez-Burks,& Lee, 2002; Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chiu, 2008). There is less direct evidence for the third pattern of hybridization in the studies reported here. However, a couple of findings are suggestive. In Study 3a, urban Chinese students' untraditional value profile was not accompanied by erosion in subjective identification with the traditional culture. In Study 4b, traditional identity performed a quite contemporary function of enabling the pursuit of tactical self-enhancement. Both pieces of evidence point to the contemporary understanding of traditionality, or the revival of traditionalism in general, taking on a hybrid twist. More than being simply reinstated, traditionality is either reinvented to combat contemporary problems or injected with contemporary concerns and agendas (for a further discussion, see the section on Current Research on Cultural Change).

Implications

I have summarized the major findings for sociocultural change and cultural hybridization in China. In this section, I will discuss their implications for related theories and research onculture and cultural change.

Understanding Culture and Psychology

In the beginning of my dissertation, I conceptualizedculture as a repository of symbolic resources influenced by diverse traditions that evolves in a historically contingent way such that some constituents are carried on, some transformed, and yet others suppressed. Inherent in this conceptual approach to culture are several assumptions. A culture is a pool of information and the pool is dynamic and diverse. Unless it were to become extinct, a cultural poolgenerally grows over time as it interacts with another pool of cultural resources. What surfaces at one point in time may not be the totality of the oceanic culture but a selective subset defined by the current adaptive problems and the group of sense-making individuals. Together with the dissertation findings as a case study of cultural processes in general, I will first discusshow this approach complements and extends existing approaches to culture.

The mutual constitution approach.As a prominent framework in (cross-) cultural psychology, the mutual constitution approach is aptly captured by the motto-like argument that cultures and individual psyches make each other up (Markus& Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1991). Given its emphasis on culture as a meaning system that imposes order and gives coherence, it has proven to be a helpful conceptual tool for elucidating the sociocultural grounding of psychological processes. That is, Markus and Kitayama (1991, 2010)argue for the importance of cultural meanings such as models of the self in selecting for a culture's ways of life such as artifacts, practices, and institutions that afford various psychological tendencies. These psychological tendencies, in turn,

reinforce and reconstitute the ways of life from which they were originally derived.

The mutual constitution model is particularly suited for explaining cultural continuity despite change in the initial material conditions that gave rise to the cultural mode of being. For example, cross-cultural research has supported the argument made by scholars such as Huntington (1996) that non-Western societies (e.g., Japan) have become economically developed without necessarily becoming Western in culture. Core cultural meanings often prevail in the face of socioeconomic change because of culture's genius of assimilating novel forms of knowledge into the existing forms (Cohen, 2001).

In all fairness, the mutual constitution model is not completely mute on cultural change. One straightforward implication is that as cultural meanings change, the mediating psychological functioning changes in turn. However, what is missing there is precisely what triggers a culture to change and what underlies the collective motivation to change. This lack of specification can be attributed to the basic premise of mutual constitution that culture as symbolic meaningsand society as a medium for social interaction and relations mutually reinforce each other in forming a coherent system. In this depiction of what can be termed cultural inertia, the distinction between culture and society is secondary in importance to a seamless sociocultural system (Markus & Hamedani, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 2010).

Findings from my dissertation call into question the stability of any sociocultural system in an increasingly interconnected world. When society is

defined as performing the primary function of actualizing a culture's dominant ideology in social action and interaction (i.e., cultural grounding), there would indeed be little incentive for cultural meanings to evolve. However, large-scale societal changes that have occurredcan be at odds with the local cultural ethos (Inglehart & Baker, 2000); a culture's vista can also be expanded through the introduction of culturally novelmeanings that are not deeply embedded in local life (Anderson et al., 2008).Therefore, it can be argued that there is no simple culture-society isomorphism and they are not always in full agreement (Chiu & Chao, 2009; Chiu, Kim, & Chaturvedi, 2009; Leung & Ang, 2009). This tensioned relation in which the updating of one subsystem requires the other to respond may well underlie the general processes of cultural change. Once stability within a sociocultural system is not taken for granted, it becomes possible to consider various forms of responses to globalization, ranging from wholesale cultural conversion, defensive primordialism, cultural revitalization, to cultural hybridizations, to be functionally equivalent.All of them can been seen as different collective efforts aimed at the same purpose of restoring equilibrium after the social and the cultural forces become disjunctive. Thus, cultural continuity may be one, albeit common, case of processes of cultural evolution.

The Chinese case is a good illustration of the continuous efforts to restore stability to the disrupted equilibrium within the sociocultural system.China's transition to a market economy was admittedly a social experiment targeted at overhauling the stagnant economy, not Chinese culture per se.Its wariness of Westernization was borne out in the data; its contemporary culture resulting from

decades of economic reforms remains distinct from Western culture. However, almost concurrent with this finding is its gradual alienation from its own traditional roots. That is, the historical effect of an originally economic experiment has spilled over to the meaning system and launched China on a path away from its traditional culture. Intentionally or not, this journey to re-establishing equilibrium involves cultural change along the way that is influenced by historical circumstances and human decision-making with not entirely predictable reverberations (see Cohen, 2001, pp. 453-460, for a discussion of different forms of cultural evolution).

In a recent elaboration of the mutual constitution model, Kitayama et al. (2009; see also Kitayama & Imada, 2010) proposed that cultural mandates such as independence and interdependence shape psychological tendencies by engaging people repeatedly with specific practices or routines known as cultural tasks that are developed to promote the cultural mandates.So in a culture of interdependence (vs. independence), people are more likely to practice cultural tasks that affordsituational (vs. dispositional) attribution, holistic (vs. analytic) attention, engaging (vs. disengaging)emotions, a social (vs. personal) basis of happiness, self-criticism (vs. self-enhancement). The cultural task analysis further maintains that while these various psychological elements of individualism-collectivism cohere at the collective level, they don't need to at the individual level. This is because a given person typically selects only a smaller subset of the available cultural tasks.To achieve the goal of interdependence, some take the route of basing their happiness on social harmony, while others practice holistic attention,

and so forth. That is, interdependence can be sustained at the group level such that various psychological tendencies of interdependence are more prevalent in collectivistic societies despite the different routes individuals take to strive for interdependence (Na et al., 2010). The merit of this theoretical framework is its ability to explain both between-culture differences and within-culture differences. Thus, it avoids the pitfall of homogenizing individuals within the same culture.

The same disjunctive sociocultural system analysis can be applied to extend the basic insight of the cultural task analysis to understanding cultural change. While it remains important to link a changing psychological tendency (e.g., self-enhancement) with a narrow set of cultural tasks that shape it, two additions to the model are needed. First, when cultural change transforms a relatively homogenouscultural space into a multicultural space,what constitutes a cultural mandate becomes complicated, if not problematic. Especially where traditional and contemporary culture clash (e.g., should a child be humble about or proud of his or her accomplishment?), it is difficult to argue that one single cultural goal will prevail in all life domains (for arguments in the Chinese case, see Leung, 2012). Second, although it makes sense that each culture is governed by a set of core cultural ideas or ideals, more cultural change tends to occur with peripheral goals, at least initially. An exclusive focus on a culture's core may prevent researchers from entertaining the diversity of legitimate ideals or acceptable life-goals thatcoexist but may never assume a dominant position. Nor would researchers be likely to detect relatively nuanced cultural change, if their thinking is fixed at the abstract level of individualism and collectivism. Current

evidence strongly suggests that both implicit and explicit individualism/collectivism are a loosely organized set of domain-specific content at the individual level (Chiu & Hong, 2006; Na et al., 2010; Oyserman,Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Yang, 2003). So while as a domain-general construct,individualism/collectivism is a useful interpretive concept for ease of communication mainly because its intuitiveness has cut across social sciences at least since Tönnies (1887/1957), domain-specific constructs are more likely to be the causal conceptsthat explain the bulk of cross-cultural differences (Kashima, 2009). Since cultural change is more likely to be reflected in change in domain-specific and peripheral constructs, a possibility not permissible from the standpoint of the cultural task analysis is that cultural change prompts change in some psychological tendencies associated with individualism-collectivism but not others also associated with it.

The socio-ecological approach to culture.The social-ecological turn in social psychology is a broad attempt to revive sociological theorizing and counteract the increasingly intrapsychic focus in psychology (Oishi & Graham, 2010; Oishi, Kesebir, & Snyder, 2009). While sharing the commitment to a sociocultural grounding of psychological processes with the meaning-centered approach (i.e., mutual constitution), the socio-ecological approach to culture also complements it in two ways. First, this approach narrows cross-cultural differences down to a more narrow set of measurable socio-ecological variables, thereby helping pinpoint the social structural origins of these differences. For example, the socio-ecological approach has shed light on a number of cross-

societal differences that may have given rise to different meaning systems in North America vs. East Asia;the most generative of this approach involves different social mobility such as relational mobility (Oishi, 2010), relational mobility (Schug, Yuki, & Maddox, 2010), and job mobility (J. Chen et al., 2009). Second, the socio-ecological approach attests to the usefulness of analytically separating social structural from cultural effects. This opens up the possibility of examining how cultural and social structural factors interact with each other in shaping psychology and behaviour (see Edgerton, 1971, for a classic example).

Both points are illustrated in the Chinese data reported here. First, there was a correspondence in Study 3b between social indicators and values change at the individual level measured by the Chinese WVSs. This finding underscores the influence of economic development on personal values independently of cultural traditions (Inglehart &Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 2008). Therefore, rather than social institutions and economic systems reinforcingthe existing cultural meaning systems, as emphasized in the mutual constitution approach, economic globalization is presumably the driving force of the rising importance of individualistic values, achievement and power in particular, in contemporary China. Second, the self-enhancement findings in Study 4a and 4bare consistent with the economic inequality account proposed by Loughnan et al. (2011). In their study, income inequality predicted cross-cultural differences in the self-enhancement bias betterthan did individualism/collectivismmeasured at the cultural level. For instance, while Japan, China, and Venezuela are all relatively collectivistic cultures, the self-enhancement bias was virtually non-existent in

Japan, moderately strong in China, and strong in Venezuela. Thus, sociological factors that consider short-term adaptations can sometimes do a better job of explaining cultural differences than pure cultural dimensions. From this perspective, rising self-enhancement in China is a product of recent sociocultural change.

Of course, a socio-ecological perspective does not mean that social structural and cultural factors are completely divorced from each other. For example, economic inequality may trigger cultural change in the direction of legitimizing competitiveness and it could be the perception of the increased importance of the competitiveness norm and/or the declining importance of the modesty norm that acts as the proximate cause of increased self-enhancement (see the discussion below on intersubjective culture). This line of reasoning is supported by the finding that those who endorse this new cultural perception (i.e., stronger identification with contemporary culture) showed a stronger BTAE. More broadly, applying a socio-ecological perspective to understanding change means that as a society evolves, both social structural and cultural factors need to be considered as the effect of sociological factors may also be moderated by preexisting local culture (Aoki, 2001;Cohen, 2001; Kagitcibasi, 1996; Leung, 2012). For instance, as the Chinese population is becoming more mobile, the effects of residential mobility on self-concepts, social relationships, and well-being may not be exactly the same as have been identified in the American cultural context (Oishi, 2010) because of China's different cultural traditions.

The intersubjective approach to culture.Finally, the intersubjective approach takes an interactionist perspective on culture. From this perspective,culture is manifested neither as deeply internalized traits nor as automatic habits as a result of repeated, non-reflective engagements with major cultural tasks; rather, it is encoded as intersubjective knowledge of what cultural membersagree to be the widespread ideasin the culture (Chiu et al., 2010). Several findings of this dissertation illustrate some of the principles of this approach that distinguish it from other approaches to culture.

First, individual values or beliefs are not cultures writ small. Although the mutual constitution approach acknowledges that cultural meanings are appropriated and even transformed by individuals, this insight has seldom been incorporated empirically because of its emphasis on long-term, non-reflective adaptations to environmental contingencies. However, the intersubjective approach maintains that people are generally aware of the dominant traditions in their culture and are able to reflect upon them (Wan et al., 2009). Thus, they are not all cultural automatons or cultural loyalists. Bygranting limitedindividual agency, the intersubjective approach emphasizes the self as the centre of experience that also reflects upon sociocultural shaping (Wan et al., 2010) and selectively weaves some of its content into the making of a narrative identity (McAdams& Pals, 2006). In Study 3a, Chinese university students' personal values were more congruent with perceived contemporary Chinese and Western values than with perceived traditional Chinese values as they didn't perceive themselves to cling to traditional values. Of course, this does not mean their

personal values can all be translated into corresponding value-expressive behaviours. Since the changing Chinese context is still distinct from the Western cultural contexts, different cultural affordances and constraints shape what are considered culturally adaptive behaviours even though a segment of the population starts to structure their values around a different knowledge tradition through cultural exposure.

Second, although individuals may not identify with their cultural traditions, they may nonetheless act on their intersubjective knowledge for adaptive, communicative, and identity reasons (Chiu et al., 2010; Shteynberg et al., 2009;Zou et al., 2009). The intersubjective approach makes the important distinction between cultural behaviours based on internalization or automaticity and those based on intersubjective perceptions. That is, it points to a distinct mechanism involved in cultural continuity. Similar to lessons from classic work on social influence (Asch, 1951; Sherif, 1936) and pluralistic ignorance (Katz & Allport, 1931), a culture-specific behaviour can be sustained by the perception that generalized others still accept it even if it is privately rejected. Perceived public norms, mistaken as they may be, can hold sway over private values or beliefs.

Yamagishi's work on how Japanese collectivism is maintained illustrates the importance of clarifying distinct cultural maintenance mechanisms (see Yamagishi, 2011, for a recent review). A growing body of evidence has shown that collectivism in present-day Japan does not seem to be sustained by most Japanese' private convictions of collectivistic virtues (Matsumoto, 1999, 2002;

Takano& Osaka, 1999). However, Japanese continue to believe that other Japanese hold more collectivistic values (Hashimoto, 2011). In a series of experiments, Yamagishi and colleagues (Suzuki & Yamagishi, 2004; Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008; see also, Yamagishi& Suzuki, 2009) have demonstrated that it is the concern about the anticipated responses from others to the violation of collectivistic norms that has made collectivisitic behaviours self-perpetuating in the Japanese society. For example, in a replication of Kim and Markus' (1999)study on conformity to the majority, they hypothesized that because the implications of offending others are more negative in the minds of Japanese people, conformity by way of choosing a majority colour pen would be a socially prudent and actually default strategy (Yamagishi et al., 2008). That is, it is adaptive to assume that by choosing a majority colour pen, you will prevent causing potential offence in case others want to pick a unique colour pen. They also created a condition in which they minimized the concern for offending others (by making participants believe they were the last person to pick the pen) and they predicted that more Japanese participants would choose a unique colour pen. Consistent with their hypotheses, cultural differences in conformity were found only in the first condition in which the social implications of choosing a unique colour pen were unclear; this presumably prompted Japanese participants to resort to the default strategy of conforming by choosing a majority colour pen.

This line of research cautions against accepting the same overt behaviours (e.g., conformity) at face value while leaving the cultural dynamics behind them unexamined (e.g., conformity because of internalized values or relying on

intersubjective guidance; Cohen, 2001, 2007)[12]. Applied to cultural evolution, one important implication of the intersubjective approach is that cultural evolution does not need to involve change in overt cultural behaviours but also change in the underlying cultural mechanisms that sustain the same behaviours from one historical time to another.Thus, contemporary Japan presents the case of intersubjective perceptions reining in the default psychological tendencies symptomatic of collectivism despite personal sentiments that appear to be shifting away from it (see Vandello & Cohen, 2004 for illustrating a similar intersubjective mechanism underlying the culture of honor).

Following from the second point, intersubjective perceptions also play a potentially important role in changein overt cultural behaviours (Chiu et al., 2010). The intersubjective approach predicts that when intersubjective perceptions have changed in response to the changing culture, behaviours sustainedby intersubjective knowledge should also change accordingly. Consistent with this supposition, the contemporary Chinese data reported here indicate weakening in some collectivistic tendencies due to the changing intersubjective perceptions of Chinese culture. First,Study 1a and 1b provide evidence for the representation of contemporary Chinese culture becoming more individualistic and less collectivistic. Second, Study 4b confirmed the rise in making positive self-evaluations as a default strategy among contemporary Chinese university students. Thus, the changing intersubjective perceptions may be proximately

[12]This is not to say that internalized values and intersubjective knowledge always work in opposition. Instead, the point is that they should be analytically separated because people's private preferences do not need to line up with intersubjective norms (Rozin, 2003) and cultural practices can still be sustained through the intersubjective route without wholesale internalization.

involved in the rise in self-enhancement as part of a longer causal chain that originates in socioeconomic change at the macro level.

ThePsychology of Globalization

My dissertation also adds to the emerging body of research that attempts to advance a psychological understanding of globalization's various consequences (Arnett, 2002; Chiu & Cheng, 2007; Marsella, 2012; Gelfand, Lyons, & Lun, 2011). Although this dissertation focuses mainly on cultural change since China opened up for external influence, the findings connect well with several research programs spearheading psychologists' foray into the complexities of globalization.

One aspect of globalization is condensation in cultural distance and the presence of local and global cultures in the same physical space. One innovative line of research has demonstrated that when two cultural representations are simultaneously activated (e.g., Starbucks Coffee in China's Forbidden City), culture becomes a salient organizing category for processing incoming information (Chiu & Cheng, 2007; Chiu, Gries, Torelli, & Cheng, 2011; see also, Torelli &Cheng, 2011). Depending on contextual and psychological factors, this dual cultural mindset can evoke exclusionary reactions, deployed in defense of the local culture for fear of cultural contamination by the global culture (Cheng et al., 2011; Chiu et al., 2009; Torelli et al., 2011), or integrative reactions, which are geared toward bridging cultural divides to foster intercultural learning (Cheng, Leung, & Wu, 2011; Leung et al., 2008).

Two points are noteworthy from this research. First, it provides needed empirical support for the validity of the oftentimes polarized positions in the globalization discourse about what it does to local cultures (Guillén, 2001; Marsella, 2012; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009). Globalization is simultaneously an opportunity and a challenge for countries that are largely recipients of globalization. Second, this research indicates that the seemingly mutually opposing motivations may actually exist in tandem. In a society in the flux of change such as China, the need to learn from Western culture and affirm traditional cultureare both in evidence. As discussed in Study 3a through Study 4b, while Chinese university students evidenced an open stance toward Western values, their identification with traditional Chinese culture was not consequently eroded. Additionally, Study 1a and 1b showed that the integrity of core Chinese values is largely preserved in contemporary China relative to peripheral ones. Indeed, one implication of those findings is that the interplay between the two motivations produces segmented cultural change, that is, uneven rates of cultural change in different life domains (Cheung et al., 2006; Fu & Chiu, 2007).

Efforts to affirm the local cultural tradition and integrate foreign cultures can be rendered intelligible from the single standpoint that globalization complicates individual meaning-making. It has been postulated that the experience of ontological insecurity or existential uncertainty is a significant condition that characterizes the contemporary form of globalization (Giddens, 1991). For example, Hermans (2010; also see, Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007) breaks globalization-induced uncertainty down into four aspects – complexity of

cultural positions and relations, ambiguity of meaning, lack of a superordinate knowledge structure, and unpredictability of future. Given the unmooring of meaning from the locality where it has historically been rooted, both exclusionary and integrative reactionscan be seen asserving the same overarching function of imposing meaning, regardless of its origin, on a world stage where meanings are in a shifting and fluid state (Bauman, 2000). My dissertation also points to a middle-of-the road or hybrid reaction. Instead of defending tradition against the perceived trampling from the juggernaut of globalization or practicing the traditional ways of life, people can appropriate tradition as a symbolic resource to achieve individual goals.Study 4b indicates that traditional culture could function to maintain a positive self by attaching contemporary Chinese to a historically significant source of shared meaning.

A developmental perspective on the complexity of meaning-making in the era of globalization maintains that the task of navigating through a multicultural space is not unique to the immigration experience (Jensen, 2003; Jensen&Arnett, 2012).We can see the phenomenon of the world becoming multicultural as a whole in explicit references to its similarity to acculturation research that has traditionally targeted at cultural migration (e.g., remote acculturation, Ferguson & Bornstein, 2012; globalization-based acculturation, S. X. Chen et al., 2008) and in extending acculturation models to understandingnew developmental pathways to cultural identity formation (Jensen, 2012; Jensen&Arnett, 2012). My dissertation findings echo this point: People in non-immigration contexts should also be

studiedas possible products of multiple cultures that interact with each other instead of isolated cultural systems.

Finally, because local cultures' reactions to globalization are likely to vary, the impact of globalization on even culturally similar countries also tends to vary. The work of Norasakkunkit, Uchida, and Toivonen(Norasakkunkit, Uchida, &Toivonen, 2012) on the marginalization of Japanese youth presents a vivid case study of the far-reaching implications of responses to globalization pressures at the institutional level for individual psychology of the youth. The crux of their sociological analysis of post-industrial Japan is that globalization has driven a wedge in the Japanese society between its interdependent, conformistculture and the post-industrial pressures to incorporate values of meritocracy, competition, and innovation (Norasakkunkit et al., 2012; Toivonen, Norasakkunkit, & Uchida, 2011). The dominant institutional responses have been protective of the interests of senior and business elites and resistant to reforming the long-standing cultural practices such as the long-termemploymentsystem. Consequently, it is the youth, who have been excluded from the core labour market, that bear the brunt of this rift between socio-structural inertia and globalization pressures. At the cultural level, what they argue this rift has created is cultural anomie among the marginalized youth due to the diminishing institutional means to or rewards for sustaining interdependent goals.

They have shown that the psychological tendencies of the marginalized Japanese youth start to deviate from the interdependent norms. For example, high-risk Japanese students (i.e., NEETs: Not engaged in Employment, Education, or

Training) exhibited psychological distancing from interdependence at both explicit attitudinal and implicit motivational levels (Norasakkunkit et al., 2012; Norasakkunkit & Uchida, 2011). In addition, although the motivational tendencies of low-risk Japanese students were still consistent with interdependent norms, i.e., they were motivated more by failure feedback than success feedback (Heine et al., 2001), the intensity of this interdependent motivation was significantly lower relative to Japanese students tested a decade ago. This latter finding suggests that the reduced motivation or willingness to maintain interdependent norms may represent a larger social adjustment problem among contemporary Japanese youth.

Sociologically informed analyses critically situate culture and psychology within a historical and global context. Findings from Japan's maladaptive institutional response to globalization and the ensuing cultural alienation of youth from their own society highlight several points made earlier about understanding cultural dynamics. First, for better or worse, the social and the culturalsegments of a sociocultural system can be rendered disjunctive by external forces. A sociocultural systemcontinues to evolve as its cultural members collectively devise solutions to re-establish the disrupted equilibrium. Second, culture seen from this macro perspective is notthe simple operation of an all-encompassing cultural logic or mandate. Culture needs to be decentered such that researchers devote attention to the tension between the cultural core and the cultural peripheraland to the groups with vested interests in core vs. peripheral cultural ideologies. Third, the case of marginalized Japanese youth being "unable to

conform and unwilling to rebel" (Toivonen et al., 2011) illustrates the general point of individuating cultural psychology and broadening its overly restrictive search for systematic and stable patterns. That youth in changing cultures tend not to value what is generally perceived to be important (Hashimoto, 2011; Norasakkunkit & Uchida, 2012; Shteynberg et al., 2009; Tafarodi et al., 2012a; also see Shimizu, 2000) may be a methodological anomaly from a canonical perspective (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Peng, Nisbett, & Wong, 1997). Butit is not so puzzling and may even be expected when considering the larger global context under which local cultures are embedded. A final lesson from this research is that because of different local responses to globalization, the psychological profiles of culturally similar countries such as China and Japan will not necessarily converge in many aspects of psychological functioning. For example, several studies have consistently shown the expression of the self-enhancement motive to be more prevalent in China (Mezulis et al., 2004). In this dissertation, I found support for a sociocultural change explanation for the rise in self-enhancement in contemporary China.

Existing Research on Cultural Change

To illustrate the implications of the current findings for the existing research on cultural change,I draw primarily on Greenfield'stheory(2009) of social change and human development.

Several aspects of Greenfield's theory make it applicable to understanding cultural change in the Chinese context. First, cultural values such as individualism and collectivism are conceptualized at the intermediate level of analysis, which

are ultimately influenced by sociodemgraphic factors. Not only is cultural change expected, but its direction is predicted by the theory. With urbanization and economic development, the theory predicts the movement of Chinese culture in an overall more individualistic direction. Second, cultures are not dichotomized as either individualistic or collectivistic; instead, they are posited to be dispersed on a continuum. In other words, change is relative to a culture's starting point on the dimension. Thus, even if the changing Chinese culture is still distinct from a prototypical Western culture, that does not speak against its trajectory of change in a more individualistic direction. Third, as noted before, the theory does not view sociodemographic variables moving in a unilinear fashion. Unlike anthropology inspired theories that emphasize cultural stability or modernization inspired theories that overstate economic determinism, Greenfield'stheory allows room for cultural hybridization in which some cultural values and socialization practices are transformed while others are preserved, as documented here in the Chinese case (for similar approaches, also see Kagitcibasi, 2005b; Yang, 1996, 1998).For example, the theory can be used to explain the changing meaning of filial piety in China. On the one hand,filial piety in the formof blindly obeying the authority of parents or continuing to live with them after marriage is disappearing, as these practices are less adapted to Gesellschaft conditions. On the other hand, filial piety in the form of maintaining close emotional connections continues to be practiced (Ho et al., 2012; X. Zhang et al., 2003).

Despite the generativity of Greenfield's theory of culture change, the current research also poses some challenges. Perhaps because of its emphasis on

offeringa unifying framework, the theory is relatively vague about the range and possible forms of cultural hybridization. In other words, although unevenly distributed cultural change falls under its theoretical purview, specification of how local cultures respond to sociodemographic change is lacking. Thus, several findings reported here are hard to explain within this framework.

First, the theory does not distinguish between core and peripheral values in the reservoir of a particular cultural heritage. Thus, it wouldn't predict that the latter may be subject to sweeping social change at a more rapid pace than the former, which was found in Study 1a and 1b.

Second, the theory tends to underestimate the diversity of local responses to change in material and economic conditions. As discussed above, Japan has taken a protective stance toward globalization pressures and has remained culturally distinctive despite being one of the most economically developed countries in the world. By comparison, China has been more receptive, particularly to the economic aspect of globalization (Guthrie, 2009; Yoshikawa, Way, & Chen, 2012), up until recently when the government attempted to appeal to Confucianism such as harmonious society to combat growing social problems. Perhaps because of this initial difference in reactions, the current research complements recent research in demonstratingmore rapid change inChina and some of its psychological tendencies (Cai et al., 2012; X. Chen & Chen, 2010; C. Cheng et al., 2011). Therefore, the ingenuity of cultural traditions may be a crucial factor in affecting the degree and rate of social change.

Finally and relatedly, it is not clear whether cultural heritage that is not directly antagonistic to social change will continue to exist or eventually become extinct as well. In this research, it was found in the WVS data (Study 3b) that a trend in the direction of autonomy and postmaterialist values in China was accompanied by the continued positive regard for parents. Indeed, there is evidence for coexistence of individualism and collectivism in at least some regions of the world (C. Cheng et al., 2011; Lu & Yang, 2006; Pouliasi & Verkuyten, 2011). Theorists of cultural change disagree how to interpret this emerging pattern. While Greenfield's theory views it as an intermediate stage en route to Gesellschaft (Greenfield, 2009, p. 413), other similar approaches stress its unique hybrid form for its own sake (Chen, 2012; Kagitcibasi, 2005b; Yang, 1996). Whether reflective of something transitory or not, the emerging cultural hybridizationaround the world suggests that the dynamic combination of individualism and collectivism needs to be studied in its own right as social change likely produces more than one hybrid kind. In this matter, a unidimensional approach such as Greenfield's theory may not be sufficient to capture its complexity.

Tamis-LeMonda et al. (2007) put forward a theoretical model that offers insight into what the different contours of cultural hybridization look like at both micro and macro levels. They postulated the relations between individualism and collectivism (as both value systems and developmental goals) to be conflicting, additive, or functionally dependent. Transported in the context of contemporary China, what this typology means is that living in an increasingly multicultural

niche, contemporary Chinese are aware of both individualistic and collectivistic values, but their responses may diverge.They may pursue one goal in the service of realizing the other larger goal if they construe individualism as a means to collectivism or collectivism as a means to individualism (functionally dependent relations). They may feel deeply ambivalent about which goals to pursue if they view individualism and collectivism goals as mutually contradictory (conflicting relations). Or, they may approach both as two equally worthy goals if they construe individualism and collectivism to be important but independent from each other (additive relations).While the WVS results in Study 3b seem to reveal the additive form, the broader implication is that all three forms can coexist within the same changing culture and greater attention to how individualism and collectivism goals are balanced is needed in research on cultural change.

Cultural Representations in Varying Contexts

Finally, although not the main focus of this research, the representations of Chinese culture were also found to vary across place. Mainland Chinese and Chinese Canadians in Study 2 held different perceptions of Chinese culture. This has some important implications as well.

As discussed in Study 2, while both groups shared a pan-Chinese representation, what was unique in their perceptions seemed to be the products of different sociocultural environments in which they are situated. One the one hand, the representation of contemporary Chinese culture reflects mainland Chinese's participation in social change in contemporary China.On the other hand, Chinese Canadians' "outdated" representation comes from their inheritance of a more

traditional representation and the existence of stereotypical beliefs of Chinese culture in Canada. While the main findings of my dissertation challenge a static view of (Chinese) culture across time, this specific finding problematizes another common assumption that the same (Chinese) culture is transmitted perfectly across locations. It supports the alternative view that the representations that children of immigrants are exposed to can be out of syncwith the current realities in their countries of origin. Because children of immigrants tend to inherit an outdated version of their heritage culture, this can explain the counterintuitive findings that American- or Canadian-born Asians sometimes hold on to more traditional values than recent Asian immigrants (B. S. K. Kim et al., 2001). So the general lesson is that findings about one ethnic group in one sociocultural environment should not be simply assumed to be true of the same ethnic group in another sociocultural environment.

An interesting, real-life example supportive of this is the controversy over "tiger parenting" popularized by Amy Chua (2011) in her memoire *Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother*. The book has captivated both public and academic attention for its portrayal of Chinese way of parenting style that emphasizes strict parental control, punitive discipline, and high expectations of academic achievement. Chua's characterization is not completely groundless. It seems to typifya traditional Chinese parenting style that is often contrasted with Western parenting style in cross-cultural research (Chao, 1994; Ho, 1994). Regardless of whether "tiger parenting" is practiced by Asian immigrant parents or not (e.g., Kim, Wang, Orozco-Lapray, Shen, & Murtuza,2013), the question here is: Is Chua's account a

true representation of Chinese parenting? The answer is: It depends on whom you ask. As uncovered by Way et al. (2013) and supported by other developmental research (e.g., Chen & Chen, 2010), mainland Chinese mothers in urban areas reported a great deal of parental warmth and autonomy support toward their children, which contrasts sharply with the "tiger mother" image. The most striking of their findings is these mothers' concern with their children's socio-emotional development over their academic achievement (Way et al., 2013).

Of course, this is not to say that Chua's representation is less true than that of mainland Chinese mothers'. Both are psychologically real in the sense of influencing their own childrearing practices. Instead, their divergence illustrates the dynamic nature of cultural representations: Divergent representations of the "same" culture are shaped by different sociocultural environments in which they are produced and maintained. As an American-born Chinese raised by parents who themselves grew up in a Chinese diaspora community in the Philippines, Amy Chua seems to have inherited a representation of Chinese parenting that is more antiquated than the representation being woven together in contemporary China (Guo, 2011; Kohler, Aldridge, Christensen, &Kilgo, 2012).Therefore, cultural narratives or ideologies evolve across both time and space.

Limitations and Future Directions

I conclude by pointing outsome important limitation of this research and discussing how they can be addressed in future research.

First, throughout my dissertation, traditional Chinese culture was contrasted with contemporary Chinese culture. Although the purpose of

employing such contrast was to make it analytically easy to demonstrate change, I am also mindful of its limitations. One limitation is the risk of reification by invoking such descriptions as dual Chinese representations. However, the portrayal of Chinese culture, its contemporary form in particular, should be best understood as a one-time snapshot over its cultural evolution. Especially because of ongoing changes, the data presented here should not be taken to indicate that contemporary Chinese culture has reached a stable equilibrium -- they are only good at providing evidence suggestive of cultural change.A more precise understanding of where Chinese culture is going requires an accumulation of data on a longer time scale. A related limitation is that because of the need to contrast the dual Chinese representations, the present research is mute on the dynamic aspect of the emergence of intersubjective reality (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009;Hardin & Higgins, 1996).Beyond evidence for the common ground that Chinese people have constructed to represent contemporary Chinese culture, one next step will be to examine how the contemporary representation became widely shared in the first place. Investigation of this scope will extend the shared reality research beyond its traditional focus on interpersonal communication (e.g., Shteynberg, 2010;Wan, Torelli, & Chiu, 2010).

Second, my research has focused mostly on psychological change in the more individualistic direction in contemporary China. However, the cultural hybridization framework it builds on is too complex to be reduced to predicting any unidimensional or unilinear change. Thus, an important task in future research is to identify psychological tendencies within or outside of individualism-

collectivism that have withstood change or perhaps have been strengthened in contemporary China. In order to do this, one approach can follow up on the distinction between core and peripheral cultural values made in this research. Core values such as family security in SVS or positive regard for parents in WVS are more resistant to cultural change. In fact, perceived cultural erosion in core values could instigate compensatory efforts to uphold their utmost importance. A second approach will be to examine the adaptive values of traditional culture to contemporary China. As discussed above, local traditions that do not directly impede or perhaps work in concert with the forces of social change may well be preserved. One candidate in the Chinese context is holistic thinking (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001).In particular, in the domain of reasoning about contradictions, Peng and Nisbett (1999) argued that traditional Chinese culture was profoundly shaped by naïve dialecticism rooted in the principles of change, contradiction, and holism, which is contrasted with Aristotelian formal logic. There are reasons to believe that the contemporary conditions, in which traditional Chinese, contemporary Chinese, and Western representations paradoxically occupy the same space, may continue to afford the psychological propensity fortolerance of contradictions (S. X. Chen, Benet-Martínez, Wu, Lam, &Bond, 2013; Faure & Fang, 2008), albeit for a different reason than how dialectical thinking may have arisen in the first place (Nisbett, 2003).This possibility awaits future research.

Third, the present research is limited by the relatively small number of variables selected. To examine cultural stability vs. change in contemporary

China in a more systematic way, future research can benefit from including a wider variety of measures tapping different domains of psychological functioning. Given the ongoing debate over the distinction between implicit andexplicit measures of independence and interdependence (Kitayama, 2002; Kitayama et al., 2009), research that administers different implicit and explicit measures simultaneously will shed further light on how individualism/collectivism coheres at the cultural level in contemporary China. The choice of comparison group(s) is crucial as well. In this regard, heeding the call to go beyond the standard East-West comparisons may pay additional dividends. This is because any revealed China-West differences may not only be unsurprising, given that data from WEIRD societies, the US in particular, are frequent outliersagainst the rest of the world (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2009); they may also be rather insensitive in terms of discovering rather nuanced cultural change, since evidence of continued differences between mainland Chinese and Western samples does not automatically imply that China has undergone no change. Instead, more fruitful approaches involve comparing ethnically Chinese groups in different sociocultural environments, as employed herein, rural and urban Chinese (e.g., Chen & Li, 2012), or culturally similar groups in Asia (e.g., Tafarodi et al., 2012b).

Fourth, future research also needs to go beyond a demonstration of cultural change in China and understand the underlying processes. For example, although Study 3a and 3b provide evidence for change in personal values, they raise a further question of how change comes about at the individual level.

Following the model of individual value change proposed by Bardi and Goodwin (2011), most of the factors they identified (priming, adaptation, identification, consistency maintenance, and direct persuasion) are likely to be involved in the change of personal values in China. Because values are about prioritizing different and often incompatible goals, change in the sociocultural environment restructures the range of goals that are easy or difficult to pursue and therefore sensitizes people to the new incentive structures and reinforcement contingencies (Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009;Brandtsädter, 2010). Change in cultural values thus results in reprioritization of personal goals to be consistent with the change. Individual value change among younger Chinese may also arise through repeated persuasion attempts such as the appeal of individualism in advertising tailored to the youth market (Zhang & Shavitt, 2003). More broadly, identifying contextual factors that mediate the effects of macro-level change on both implicit and explicit psychological tendencies will be an important avenue of future research.

Fifth, the dynamic way tradition continues to be relevant in China warrants future scrutiny. Its dynamic role is emphasized here because my research suggests that identification with traditional culture has taken on novel meanings (see Study 3a and 4b). Together with research showing motivated exclusionary reactions to globalization to protect the purity and sanctity of cultural traditions (e.g., Chiu et al., 2011), these findings indicate that the connection between self and tradition in the contemporary context may not automatically evoke psychological tendencies typically associated with collectivism (e.g., self- or

group-effacement). One possible future direction is to investigate more precisely what tradition evokes among contemporary Chinese. If it is correct that tradition connects the self with a wellspring of meaning, one specific way in which traditionality legitimizes enhancing the self or the culture may be through the activation of feelings of pride and warmth toward the past (cf. Cheng, Chao, Kwong, et al., 2010).

Another direction is to take a close look at multiple components of cultural identities. Leach et al. (2008) recently confirmed a multicomponent model of group-level identification with two higher-order dimensions: self-definition (individual self-stereotyping and in-group homogeneity) and self-investment (solidarity, satisfaction, and centrality). The appeal of this model lies in reducing group identification to two basic routes – either by perceiving overall similarity to the in-group or by investing emotionally and symbolically in the in-group. Self-investment is particularly interesting as it indicates one can feel committed to traditional Chinese culture without necessarily letting itdefine the entirety of the self-concept. In other words, heavily invested members are more likely to react negatively to an in-group threat, but they may not behave in a way consistent with an average in-group member (Leach et al., 2008). Thus, it can be predicted from this work that contemporary Chinese' identification with traditional culture should be based more onself-investment than self-definition. More broadly, however, the revival of traditionalism needs to be studied not as mere proof of cultural resilience, but rather as dynamic instances of cultural hybridization.

Sixth, future research should investigate the potential differences as well as similarities between immigration-based and globalization-based acculturation. Although an argument is made here that both types of acculturation be studied under the same hybridization framework, they are not identical, particularly in terms of the aforementioned patterns of hybridization they tend to foster. It may be worth examining whether immigration-based acculturation is more likely to give rise to the most agentic expression of hybridization or the conditions in which globalization-based acculturation will or will not lead to this third hybrid style.

Finally, I took a primarily descriptive approach to sociocultural change in China. Hence, the findings are not meant to make a normative claim that the hybridizing Chinese culture is inherently superior to its older form. It remains to be an open question the extent to which the contemporary culture is adaptivefor China and its people.Therefore, in addition to advancing a scientific understanding of the diversity of ways in which individuals and cultures make sense of globalization (Chiu et al., 2011; Gelfand et al., 2011), critical and clinical perspectives are also needed (Marsella, 2012; Prilleltensky, 2012). The mental health implications of rapid social change, the uncertainty surrounding the loss of a grand narrative, the dwindling sense of self-efficacy to keep up with the pace of change, the pressure to manage diverse life-goals, and the experience of alienation or marginalization from globalization are among the research opportunities and challenges that will certainly deepen the psychological understanding of the

complex and ambivalent sociocultural conditions in China and beyond in the age of globalization.

Conclusion

Coming back in full circle to the dragon imagery in the dissertation title, its choice was not accidental. The multi-layered meanings associated with dragons jibe with the conclusion about Chinese culture drawn in this dissertation. To begin with, the dragon symbol does not have a culture-universal connotation. While a dragon in the Western lore is a fire-breathing, maiden-snatching, and gold-hoarding, snarly monster to be slaughtered by fearless warriors, the Chinese counterpart is a symbol of omnipotence and good fortune. The significance of the Chinese dragon as aniconic marker of Chinese identity is seen in the linguistic preference for tracing all people of Chinese descent back to this mythical creature (i.e., "descendants of the dragon") and the cultural activities structured around it (e.g., dragon dancing and dragon boat racing). However, this unifying dragon narrative is perhaps exaggerated. Even dragon depictions in the Chinese classical texts were diverse with metaphorical images (Carr, 1990). Thus, the meanings of the Chinese dragon are in flux themselves and subject to appropriation and change. Whether just a change of hue or a more radical metamorphosis, the changing Chinese dragon drawn out here appears to conform to neither the standard Western nor a pan-Chinese imagination.

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Appendix A

Schwartz's Values Survey used in Study 1a, 1b, 2, 3a, and 3b

Not important Extremely important

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1. A spiritual life (emphasis on spiritual not material matters)
2. A varied life (filled with challenge, novelty, and change)
3. A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)
4. A world at peace (free of war and conflict)
5. Accepting my portion in life (submitting to life's circumstances)
6. Ambitious (hardworking, aspiring)
7. An exciting life (stimulating experiences)
8. Authority (the right to lead or command)
9. Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
10. Capable (competent, effective, efficient)
11. Choosing own goals (selecting own purposes)
12. Clean (neat, tidy)
13. Creativity (uniqueness, imagination)
14. Curious (interested in everything, exploring)
15. Daring (seeking adventure, risk)
16. Privacy (the right to have a private sphere)
17. Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)
18. Enjoying life (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)
19. Equality (equal opportunity for all)
20. Family security (safety for loved ones)
21. Forgiving (willing to pardon others)
22. Freedom (freedom of action and thought)
23. Healthy (not being sick physically or mentally)
24. Helpful (working for the welfare of others)
25. Honest (genuine, sincere)
26. Honoring of parents and elders (showing respect)
27. Humble (modest, self-effacing)

28. Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
29. Influential (having an impact on people and events)
30. Inner harmony (at peace with myself)
31. Intelligent (logical, thinking)
32. Loyal (faithful to my friends, group)
33. Mature love (deep emotional and spiritual intimacy)
34. Meaning in life (a purpose in life)
35. Moderate (avoiding extremes of feeling and action)
36. National security (protection of my nation from enemies)
37. Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)
38. Pleasure (gratification of desires)
39. Politeness (courtesy, good manners)
40. Preserving my public image (protecting my "face")
41. Protecting the environment (preserving nature)
42. Reciprocation of favors (avoidance of indebtedness)
43. Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honored customs)
44. Responsible (dependable, reliable)
45. Self-discipline (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)
46. Self-indulgent (doing pleasant things)
47. Self-respect (belief in one's own worth)
48. Sense of belonging (feeling that others care about me)
49. Social justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak)
50. Social order (stability of society)
51. Social power (control over others, dominance)
52. Social recognition (respect, approval by others)
53. Successful (achieving goals)
54. True friendship (close, supportive friends)
55. Unity with nature (fitting into nature)
56. Wealth (material possessions, money)
57. Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)

Appendix B

Stimulus pictures employed as cultural primes in Study 4a

Traditional Chinese primes








Contemporary Chinese primes



sina 新浪

lenovo 联想

Appendix C

Self-evaluation traits used in Study 4b

Kind	Generous	Sociable	Creative	Capable
Trustworthy	Sympathetic	Cheerful	Polite	Daring
Assertive	Conventional	Humorous	Broad minded	Unique
Contented	Confident	Stubborn	Independent	Lazy
Optimistic	Imaginative	Ambitious	Forgiving	
Selfish	Moody	Obedient	Humble	
Efficient	Shy	Hedonistic	Helpful	